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INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM OF 
RESEARCH, METHODOLOGY AND 
SCOPE OF STUDY 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Man as a member of the human society has some rights in order to 
survive as well as to make his/her life better. Human Rights are concerned with 
the dignity of the individual the level of self-esteem that secures identity and 
promotes human community. Human Rights recognize the inherent dignity and 
Fundamental freedoms of all members of the human family and are the 
foundations for all basic freedoms, justice and peace in the world. Peace and 
progress in a society will be possible only when the state-Government and the 
people are conscious of the need to ensure that everyone enjoys human rights.  
In accordance with the changing global scenario the Government of 
India passed the protection of Human Rights Act 1993 for better protection of 
Human Rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The 
Act provides the constitution of a National Human Rights Commission and a 
commission for each state. National and state Human Rights Commissions are 
basically an investigative and reporting body imbued with the powers of a civil 
court. National Human right commission functions from New Delhi with 
jurisdiction all over India while State Human Right commissions are 
functioning from state capitals with jurisdiction limited to states. All Human 
Rights Commissions has been playing a catalyst role not only in developing 
awareness among people for their Human Rights but also in generating 
administrative concern for Human Rights in contemporary India. It is 
completely dedicated towards protection of human rights. National and State 
human rights commission are also protect four pillars of Human rights i.e. life, 
liberty, equality and dignity. 
The present study is an attempt to study the State Human Rights 
Commission and its problems and prospects.  
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1.2 The Problem: 
 
 The Role of State Human Rights Commission in Administration of 
Human Rights Justice. Naturally, these two matters hold many social 
dimensions. Today, democracy rules the world. The personal of fundamental 
rights has been wholly accepted concepts in each & every part of this world.  
 With related to human rights, the situation is really strange.  e. g. We 
find violation of human rights on many matters. Unfortunately, many people 
don’t know about human rights. Even they don’t know what the human rights 
are and what the importance of human rights are. This is not only for particular 
for a state but it is related to whole country. Even people do not knows, the 
functions of human rights commission in nation. Common nationalist should 
know the basics of human rights. 
 The constitutional Law of India guaranteed, to have preamble presents 
an ideal of 'fraternity' - through personal liberty and protection of fundamental 
rights. But, case of violations of all these rights has been increased. But, cases 
of violation increasing day by day. 
 Human Rights has universal acceptance. But, there are many 
inequalities among people. Frequently, we find many cases those are injurious 
to personal dignity.  
 Here, any self conscious citizen has many questions about State Human 
Rights Commission's activities. Common person should know what SHRC do 
for protect and promotion in state.  
 If NHRC pay attention, then in this country so many questions in which 
Human Rights Justice can be administered.  
 This inspires the present researcher to study in constitution of SHRC.  
Plus, SHRC's work and its contribution towards its administration of Human 
Rights justice are also very useful.  
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1.3 Aims & Objectives of the study: 
 
 The aims and objectives of present research scholar want to arrange 
research activities for SHRC; 
 (i) To examine the concept of Human Rights. 
(ii) To understand the constitution of State Human Rights 
Commission.  
(iii) To understand the administration of State Human Rights 
Commission. 
(iv) To understand the Right to Life and to examine a contribution of 
SHRC in it's protection and promotion.  
(vi) To understand Right of Liberty and to examine SHRC's 
contribution in protection and promotion. 
(v) To understand Right to Equality and examine SHRC's 
contribution in protection and promotion.  
 (vii) To understand Right to Dignity and to examine SHRC's 
contribution in protection and promotion.  
(viii) Statistical report - to examine of SHRC's impact.  
(ix) From SHRC's annual report - conclusion and suggestions.  
 
1.4 Hypothesis: 
 
(i) What are the concept of Human Right?  
(ii) What is the procedure related to appoint qualified SHRC's 
Chairman’s & Member's appointment? 
(iii) What is an administration of SHRC & What is a legal 
infrastructure to dispose complaints inside it? 
(iv) What is Right to Life? And what is contribution of SHRC in 
protection and promotion? 
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(v) What is right to liberty? What are the contributions of SHRC to 
protect it? What is the contribution of SHRC to promote the 
right? 
(vi) What is right to equality? And what is contribution of SHRC in 
protection? What is the contribution of SHRC to promote the 
right? 
(vii) What is Right to Dignity? Can SHRC contribute for protection of 
Right to Dignity? And what are the contributions of SHRC for 
promote the right? 
(viii) What we can conclude from Statistical reports of SHRC impact 
in state? 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study: 
 
 The present research's topic is “An analytical study of the 
Justification of the Human Right Commission at state level for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights with reference to Rajasthan 
and Gujarat states” Researcher want to know the scope includes State Human 
Rights Commission's constitution, power, work, promotion and protection of 
Human rights in state.  
 In India 18 states having Human rights commission for protection and 
promotion of Human rights in respective states. But, present research work will 
be comparison of Rajasthan and Gujarat human right commission’s work and 
jurisdiction, where a provision lies.  
 In addition, state taken action which are not have directly component of 
Human Rights. But it is a form is specific kind of results so; only one or more 
than one Human Rights affects adversely.  
 In the same reference, SHRC's directions, recommendations & orders 
are subjects of present research. Any constitutional or statutory institution may 
approach, procedure related to it and taken steps towards it are also dimension 
& scope of this study. 
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1.6 Research Methodology and collection of data: 
 
 The research study is mainly an analytical and comparative form. But, it 
has also an effect of some historical, political and philosophical thinking.  
 The study mostly depends on secondary level data based points on 
reference books, journals, periodicals, reports, newspapers & magazines 
including NHRC, SHRC’s annual reports. 
 
1.7 Significance of the Study: 
 
1.7.1  At International Level: 
 
Human Right is a human concept. This has not any national, 
Geographical or political borders. Human Rights advent & development both 
are in international form and has the same nature. And this concept's 
construction holds various kinds of beliefs. Those have important contribution. 
In that situation, at international level all aspects should be covered. And 
maximize the concept of human rights and also introduce it, prepare it. In every 
nation's progress has big role in this.  
 In reference to India present research study will be useful to construct 
the International concept of Human Rights, specifically to Indian identity at 
world level. This study will gainful to enflame human right's instruments at 
regional level & international level. This would be direct result of this study.  
 
1.7.2 At National Level: 
  
If there is any dilemma in people's mind about the concept of Human 
Right, that would be removed. In addition, an explanation of concept of human 
right at micro level to society would be available whatever confusion about 
human right is existed in society or people that would be repealed.  
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 Because of this study, people would be more and more familiar with 
own human rights. So, at the time of violation of human rights, people can 
complain in State Human Rights Commission and ask reprisal of protection 
from it.  
 With this, how commission is working & which type of power it has... 
and from both of this, the commission has achieved results can be classified. 
All these information would be available from this study.  
 The State Human Rights Commission's authority is in recommendatory 
form. But up to this time the commission's recommendations towards 
Government, all are accepted by it. From this action, at state level, in interest of 
Human Right Commission's contribution is valuable.  
 
1.7.3 A Contribution in expedition of Knowledge: 
  
This study is useful to them who are engaged in spread of knowledge.  
 This study will be useful to every citizen, educators, teachers, 
researcher, advocates & Judges, Law students including victim, NGOs and 
GOs at state level. This study will also helpful to political leaders and 
sociologist.  
 
1.8 Scheme of the Research: 
 
The present research student has divided his research work as following 
chapters:- 
Chapter - l narrates about scope and work over view of selected topic on        
comparative study of THE STATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION. 
Chapter -  2  covers the concept of Human Rights 
Chapter - 3, 4, 5 and 6 describe about four pillars of Human Rights i.e. life,    
liberty,   equality and dignity. 
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Chapter -7 narrates about International and National Human Rights 
commission. Also this chapter describes the constitution of 
National and State Human Rights Commission. 
Chapter - 8 is a part of analysis of State human rights commission. In this 
chapter researcher has given broad idea about Gujarat & Rajasthan 
State Human Rights Commission. He also tried to give analytical 
comparison of both SHRCs’ activities. 
Chapter - 9  is Conclusion and suggestions. 
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CHAPTER – 2 
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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2.1  Basic vocabulary and core concepts 
 
The human rights community, like any other community, has a certain way of 
speaking. Such speech can at first seem peculiar, or even forbidding, to those not familiar 
with it. As with learning any language, though, it is both possible and pleasant to learn 
the human rights language, provided one has a welcoming introduction to it, and one is 
willing to put in the effort required. The language of human rights is an important one to 
know at this point in our shared history. It is an especially influential language in moral, 
legal and political debate, and like other languages is possessed of its own brand of logic 
and inner beauty. It is, moreover, a language designed to be spoken universally—by each 
and every one of us—and so we all have reason to inquire into its structure and 
significance. It is therefore essential, at the earliest moment, to grasp the basic vocabulary 
and the core concepts employed in the human rights language. 
 
2.1.1 Human 
 
One cannot say "human rights", of course, without saying both "human" and 
"rights." The assumption will be made, for now, that there is no need to define 
exhaustively what a human being is: we are, I suggest, rather well acquainted with such 
creatures. The importance of drawing attention to the "human" component of "human 
rights" is to introduce a core concept: that of a right-holder. A right-holder, very simply, 
is the person who has the right in question. Part of the distinctiveness of the human rights 
idea is the belief that all human beings have, or hold, human rights. While this seems to 
follow rather obviously when one looks at the language, it is actually a bold and 
substantive moral claim, and one which, when first introduced, went against the grain of 
history.  
  
10 
 
For the longest time, a person was considered a right-holder only if possessed of 
certain select characteristics, like being an able-bodied, land-owning adult male. The 
contemporary human rights idea, by contrast, suggests that every human being—man or 
woman, rich or poor, adult or child, healthy or sick, educated or not—holds human rights. 
We are all members of the human community, and so hold any and all of those rights 
referred to as “human rights”. It is astonishing how often even human rights activists 
overlook this fundamental feature, often referred to as the “universality” of the human 
rights idea. Overlooking universality is, of course, the very bread-and-butter of human 
rights violators, such as repressive governments. Officials in such governments often 
claim many things for themselves—rewards and resources, access and influence—which 
they deny to their fellow citizens. They thus fail to grasp, or respectfully, the twin 
commitments to universality and to a form of equality inherent in the human rights idea. 
Particularly vicious human rights violators, like the Nazis, often claim that those whose 
human rights they violate are not even human, and so are not entitled to claim human 
rights. The first step on the road to mass human rights violations is, invariably, to 
denigrate the very humanity of the person(s) targeted. The sad psychology seems always 
the same: denying the humanity of the hated person(s) dislodges both conscience and 
sensitivity, which normally prevent innocent people from being brutalized. Crude 
propaganda is sometimes used to cement such bizarre beliefs about the inhumanity of 
those targeted for persecution. One thinks, for instance, of the Nazi "news-reels" 
depicting Jewish people either as rodent-like vermin at the very bottom of the social 
scale, or else as fat-cat capitalists at the very top1. These are not the most consistent set 
of images, surely, but the crucial point remains that these images, and such beliefs, are at 
odds with the core commitment to a baseline level of equality for all present in the human 
                                                 
1  The connection between hate propaganda and the promotion of  brutalities against a targeted group can also be 
seen, very sadly, in the more recent case of  the Rwandan civil war of 1994. Most estimates place the death toll for 
that near-genocidal strife somewhere between one-half, and one full, million human beings. For more, see G.Pruier, 
the Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. For more on the Holocaust 
perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jews, and other groups, during the Second World War, see M. Gilbert, The 
Holocaust. New York: Henry Holt, 1987. Most estimates of the death toll from the Holocaust coalesce around the 
figure of at least six million.           
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rights idea. This notion—that as human beings we all share a baseline level of equal 
moral worth in some significant respect—is a thoroughly modern concept. It is morally 
moving yet surprisingly difficult to defend; it is inspiring yet constantly subject to critical 
challenge. This is not to suggest that the core commitment to elemental equality has no 
basis other than raw conviction or personal temperament: human rights advocates offer 
reasons to justify this commitment. It is, indeed, crucially important to justify it, 
otherwise the rights violator will ask why he should treat as respected equals those he 
rejects, spurns, and ultimately abuses and brutalizes. What makes us think that we are all 
equally entitled to human rights? What makes us think that, just because we were born 
biologically human, we are entitled to rights, regardless of what further qualities we 
possess? A fuller discussion of this complex topic, which combines issues of rights 
holding with rights justification, must wait for a subsequent chapter. 
 
2.1.2 Rights 
 
We turn now to the "rights" element in "human rights." What is a right to begin 
with? The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) offers a helpful introduction, suggesting a 
three-fold definition of a right: 
1. "That which is morally or socially correct or just; fair treatment." 
2. "A justification or fair claim." 
3. "A thing one may legally or morally claim; the state of being entitled to a privilege or 
immunity or authority to act." 
We do well here in noting, for the time being, how the concepts of morality and 
justice in general, and of fairness in particular, are implied in each one of these OED 
definitions of a right. Central, too, to these OED offerings are references to being entitled 
to something, to being able to claim something as one’s own or as one’s due.  It is 
important to be mindful of a meaningful yet subtle distinction, namely, that between 
"right" and "a right." The difference is that between adjective and noun: "right" is to "a 
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right" what "black" is to "black car". In general, "a right" has a more narrow and concrete 
reference than "right" does. After all, a correct answer to an exam question is right but is 
not, presumably, something students have a right to ask their professor for during exam 
time. To have a right is to have something more specific and meaningful than abstract 
rightness on one's side: it is to have a well-grounded and concrete claim on the actions of 
other people and on the shape of social institutions, in particular governments. Just as we 
would much rather have a black car than mere blackness; we should much prefer to have 
a right over mere rightness.  
There is considerable consensus amongst rights advocates that a right is well-
defined, at least initially, as a justified claim or entitlement. A right is a justified claim 
on someone, or on some institution, for something which one is owed. In general, a right 
is a justified claim on other people, and social institutions, to a certain kind of treatment 
from them. The right- holder, in claiming a right, is asserting that he is entitled to be 
treated in certain ways by other people and by social institutions. The need for justifying 
rights is obvious: we cannot be required to jump up and obey on somebody else's mere 
assertion. A right-holder must offer us sufficient reasons why we should treat him the 
way he wants. What counts as a sufficient reason is one of the most important issues in 
rights theory. It is a topic to which we will return and it demands that we offer plausible 
answers to the following questions: what can we reasonably require of people in social 
and political life? What, if anything, is so valuable that we can oblige, perhaps even 
force, other people and social institutions to provide for us?   
 
2.1.3 Rights are Reasons, not Properties 
 
The fact that a person claiming a right must offer the rest of us sufficient reasons 
why we should respect his claim provides us with insight into the ultimate nature of a 
human right. A human right, like any other right, is not a property of persons; rather, it is 
a reason to treat persons in certain ways. This is a crucial distinction, for on it rests the 
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difference between the dated and discredited theory of natural rights and the more 
compelling and contemporary theory of human rights. 
 If one believes that human rights are properties of persons—an essential part of 
human make-up, as it were—then one is immediately confronted with sharp questions, 
like “Where are they?” If human rights are literally properties of personhood, then one 
should be able to display them for all to see. But, of course, nobody can show us his 
human rights. Human rights are, after all, not material things like cars, houses or oil 
paintings. Nor are human rights more immaterial things like personality traits, or 
psychological dispositions, which in general are also observable, albeit in a different 
way, over time. With enough observation, for instance, one can discern that Jimmy is an 
angry young man; but all the observation in the world will not allow one to see Jimmy’s 
human rights. This must mean that human rights are either non-visible properties of 
persons, or else that they are not properties of persons at all.  
Older natural rights theorists, such as English philosopher John Locke, tried to 
suggest that human, or “natural”, rights are non-visible properties of personhood. These 
older theorists, in other words, relied on a metaphysical conception of human nature to 
ground their claims about natural rights to things like life and liberty. We have rights, 
they said, in the same way that we have a soul. To have human rights simply comes with 
the territory, so to speak: the familiar ground of being a member of the human 
community. The enduring problem with such an approach to natural or human rights is 
that, as with any metaphysical postulate, it is incapable of being proven true. 
Metaphysics literally means “beyond physics”, and it denotes a realm of human 
thought in which physical evidence—observable, demonstrable experience—is either 
completely useless or, at the very least, insufficient to prove one claim over its very 
opposite. The existence of God, for instance, is a perennial issue for metaphysics. The 
fact that this debate endures as one of philosophy’s major disputes is precisely because 
the issue is metaphysical—i.e. necessarily speculative, something e settled by pointing 
to physical evidence. The existence of God can neither be conclusively proved nor 
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finally disproved, and so is destined to remain one of the ultimate intellectual teasers. 
After all, if God’s existence could be proven, then what role would there be for religious 
faith? Faith, after all, is nicely defined as believing in something for which there is 
insufficient evidence. But God’s existence cannot be disproved either: from the fact that 
we lack evidence of God’s existence it does not follow that there is no God. No evidence 
of existence is not the same thing as non-existence: the “New World”, for instance, 
existed even when people in the “Old World” lacked any firm evidence of its existence. 
What these considerations indicate is that the older insistence on viewing human 
rights as non-visible properties of persons is, in fact, a metaphysical proposition which 
cannot be proven. While it cannot be disproved either, relying on it would threaten us, 
right from the start, with stalemate or deadlock when arguing over human rights: a far 
cry indeed from the universal agreement we are striving for. We probably do not want to 
rest our rights on so flimsy a foundation as metaphysical speculation. Flat assertions 
about souls or non- visible properties may make for pretty poetry, or inspiring theology, 
but they fail to persuade those dedicated to sober and compelling thought about hard 
choices in ethics, law and politics. Locke, for instance, may well have asserted that 
knowledge of natural rights is “written on the hearts of men” but the rest of us may be 
forgiven for not being fully satisfied with such a sweeping proclamation. It has great 
rhetorical force but small substantive content.2  
Another problem which older natural rights theorists wrestled with was the issue 
of forfeiture. Many of us want to say that convicted criminals, for example, forfeit—or 
lose, or give up—their human right to liberty for the duration of their imprisonment. 
You do the crime, you do the time. But how can imprisonment be justified if human 
rights are properties of persons, part of the very fabric of their being as people? Some 
natural rights theorists responded by saying the answer is that imprisonment is thus 
unjustified, while such others as Locke said that a felon committing a crime somehow 
                                                 
2  John Locke, “Second Treaties” in his Two Treaties of Civil Government, ed. By P.Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988.Fist published in 1688-89.Chapter-2, Section 8-16.   
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renounces his very humanity and becomes "a noxious Creature, like a Wolf or Lyon."3 
Both responses seem unsatisfactory. There is nothing wrong with sending a convicted 
criminal to prison as punishment and it is palpably untrue that a criminal can no longer 
be considered a human being. The most plausible conclusion to draw here is that we 
should reject the assumption that human rights are properties of persons, woven into the 
very fabric of our being.  
The nail in the coffin of the idea that rights are properties is this: to view rights as 
natural properties is, mistakenly, to mix up a fact (or description) with a value (or 
prescription). Make no mistake about it: human rights are not facts about us; rather, they 
are value commitments we have to treat each other in ways we think we all deserve. 
Human rights do not tell us who or what we are, rather, they tell us how we should treat 
our fellow human beings. Human rights do not describe our nature; rather, they prescribe 
our behavior. Rights, most generally, are reasons to treat persons in certain respectful 
ways. This does not mean that such reasons never refer to facts about the kinds of 
creatures we are, or about how we are motivated to act. But it does mean that such 
reasons are not themselves part of our constitution as human beings. We do well here to 
note Jan Narveson's instructive phrase: "a person's rights are as real as his reasons are 
strong."4 When someone says, “Respect my rights!”, we can always respond, “Why 
should we?” A person’s reasons for others to respect his rights thus become all 
important. So important, I submit, that after peeling away all the layers we witness that, 
at the very heart of human rights, is a set of especially powerful reasons informing us as 
to how we should treat each other and how we should shape our shared social 
institutions. In the final analysis, rights are reasons.5 This only underlines the 
importance of considering what counts as a strong reason, how we are to know whether 
a "justified claim" is, in fact, justified. The forthcoming chapter on the justification of 
human rights will examine several of the most influential views on this vital issue. 
                                                 
3  Locke, “Second”, Section 8-16. 
4  J. Narveson, Moral Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, 22. 
5  I fist made this claim in my war and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective. Waterloo:Wilfrid Laurier   
University Press,2000, 90-190. 
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2.1.4 Trumps 
 
Contemporary rights advocates agree that a right is not merely any old claim, 
justified by a sufficient reason, to a certain kind of treatment; rather, it is an especially 
powerful and weighty claim. The very word "right" clearly connotes something serious 
and compelling, something which should not be denied lightly. Many rights defenders 
agree with Ronald Dworkin's famous declaration that "rights are trumps." Just as, in 
certain card games, a trump card beats all others, a rights claim "beats" such competing 
social values as the growth of the economy, the happiness of the majority, the promotion 
of artistic excellence, and so on. A rights claim is thought to be heavier—a better reason 
for action, something more deserving of our attention and protection—than these other 
social goals. Rights stand at the very foundation of political morality in our era. A 
standard claim about human rights, in this regard, is that respect for them is a necessary 
condition for a government to be considered minimally just and decent on the world 
stage. Respect for human rights is the price of admission for political decency; it is the 
touchstone of legitimacy for those with ambitions to rule. 
 Dworkin's declaration is sometimes taken to be an expression of absolutism 
about rights. Absolutism would be the belief not merely that rights are trumps but, 
moreover, that they are always trumps: that under no conditions can rival social goals 
beat out a rights claim in the competition for our attention, protection and social 
investment. It is important to note that this is not Dworkin's actual position. In fact, 
absolutism is an extreme view of rights which is not often defended nowadays. 
Dworkin's actual position is that rights are trumps only if other things are equal. If other 
things are not equal—if certain exceptional circumstances hold—then rival social goals 
may actually have a greater claim on our attention. Consider a case of serious and 
widespread national emergency, such as war, famine, or epidemic. We might think, for 
instance in a country being swept by the deadly Ebola virus that those afflicted should be 
quarantined and that the antidote, if there is any, should be made available to all who 
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need it. We might think, further, that these things should be done, in such an extreme 
crisis, even if those afflicted are forced into quarantine against their will and even if the 
medical supplies have to be appropriated by force from a company which claims them as 
its property. In truly exceptional cases, such rival social claims as national survival, or 
the avoidance of widespread disaster, may be compelling enough to outweigh rights 
claims, maybe even some human rights claims. But Dworkin correctly emphasizes the 
rarity of such occasions and suggests that, in daily life in a normal society, we still feel 
the force of the claim that rights are trumps. It is reasonable, then, to note that it adds to 
our definition of a right to say that it is a high-priority justified claim to a certain kind, a 
respectful kind, of treatment.6 
 
2.2 Hohfeld's Analysis 
 
More can, and should, be said about the nature of a claim and its connection to 
the essence of a right. For this, we should turn to W.N. Hohfeld. Hohfeld, a former law 
professor, is one of the most cited authorities on rights: it would be a real challenge to 
crack open a contemporary book on rights which does not contain at least one approving 
reference to him. Hohfeld famously claimed, way back in 1919, that we should realize 
that a right may be one of four kinds: a claim; a liberty; a power; or an immunity.7 
The OED informs us that a claim is well-defined as "a demand or request for 
something considered as one's due." A Hohfeldian claim-right is a demand for 
something from some person or institution. It is a claim on somebody for something. A 
claim-right imposes an obligation on other people and/or on social institutions. In the 
language of rights theorists, a claim-right imposes a correlative duty. The duty literally 
co-relates with the right. There is no claim right-holder without a correlative duty-bearer. 
For example, if I claim that this book is copyrighted by me, I am demanding that, among 
                                                 
6  R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. Cambrige, MA: Harvard University Press,1977. 
7  W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conception Applied to Judicial Reasoning. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press,1919. 
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other things, other people may not copy it without my permission and perhaps even 
some royalty payment to me. My copyright is a claim on other people's behaviour, as 
well as upon such social institutions as the legal system. We will return shortly to 
consider Hohfeld's important assertion that, of the four kinds of rights, only claim-rights 
are "rights in the strict sense."8  
A liberty, according to the OED, can be defined as "the right or power to do as 
one pleases." A Hohfeldian liberty-right is quite different from a claim-right: whereas a 
claim- right imposes correlative duties, a liberty-right is, so to speak, duty-free. Liberty-
rights survive and flourish only in an environment where there are no duties. Hohfeld's 
technical definition of a liberty-right runs something like this: Bob has a liberty-right 
with regard to an action only if no one else has a claim on him with regard to that action. 
Only if Bob bears no duties to refrain from the action can he be said to be at liberty to 
perform it, should he choose. If there is no claim to tie him down, Bob is a free man. 
Suppose, for example, that Bob is single and owns his house. Suppose further that, in his 
basement, he wants to install a private, full-length bowling alley. Now, the rest of us 
may find this lacking in taste (and may not be surprised that he is single!) but none of us 
have any claim on Bob that he not go ahead with it. It is, after all, his house; he bears no 
duties to anyone to refrain from refurbishing his basement in this way. He thus enjoys a 
liberty-right to do so.  
Power's definition, in the OED, is "the ability or authority to do or act." Sally 
enjoys a Hohfeldian power-right to perform an action if some other person, such as 
David, can and will—or at least should—be affected by her action. For Sally to enjoy 
the power-right, David must be in some sense liable to her, in the sense that he is subject 
either to her power (i.e. her actual ability to act) or to her authority (i.e. her entitlement 
to act), or perhaps both. For example, holders of public office, whether it be the local 
mayor or the President of the United States, enjoy numerous power-rights. They 
frequently have both the power and the authority to affect our lives in a substantial way: 
                                                 
8  Hohfeld, Fundamental, 15-6. 
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by setting rates of taxation, for instance, or by their decisions about public investment in 
health care and education, or by sending our soldiers off to fight a war. Parents also have 
many power-rights over their children, rights which erode over time as the children grow 
into adulthood. 
 The OED defines immunity, in the relevant sense, as "freedom from an 
obligation." Hohfeld himself would be hard-pressed to improve upon this conception. 
For him, an agent like Jim has an immunity-right from the action of Alison if Alison has 
no power-right over Jim with regard to the action in question. If Alison has neither 
power nor authority over Jim, then Jim is immune from Alison's action. An example of 
an actual immunity-right would be the fact that, in most Western democracies, elected 
members of public legislatures are immune from being sued for anything they say during 
a debate in the legislature. Elected members of legislatures do not have to worry about 
being sued for slander, libel, or fraudulent misrepresentation, for anything they say 
during the course of a legislative debate. The goal of granting our elected officials such 
immunity is to encourage the maximum freedom of expression during legislative 
debates, in the hopes that such will ultimately forward the public good.  
There are at least two different ways of interpreting Hohfeld's important argument 
that, of these four kinds of rights, only claim-rights are rights "in the strict sense." The 
first way is literal: only claim-rights are worthy of the narrow and high-priority status 
synonymous with rights, whereas the other kinds of "rights" are merely pretenders to the 
throne, so to speak. It is only those entitlements which make concrete claims on other 
people, or institutions, that deserve to be called "rights". The problem with this literal 
way of interpreting Hohfeld is that, while it makes for a meaningful distinction between 
claim-rights and liberty-rights, it fails to do so between claim-rights and power-rights, or 
between claim-rights and immunity-rights. For power-rights also make claims on 
others—claims of liability—and immunity-rights claim that others either cannot or may 
not have power over the right-holder with regard to the action at hand. Indeed, even 
liberty-rights seem to make, or contain, a claim of a kind: Bob, in our example, seems 
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most centrally to be claiming that no one interfere with his liberty to install a bowling 
alley in his basement.  
This leads us to the second, preferred way of interpreting Hohfeld: to say that a 
right "in its strict sense" has the nature of a claim is to say that, whatever other elements 
may be present—such as power, liberty, or immunity—the element of a claim must be 
present. A claim that other people, or social institutions, either should do something, or 
should refrain from doing something, is a necessary condition for a rights-claim. A claim 
is at the core of a right. Consider Peter Jones' compelling idea that, in any familiar kind 
of right, there is typically found a cluster of Hohfeldian rights: 
 “(I)f I have a property right in a car, that right is likely to consist of a 
complicated cluster of Hohfeldian rights. Typically these would include the claim-right 
that others should refrain from damaging my car or using it without my permission, my 
liberty-right as owner of the car to use the car, the power to sell the car or to permit 
others to use it, and my immunity from any power of others to dispose of the car without 
my consent. In other words, a single assertion of right might, on inspection, turn out to 
be a cluster of different types of right.”9 
  To this notion, I suggest, we add the further proposition that it is the claim-right 
within the complex cluster which is necessary; it is what genuinely causes the assertion 
to strike with the force of a right. It is the concrete claim on our personal behaviour, and 
on the structure of our shared social institutions, which gets our attention and demands 
our respect.  
 
2.3 Claim, Right, Entitlement 
 
A cautionary note about claiming is in order. The impression should not be 
gained that, for the rest of us to respect Brenda's rights, she actually has to claim her 
rights in the strict sense of verbalizing these claims, constantly letting us know what her 
                                                 
9  P. Jones, Rights. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994, 12-24. 
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rights are, with what she's got coming to her. The sense of claim here is not the very 
narrow one of uttering a claim. The sense, rather, is that of being entitled to utter such a 
claim, and to expect that it be fulfilled. We see this clearly when we consider as an 
example Brenda's being unable to speak, for instance because she is asleep. Her inability 
to speak, at that point, does not mean that Brenda lacks rights. She still has claims on 
others even when she is not shouting them at the top of her lungs, or filing a lawsuit in 
court. Indeed, it seems that verbal claims are necessary only when things have gone 
wrong and when the duty-bearer needs to be explicitly reminded of his duty, or punished 
for having violated it. It is perhaps most appropriate, then, to view a right as the 
combination, or fusion, of both a claim and an entitlement. (It is interesting to note that 
the OED underlines this very tight conceptual connection by defining an entitlement as 
"a just claim, a right.") A right is an entitlement which endures even when the right-
holder is not actually making a verbal claim and yet, most crucially, a right remains a 
justified claim, or demand, on the behaviour of others and the shape of social 
institutions. In other words, a right is a justified claim which remains justified even in 
the absence of verbal assertions: the reasons, even if unstated, still exist for the duty-
bearer(s) to treat the right-holder in the appropriate way. These observations only 
underline the key insight that, in the final analysis, rights are reasons. Rights are 
enduring grounds for treating the right-holder in a respectful way. 
 
2.3.1 Moral vs. Legal Rights 
 
So a right is a high-priority entitlement, justified by sufficient reasons, to 
something one claims as one's due. But it is important to note that rights, thus defined, 
can be of two kinds: moral or legal. It is crucial to make this distinction, since far too 
often the two are run together. Legal rights are those rights, as just defined, which: 1) are 
actually written into legal codes, such as the U.S. Bill of Rights, or the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms; and 2) when violated have concrete legal remedies, notably 
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lawsuits seeking restitution. An example would be the legal right, codified in the 
American Bill of Rights, not to be put on trial twice for a serious crime such as murder, 
provided one has already been found innocent of the same charge in a previous trial. 
This is the legal right of American citizens not to be put in "double jeopardy." 
 Moral rights need not be written into actual legal codes: maybe they are, maybe 
not. Moral rights exist either as rights within social moralities or as rights within what 
we might call a critical, or justified, morality. A social morality is a widely believed and 
practised code of conduct in a given society. For instance, in most cultures it seems to be 
a widely recognized moral right not to be lied to: we believe we are entitled to be told 
the truth and we condemn, criticize and shun those who lie to us. Though there are some 
cases when we excuse lying, in general nobody praises a liar, and no one enjoys being 
lied to. Being told the truth is something we feel is a reasonable claim on the behaviour 
of other people and on social institutions, especially our governments. A critical or 
justified morality, by contrast, is a complex and well-defined theoretical system of 
morals: it need not be widely believed and practised. It is more systematic and logically 
coherent than social moral codes and, at times, criticizes such social codes on grounds of 
inconsistency, incompleteness or hypocrisy. A prominent example here would be 
utilitarianism, an elaborate ethical code designed to maximize the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number of people. Perhaps another example would be human rights theory 
itself, as developed by professional theorists who devote their careers to understanding 
human rights and to extending their development. 
 It is important to note that there may be some overlap between legal rights and 
moral rights: moral rights, in either sense—but especially the first, social code sense—
often find expression in particular legal codes which provide concrete remedies for their 
violation. For instance, the moral right not to be lied to is at least partially codified in 
most Western democracies in the form of the law of perjury: lying to a court, while 
under oath during a proceeding, is a crime for which there is legal punishment. Another 
relevant observation here is this: the fact that the U.S. Constitution has remained 
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comparatively stable over more than 200 years may well be because the rights which it 
includes and protects are rights which Americans largely endorse as part of their actual 
social morality. Widespread agreement between moral rights and legal rights will lead to 
relatively stable legal systems, as well as to reinforced social moral codes. 
 The degree of overlap between legal and moral rights does not diminish the 
differences between them. Two differences, in particular, must be noted. The first is that 
moral rights need not have legal codification for their existence and claim on our 
attention, nor effective legal remedies for their violation. There is no such thing as a 
legal right for which there is no law; but moral rights, in either sense, can exist and be 
real for people regardless of whether they are recognized in law. Indeed, changes in laws 
over time are frequently brought about because there has been a change in the social 
morality of the people, a change that is often first seen in the theoretical works of the 
professionals developing critical moralities. An example of a moral right not codified 
into law might be, say, the right in most Western cultures not to be betrayed sexually by 
one's partner, unless in the context of an "open marriage." You cannot throw your 
cheating partner into jail—it is not a legal right—but I suggest that most of us believe 
sexual fidelity from one's partner is a moral right, a reasonable claim on the behaviour of 
the partner, unless both have come to an explicit alternative arrangement. The social 
stigma surrounding adultery counts as some evidence in favour of this claim. 
 The second key difference between legal and moral rights is that legal rights 
need not be rights which are morally justifiable, either to the social morality of the 
particular culture or, perhaps more frequently, to plausible critical moralities. Many of 
us, for example, would say that the legal rights granted to slave-owners over their slaves 
in the American South before the Civil War were legal, but not moral. The same holds 
true for the legal rights granted to whites, in preference over blacks, during apartheid-era 
South Africa. It is interesting and important to note that, sometimes, the rights held in 
social moralities may themselves be subjected to moral criticism from critical moralities. 
As a critical moralist would say: just because it is widely believed or done does not 
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make it right. Sometimes even society-wide beliefs and actions need critical correction 
from a gifted expert or inspired leader. Such figures, when successful, are often referred 
to as “moral reformers” in the history books. 
 The question arises: are human rights moral or legal? This is a surprisingly 
difficult question to answer fully. The short answer is both. Many human rights have, in 
a number of countries, been written into legal codes, and they can enjoy effective legal 
protection. For example, one of the most codified rights in the various constitutions of 
the Western liberal democracies is to "life, liberty and security of the person." Claims to 
personal security and personal liberty are some of the most plausible human rights 
claims there are. But all too often, human rights are either not written into the laws at all, 
or are written into laws but not actually protected on the ground. History is relevant 
here: human rights came into being first and foremost as rights developed by 
philosophers and theologians in critical or justified moralities. They were then 
incorporated into social moralities, for instance through the pro- rights revolutions in 
America and France in the late 1700s. Since the end of the Second World War in 1945—
and spurred especially by reaction to the horrors of the Holocaust—social commitment 
to the idea of human rights has both widened and deepened to the point where it is now 
one of the most influential moral and political concepts of our time. So, human rights are 
sometimes, in some places, legal but they began and continue in many places to exist 
only as moral rights. The contemporary human rights movement has, as probably its 
main goal, the effective translation of the moral values inherent in human rights theory 
into meaningful and concrete legal rights. Making human rights "real", in this sense of 
translating fine thoughts and warm feelings into guaranteed legal protections, is what 
animates many human rights activists today.  
A word about international law is appropriate at this point. In addition to being 
written in to the national constitutions of various countries, human rights have been 
written into the body of international law. International law refers to various rules agreed 
to by different countries in order to regulate their interactions. Governments come 
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together to sign international treaties endorsing these rules and regulations. They then 
each return to their own countries and pass these treaties into law within their own 
borders. This procedure is referred to as “ratifying” the treaty, and in most countries this 
is done through the various constitutional means for turning a bill into a law. It may 
surprise some readers to know that there exists something called the International Bill of 
Rights, composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Most countries—almost all, 
in fact—have by now ratified this International Bill. In theory, this means that such 
countries have committed themselves to making human rights real within their borders. 
The trouble, though, with calling human rights "legal" in this sense of being codified 
into international law is that the enforcement mechanisms of international law are very 
weak, at least in comparison with those of national law. If one lives in a well- run 
country, one can have considerable confidence in the law being effectively enforced by 
the police and the courts. But if one’s distant relative lives in a country that is not well-
run, then not only is the relative worse off, there is also little that one can do to ensure 
that the relative will be treated well by his own government. There just is not the same 
network of effective social institutions connecting countries together as there is 
connecting people together within the borders of a well-run country. As a result, it is 
sometimes said that "International Law" does not even deserve to be called "law" in its 
proper sense, since it is so much more difficult to bring outlaw governments to justice 
internationally than it is to bring criminals to justice domestically. There are, in practice, 
precious few international guarantees for the human rights of persons living in countries 
which refuse to make human rights real within their borders, even if those countries have 
signed all the international human rights treaties currently on offer. It thus seems 
justified to suggest that human rights exist first and foremost as rights in critical and 
social moralities, rights which many people hope to translate into effective legal rights 
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throughout the world's many nations through a process of long-term political struggle, 
educational engagement and institutional reform. 
 
2.3.2 General vs. Special Rights 
 
General rights are those rights which make claims on all other people and all 
relevant social institutions. For example, human rights are general moral rights, held 
against all. No one has the right to violate, or perhaps even to ignore, the legitimate 
human rights claims of others. Special rights, by contrast, are rights which make claims 
only against particular persons or institutions, and usually only at particular times and 
under certain circumstances. A kind of special legal right would be, for example, the set 
of rights that a landlord in a particular country or state has against his tenants regarding 
the terms of the lease, and vice-versa. Such precisely defined entitlements are not 
claimable against all humanity; their scope is specially onfined to the particular 
relationship in question. 
 
2.3.3 Rights vs. Their Objects 
 
It is crucial not to confuse a right, whether it is general or special, with its object. 
A right's object is sometimes also called the right's substance. The difference, once 
grasped, should never be lost sight of: a right is a justified claim to something, whereas 
the object of the right is that very something being claimed. Consider a property right, 
say, in a house. The right is the justified claim, or entitlement, to the house, whereas the 
house itself is the object of that claim. To use a metaphor, a right is like an airplane 
ticket: it is one’s claim, or entitlement, to get on the plane when the flight is ready to go. 
But it is the flight itself which is one’s main want, or object.  
This distinction is crucially important for all talk of making rights, especially 
human rights, real. To make a right real, it is not enough to get the right written into a 
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legal code, nor even to get the majority of people in a culture to endorse it in their social 
morality. To make a right real is to bring it about that the right-holder actually possesses 
the object of his right-claim. Think of the airplane ticket metaphor: one does not really 
care about the ticket itself—the small scrap of paper—except insofar as it allows one to 
get on board the flight, which is what one really wants and why one bought the ticket in 
the first place. Likewise, one does not care so much about the mere entitlement to one’s 
house or car, to one’s raw right to vote in elections, or to enjoy personal security. What 
one really cares about is actually having a house, a car, a vote, reliable security, and so 
forth. Rights are always rights to something, and it is the something which we most 
want. This does not mean that rights themselves are valueless: try getting on board an 
airline flight without a ticket. Rights have, historically, proved rather useful in helping 
us get our hands on the things we want to claim as our due. First came the claim, and the 
object followed.  
The point here is that the value of rights rests mainly in the way they facilitate 
and help secure our possession and enjoyment of the objects we claim from society as 
those things which we are owed. What exactly are the objects of human rights? This is a 
controversial question, one for which no two rights theorists will offer the same answer. 
We will examine this question intensively in a subsequent chapter. It has already been 
suggested that, most generally, rights are justified, high-priority claims to a certain kind 
of treatment. Human rights, in particular, are justified, high-priority claims to that 
minimal level of decent and respectful treatment which we believe is owed to a human 
being. But what exactly is meant by "decent and respectful treatment"? How do we 
measure it? How do we know when we have received it? How do we know, conversely, 
when our claim to such treatment has been ignored or violated? It seems fair to say that 
we tend to measure and rate the caliber of treatment we receive from society by the 
degree to which we are secure in our possession of the following items: freedoms and 
opportunities; protections from serious threats; elemental regard and recognition from 
others; and also concrete objects, such as cars and houses.  
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We know we are being treated decently when we actually possess, or otherwise 
enjoy, secure access to these important objects. It should, of course, be noted that these 
objects are not just “objects” in the familiar sense of the term. We can, and do, have just 
and high-priority general claims to things other than concrete objects: just because an 
object is abstractly-defined, it does not make it less vital to the minimal level of 
respectful treatment we are demanding when we demand that our human rights be 
satisfied. Indeed, we might judge that such abstractly- defined objects as security, liberty 
and recognition are just as important—perhaps even more fundamentally important—
than the more concrete objects of our rights claims. It is, furthermore, quite plausible to 
suggest that our claims to concrete objects are justified precisely by the fact that they are 
connected to the satisfaction of our claims to the more abstractly-defined objects. For 
example, many people have argued that owning private property is a justified right 
insofar as it is implied by the prior, more abstract, right to human freedom. One gets to 
claim the concrete object as a way of making real one’s prior claim to the abstract 
object, which contains the overriding general value and reason for action.  
Perhaps the most encompassing description for the objects of our rights claims is 
that they are important benefits: concrete goods, freedoms, protections, respectful 
treatment are all beneficial and all things we place great value on. Indeed, they must be: 
otherwise, why would we bother to claim them as objects of our rights? We deeply want 
things that benefit us importantly, be they material goods, security from violence, or the 
freedom to make our own choices in life. Which mixture of these important benefits 
provides us with the minimum level of decent treatment which every human being can 
rightfully demand? That is a topic whose answer must await fuller development in a 
future chapter. 
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2.3.4 Civil and Political Rights vs. Social and Economic Rights 
 
We saw that, in the International Bill of Rights, there are two International 
Covenants: one on civil and political rights, the other on economic, social and cultural 
rights. This split has become controversial in recent times. The notion behind the split is 
that there are two kinds of human rights, distinguished by the unique set of objects to 
which each lays claim. Civil and political rights claim various freedoms and legal 
protections: freedom of personal conscience and expression; freedom of movement and 
association; freedom to vote and run for public office; reliable legal protection against 
violence; and the various due process rights, like the right to be considered innocent 
before proven guilty of a crime and the right to a public trial before an impartial jury. 
Civil and political rights are sometimes called "first generation" human rights, because 
they were the first claimed by human rights activists. Such rights are the classical, 
traditional, canonical human rights recognized in the history of political struggle in the 
West. Economic, social and cultural rights, by contrast, claim concrete material goods 
and various social benefits, such as: a subsistence level of income; basic levels of 
education and health care; clean water and air; and equal opportunity at work.  
These rights are sometimes labeled "second-generation" human rights, for 
obvious reasons: after the first generation had been secured and the Industrial 
Revolution brought about sweeping social change, different objects started to be claimed 
by social activists as a matter of human right. There has even been talk, very recently, of 
a “third generation” of human rights—the latest set of claims, focusing on recognition 
and equality—but consideration of it is best reserved for later, since the aim in this 
section is to introduce the storied clash, or so-called clash, between first- and second-
generation rights. 
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Contemporary human rights defenders, led in this matter by Henry Shue and 
James Nickel,10 tend to deny that this supposed split, between first- and second-
generation human rights, constitutes a split in kind. Most want to say that there is but 
one correct list of human rights, and it contains objects from both of these supposedly 
separate "kinds" or lists. Hence their use of the "generations" metaphor: the one set of 
claims is not utterly different from the other, it merely came later and seeks to complete 
the same task. More pointedly, the subsequent rights originated from, and remain 
sustained by, the same family of concepts and core values that are implied by those in 
the first generation. This inclusive contemporary view, however, remains hotly contested 
in some circles: there are still a number of theorists who insist that only civil and 
political rights are really human rights, whereas socio-economic "rights" are merely 
desirable goals dressed up in the more powerful rhetoric of rights.  
Such skeptics, like Maurice Cranston, argue that if the objects of socio-economic 
rights were provided to everyone, that would impose outrageous costs on society.11 
Civil and political rights, by contrast, supposedly entail duties which are both affordable 
and readily assumed. It is not too much to ask for the standard civil and political 
freedoms, as well as for a well- functioning legal system. But it would cost society far 
too much, and prove far too burdensome, to provide everyone with drinkable water, 
basic education and health care, and a subsistence level of income—and that is assuming 
we could even arrive at an agreement on what defines such a level. The response from 
defenders of socio-economic rights points out that defenders of civil and political rights 
also staunchly defend the right to own private property, a right with socio-economic 
consequences if ever there was one. Furthermore, they suggest that civil and political 
rights also impose costly burdens: no one can suggest that running the legal system, for 
example, comes cheap. Yes, realizing human rights costs money, and absorbs real time 
                                                 
10  H.Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreingn Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
2nd  ed.,1996; J.Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 
11  M.Cranston, What are Human Rights? New York: Basic Books,1973. 
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and resources, but this is a price worth paying, owing to the great importance of 
providing everyone with the objects they need to be treated decently as human beings. 
 
 2.3.5 Negative vs. Positive Rights 
 
This distinction has probably the highest profile, and is also the one that always 
generates the most discussion and debate. A negative right can be defined as one which 
imposes a correlative duty which calls only for inaction on the part of the duty-bearer, be 
it a person or institution. The duty-bearer can fulfill his duty merely by refraining from 
acting. For example, it is sometimes said that all a duty-bearer has to do, to fulfill his 
duty correlative to the right of free speech, is not to interfere with the speech of others. 
One fulfills one’s duty by doing nothing. (This does not imply, of course, that one must 
sit there and listen to the speech; it means merely that one fulfills one’s duty by 
refraining from attempts to suppress the speech in question.) A positive right, by 
contrast, can be defined as one which imposes a correlative duty which does call for 
action on the part of the duty-bearer. The duty-bearer must do something to fulfill his 
duty in this regard. For instance, if the right is to a subsistence level of income, then 
social institutions have to provide that income to those who do not have it. They can do 
this through such means as social welfare transfers. 
 Many thinkers in the past, such as Cranston, were tempted to claim that negative 
rights line up with civil and political rights, whereas positive rights line up with social 
and economic rights: the former kind only demand forbearance and non-interference on 
the part of duty-bearers whereas the latter kind demand action, provision, assistance and 
aid on the part of duty-bearers. These thinkers concluded that, since it is both reasonable 
and affordable to require non-interference, and both unreasonable and costly to demand 
provision and aid, civil and political rights are the only genuine human rights in 
existence. Strictly speaking, this strict equation does not seem sustainable. For example, 
the construction and maintenance of an effective legal system clearly requires that a 
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series of actions be taken, and yet a well- functioning legal system is something very 
near and dear to the defenders of civil and political rights. So here is a case of civil and 
political right imposing correlative duties which are positive in nature. Thus, the older 
equation breaks down.  
Not all rights theorists agree with the definition of negative and positive offered 
above. We will consider their objections in a subsequent chapter. The point which the 
present distinction between negative and positive underlines, regardless of whether or 
not it is ultimately sustainable, is this: what duties can we reasonably require of people 
and institutions? What does respect for human rights really cost—and is it a price we are 
willing to pay? These issues are fundamental to the human rights debate: who, or what, 
should bear the duties correlative to human rights? Which exact duties are these? Where 
should we locate the line between a duty which is reasonable and fair, and one which is 
excessive and destructively burdensome? Indeed, what objects of human rights claims 
are so vital that it makes sense to say that we can require that they be made available to 
everyone, perhaps on penalty of being subjected to force? 
 
 
2.4 Rights Violation 
 
Much of our concern with respecting human rights is to avoid violating them. In 
general, a human right is violated when a duty-bearer fails to perform his correlative 
duty without just cause. Since human rights are designed to provide elemental 
protections and benefits, it follows that just causes for ignoring them, or for putting 
correlative duties to the side, are few and far between—and must be of exceptional and 
overriding importance. One is reminded here of our earlier discussion of rights as 
trumps. Human rights are not absolute: there are very rare personal and social 
emergencies when the duties correlative to human rights may, with sufficient reason, be 
put aside. Certain cases of self-defence, or war, come to mind. In the ordinary course of 
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life, however, human rights outweigh all rival claims and inclinations. So for a person to 
take away an object of one’s human rights—be it security or liberty—is for that person 
to violate one’s human rights. Such a person may be resisted, and subsequently 
subjected to proper punishment. For a social institution to fail to provide the protections 
or benefits in question would be for it to violate human rights. It is important to consider 
whether such failure is intentional and deliberate or not. Intentional failure is the clearest 
form of violation, and calls for the reform of a morally decrepit and wicked social 
structure. Non-intentional failure, while still a violation, calls for institutional reform of 
a different kind. In this non-intentional case, the institution usually lacks the 
wherewithal to do its part in making human rights real. It may therefore require 
assistance, or restructuring, or an injection of resources. But it does not deserve to be 
under the same dark cloud of disapproval as institutions of the first sort. Institutions 
which intentionally violate human rights are wicked, and have neither legitimacy nor 
grounds for complaint against those who resist them. Institutions which unintentionally 
violate human rights are merely disadvantaged, albeit seriously so. These regimes may 
yet earn their legitimacy by locating and prioritising the resources they need to become 
rights-respecting. Such disadvantaged regimes may call, in the first instance, for 
assistance rather than resistance. 
 
2.5 Over-all Initial Definition of a Human Right 
 
A Human Right, then, is a general moral right that every human being has. 
Sometimes it finds legal expression and protection, sometimes not. This legal variability 
does not undermine the existence and firmness of the moral right, and actually provides 
focus for contemporary human rights activism, where the goal is often to translate the 
pre-existing moral claim into an effective legal entitlement.  
A Human Right is a high-priority claim, or authoritative entitlement, justified by 
sufficient reasons, to a set of objects which are owed to each human person as a matter 
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of minimally decent treatment. Such objects include vitally needed material goods, 
personal freedoms, and secure protections. In general, the objects of human rights are 
those fundamental benefits which every human being can reasonably claim from other 
people, and from social institutions, as a matter of justice. Failing to provide such 
benefits, or acting to take away such benefits, counts as rights violation. The violation of 
human rights is a vicious and ugly phenomenon indeed; and is something we have 
overriding reasons to resist and, ultimately, to remedy. 
 
2.6 Generation of Human Rights  
  
Louis B. Sohn has classified human rights in the following three categories.12 
1) The Human Rights of First Generation; 
2) The Human Rights of Second Generation; and 
3) The Human Rights of Third Generation. 
 
 2.6.1 The Human Rights of First Generation 
 
 The human rights of first generation are civil and political rights of the individuals. 
The various civil and political rights are conferred through different Constitutions and 
also by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. However these 
rights are not new rights. They have been recognised since very long periods. These 
rights have developed from the time of Greek city states and over the period have found 
expression in different national charters. They have been concretized in the form of 
Magna Carta of 1215; The American Declaration of Independence, 1776, and the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
                                                 
12 Louis B. Sohn, “The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather than States”, 32 Am.U.L.Rev.1 (1982), Cited by Dr .U. 
Chandra, supra n.16, p.20. 
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The right to life, liberty, security, free speech, assembly and worship etc are some of the 
civil rights. Right to free elections and representative institutions are examples of 
political rights which provide legitimation, integration and participation by linking the 
ruler to the consent of the ruled. These rights are human rights arising out of the conflict 
between people and governmental tyranny. For this reason, the main source of the civil 
and political rights is considered to be the American and French Revolutions. These 
rights came as formal assurance against the oppression and arbitrary governmental 
tyranny. Moses Moskowitz calls the human freedom and liberty as “the fruits of struggle 
against the authority of state”.13  
        The  human rights of first generation reflect long established human values and as 
such are incorporated not only in almost every Constitution of various States but also in 
the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; in the  European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, 1950, and in  American and 
African instruments of  1969 and 1981, respectively. 
      As the civil and political rights are incorporated in different national, regional and 
international instruments, they represent an overwhelming consensus of international 
community and further have given rise to rules of international customary law of general 
application. Louis Sohn has suggested that “the consensus on virtually all provisions of 
the covenant on civil and political rights is so widespread that they can be considered as 
part of the law of mankind, a jus cojens for all. 14 
 
  2.6.2 The Human Rights of Second Generation 
 
 These rights are the economic, social and cultural rights. Rights to education, 
health, freedom from want, fear or terror are examples of economic and social rights.  
                                                 
13  Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order, (New York: Oceana Publications Inco., 1958), 
p.159.  
14  Ibid. 
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These rights require that the Government should act to secure these to the people.  
Freedoms of thought, of communication, and of cultural and aesthetic experience are 
examples of cultural rights. These rights are claimed in response to threat of mass 
manipulation. 
       These rights are incorporated in the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1966. The main source for the origin of these rights is considered to be 
the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The Russian 
Revolution is significant in recognising economic rights. The Paris Peace Conference is 
more significant for the establishment of the International Labour Organisation. The 
International Labour Organisation has laid emphasis on the concept of social justice by 
proclaiming that “peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice”;  and 
that “the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the 
way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries”.15 
 The real credit for giving expression to economic and social rights goes to the 
American President Roosevelt. He, for the first time expressed his hope for an 
instrument dealing with the economic and social rights. In his message to the Congress 
of January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt referred to the four essential freedoms viz., 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own 
way, freedom from want and freedom from fear to which he looked forward as the 
foundation of a future world.16  “Freedom from want” formed the basis on which the 
concepts of economic and social rights were formulated. President Roosevelt in his 
another message to Congress in 1944 made the concept of “freedom from want” clear.  
He contemplated that “true individual freedom can not exist without economic security 
and independence” and that “people who are hungry and out of job are the stuff of which 
dictatorships are made”, thus economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. He 
was of the view that economic problems in the present day world have acquired 
                                                 
15  Fenwick, Charles G., International Law, 3rd ed., Indian Reprint, 1971, n.67, p.152.  
16  See (1941), 35 A.J.I.L., p.662, cited in Dr. U. Chandra, supra n.16, p.21.  
  
37 
 
alarming magnitude, therefore, he advocated for drastic economic and social reforms. In 
his opinion, “true individual freedom can not exist without economic security and 
independence”.17 These pronouncements had exercised their full impact upon the United 
Nations when it began to address itself to the human rights issue.18 
 
 2.6.3 The Human Rights of Third Generation 
       
 These are collective rights. According to Louis B. Sohn, individuals are also 
members of communities- family, religious communities, social or professional 
communities or racial communities (groups) or political community, the state. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that international law not only recognises inalienable rights of 
individuals, but also recognises certain collective rights exercised jointly by individuals 
who are grouped into larger communities including people and nations.19 The right to 
self-determination, right to development, right to peace and right to solidarity are 
examples of third generation human rights. 
       According to Karel Vesak, the third generation of human right refer to the fraternity 
or brotherhood. This category of rights is based on the sense of solidarity, which is 
essential for the realisation of the major concern of the international community such as 
peace, development and environment.20 
        The human rights of third generation infuse the human dimension into areas where 
it has all too often been missing having been left to the state or states and these rights 
can be realised only “through the concerted efforts of all the actors on the social scene; 
                                                 
17  Eleventh Annual Message to Congress, Jan, 11, 1944, 2881, cited by Dr.U. Chandra, supra n.16, p.21.  
18  Dr.U. Chandra, supra n.16, p.21 
19 Thomas Buergenthal and Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the 
Americas, Cases and Materials, 1995, p.11, cited in Dr.U. Chandra, Ibid., 21.  
20  Lecture by Karel Vessak, “Tenth Study Session of the International Institute of Human 
Rights,” (July, 1979), cited by Thomas Bergenthal and Dinah Shelton, ibid., p.15.  
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the individual, the state, the public and private bodies and the international community.21 
These are the rights which belong to people as group; they emphasise that human needs 
are best fulfilled within a collectivity. 
 
2.7 The Indian Perspective on Human Rights 
 
The vast literature that has grown in the West around the concept of 
rights is in itself an indication that the concept bad to be defended and 
philosophically justified. In the long h i s to ry  of the Indian civilization, the 
freedom of thought and speech the freedom of one's life in the light of one's 
beliefs, the freedom of association, the freedom of public debate between the 
contending philosophical schools were taken to the  natural foundations of human 
relationships. it was always taken for granted, and consequently there is hardly 
any literature on the idea of rights. When t h e  word 'Adhikar’ was used to 
convey a similar sense, it always h a d  a much deeper meaning. However, the 
freedom of the individual in the western societies was secured alter a long and 
bitter struggle against the Church and the State; in India, those freedoms were 
seen as the very substance of human existence, therefore, in view of the fact 
that the West possesses rich literature to its defense and t h e  same is absent in 
India, it would be wrong to conclude that t h e  idea of freedom is chiefly a 
Western one.22 
The foundations of human rights may be established in two different 
frameworks of perceiving man and the world; one is that of t he  modern Western 
political thought and the philosophy o f  law and the other of 'Dharma’ and its 
method that characterizes the journey of Indian civilization. Keeping this in 
view, the Western, philosophy had its own way of perceiving man, society and 
                                                 
21  Ibid. 
22  Human rights Manual Department of foreign Affairs and Trade ,Australian Govt. Publication Service, Canberra, 
1993, p.119    
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their relationship from which it deduced the foundation of human rights, but nevertheless, 
the Indian philosophy characterizes the foundation in the ancient conception of Dharma 
and Danda which regulated the governance of State and its citizens. The concept of 
Sanatan Dharma which laid down these foundations in ancient civilization is 2,000 years 
older than Western Christianity with a central theocratic doctrine. It laid down the 
foundation of a sane society in ancient Indian civilization encompassing a moral code, 
righteousness and responsibilities. It was certainly wider and broader than the concept of 
religion, a, used in the Western historiography.  
It was on the basis of those existing principles that detailed rules were laid down 
for the guidance of the king. It was his duty to uphold the law and he was as much subject 
to law as any other person (equality before law and, equal protection of law can be 
deduced from that practice). One of his chief duties was administration of justice 
according to the laws of religious texts, local customs and usages and written cotes. It 
was obligatory for him to enforce not only the sacred laws of the existing tests but; also 
the customary laws (rights and clams) of the subject This was possibly the human rights 
enforcement situation in its embryonic stage. The guiding  principles laid down for the 
kings were, however, taken mainly from the species of dharmic texts like the Vedas and 
the Vedanta under the genus Sanatan Dharma which enshrines "Truth is one" and "God 
resides in every human being". Besides Vedas, Upanishads, Mahabharata and Bnagavat 
Gita also furnished philosophic foundations for subsequent social developments, thereby 
enriching the doctrine of human rights. Upanishads, emphasizing the individual self and 
its truth say that "there is nothing higher than the person  Mahabharata also emphasizes 
the point that "without ethical and moral principles, there is no true happiness and a 
society cannot hold together; the principles such as truth, self-control, asceticism, 
generosity, nonviolence, constancy in virtue should serve as the means of one's success". 
Bhagavat gita being a part of Mahabharata preaches us to meet the obligations and 
duties of life, always keeping in view the spiritual background of human existence which 
is the manifestation of an ultimate and the infinite. It is evident that the subsequent 
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scriptures emphasizing on the individual, and the guiding principles of his success, from 
the base from which the essence of the modern conception of human rights can be 
deduced. 
However, even at the individual level, there were some significant contributions 
by the religious prophets with regard to the basis of human rights, Mahavir, the founder 
of Jainism said that the foundation of human freedom in its deepest sense, is truth known 
as Adhersed, wich demonstrates the idea of the relative pluralism and many sides of truth. 
This attitude towards truth gives a profound implication for various aspects of human life 
personal and social. During Chandra gupta Maurya’s regime kautilya in his Arthashastra, 
which depicted the political, social and economics codes of conduct, laid down certain 
principles of the law of punishment as the foundation of social existence. These 
principles then became the basis of the law against, inter alia, illegal arrests and 
detention, custodial death, ill treatment of woman such as rape, inequality of gender, 
corrupt judicial system, etc. The legendary king Ashok in the post Kalinga regime had 
shown the seeds of a humanitarian society, which, in its operational concept was not 
sharply asymmetrical from Western version of a welfare state; the law of piety being its 
lei motif Asoka’s policy of tolerance bears a close resemblance to the concept of civil 
liberties. He desired that all animate beings should have security self control, peace of 
mind and joyousness; inhuman treatment or torture of prisoners was prohibited in 
Ashoka’s administration. 
Thus, the influence of ancient Indian Dharma with its universalistic and 
humanistic strains, the contribution of Hindu scriptures and noted scholars and kings, 
tends to underscore the historical reality that the concept of rights is neither gift from the 
West nor typical Western monopoly of wisdom; its origins are as much rooted in ancient 
Hindu civilization. This may explain its contemporary universal appeal which, of course 
has been facilitated in the era of the global domination of the West since the colonial era. 
What is being contested within this historical narration is the appropriation of the idea of 
human rights as an essentially Western contribution to human civilization, as is often 
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implicit in the Western discourse on this subject. This tends to underrate its truly 
universal heritage, and the possible contributions of other civilizations like that of India, 
described here, as the contemporary universal appeal of human rights. 
However, one cannot possibly ignore the violation of human rights in ancient 
India which mainly stems from the; then social "stratification. Social life was largely 
stratified into the four major divisions: the Brahmins (priestly class); the Kshatriyas 
(rulers and warriors class); the Baisyas (trading class); and the Sudras (labourer and 
unskilled workers other then agriculturists,). The rights and duties of the aforesaid classes 
were determined according to their assigned duty. According to Raimundo Panikar, the 
Indian framework of right: was' essentially derived from Swadharma, i.e., the Dharma 
inherent in every human being which maintains cohesion and strengthens reality. The 
Brahmins, due to their hegemony over the caste-system, denied the rights to the lower 
caste, the untouchables, and other deprived sections of the society, so there was violation 
of their right and dignity. But in general the ancient Indian society was peaceful within 
the moral codes of conduct of the society provided by religion which in due course of 
time hegemonies all sections of society within its rules of the game. 
In the medieval period, however, the three Basic elements of the ancient Indian 
tradition: universalism and humanism in its philosophical thought, the struggle against 
caste discrimination and religious tolerance received a fresh relevance and impetus from 
Islam following the Muslim conquest during the tenth century A.D. Emphasizing the 
greatness of this religion, Abdul Aziz says in Islam as in other religious traditions, human 
rights are concerned with the dignity of the individual, the level of self-esteem  that 
secures personal identity and promotes human community. He further argues that it also 
established a social order designed to enlarge freedom, justice and opportunity for the 
perfectibility of human beings keeping an eye on the overall social, political and 
economic development of the society. However, "the operational ramifications of the 
Islamic norms can be gleaned from the Mughal history of India. Though the Mughal 
Government could be typically characterized as centralized despotism, its judicial 
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administration contained all the basic elements of modem doctrine of due process of law, 
fair trial and independent judiciary23 Akbar's (1526-1605)'great regard for rights, justice 
and secularism could be cited as an example in this regard. In his  religious policy Din-e-
Ilahi (divine religion), he tried to preach the ideas of secularism (respect for all religions) 
and religious tolerance Similarly, parallel to Akbar's exquisite religious reform policies, 
religious movements like Bhakti (Hindu) and Sufi (Islamic) made remarkable 
contributions towards eliminating the irreligious practices of the contemporary society 
These movements tried to revive the ancient humanist tradition and preached the sacred 
principles of humanism and universalism denouncing the narrow sectarianism prevalent 
in both the religions - Hindu and Muslim. Further efforts were also made in the modern 
era by Britisher to break and politicise the amity of these two religions on the basis of 
their famous principle 'divide and rule' by bringing into practice certain measures like the 
introduction of English education, the merit system for recruitment and a system of 
discriminatory representation, and communal representation at a later stage. However, 
some Indian leaders being influenced by English education started a movement for 
Renaissance and Reformation. Raja Ram Mohan Roy, one of those loaders, demanded 
the abolition of Sati system, female infanticide, caste system and also initiated a 
movement for widow remarriage and female education. Mere, once again the attention 
centered around the human being rather than god; which was somewhat a new approach 
to human reason and human dignity. Further, establishment of Brahmo Samaj (1828) and 
Arya Samaj (1875) lend support to this cause. 
For the political freedom of India the formation of the Indian National Congress 
(1885) also gave a new vista for the came of human rights which was being violated by 
the British rule in India. 
Influenced by the reformist movements in different parts of the world for the cause 
of freedom, the Nehru Report of 1928, the first commitment to civil liberties, and the 
Karachi Resolution of 1930, the most important commitment to individual and group 
                                                 
23  Aswini K. Ray, ‘civil Rights Movement and Social Struggle in India’ (Aanmol Publication, New Delhi,1995),p.12. 
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rights, were prepared. These were included in the Constitui.cn of free India as 
Fundamental Rights in Part III, and as Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV 
respectively. 
To conclude, however, the Indian perception of human lights does not emanate 
from the theory of a priori or natural lights doctrine of the West, rather it has its own base 
in ancient Indian culture and civilisation. "The Indian vision of right amphasises not only 
the individual but also the total person, a person whose interdependent rights and duties 
are determined by his/her position within a hierarchical network of relationship”24 The 
impact of Islamic religion, renaissance and reforms movements, British colonialism and 
the nationalist ideology played a vital role in the formation and practice of human rights 
in India. 
The Western and the Indian conceptions of rights also differ in their attitude 
towards the relationship between rights and duties unlike its Western counterpart, 
traditional Indian thought emphasizes the duly especially towards one group and society. 
Thus, the support for observance of rights and duties is conditioned by ancient tradition 
and belief.                                                                                                                                   
From the above analysis it can be derived that the Indian intellectual generally 
accept the view that rights are not over and above the State ; rather they are gift from the  
State itself. To them rights of an individual must be balanced with the interest of the 
society as a whole. The good of each as they argue, must contribute to the good of all. 
   During the struggle against colonial rule, Indian nationalist movement 
emphasized upon political right as a reaction against the repressive and exploitative 
character of the British, rule; but the nationalist ideology also emphasized on social and 
economic rights, a:; evident from their inclusion in the Constitution of India formulated 
by the leaders of the national movement. 
Even though the Indian nationalist leaders adopted the Western framework of 
political right, they rejected the Lockean theory of a priori or natural Rights. They 
                                                 
24  Ibid 
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considered rights as the gift from the State hence are not absolute and their enjoyment is 
conditioned by a number of factors-social, economic and political. The rights of different 
groups and society are counter-balanced by the rights of the State and its obligation to the 
weaker sections of the society. 
The economics rights of the people are limited only by considerations of 
economics development and national security, which take proceed cover the individual’s 
economic rights and consume a lion's share of the annual budget of the countries. This a 
so because Indian leader perhaps follow and practice the principle of ‘Nation before 
community’ or ‘society over the individuals’ ”When the low priority given to economics 
rights can be justified on the basis of theories of economics development and consider 
action of national security, in the final analysis, priorities are determined by the 
ideological commitment of the leadership which, in turn depends upon the distribution of 
political and economic power within the system. Hence, political and economic 
underdevelopment to a large extent, and not ideology, seems to be the greatest hurdle in 
the quest for the realization of human rights in India.25  
 
2.8 The Indian Constitution and Human Rights 
 
The Constitution of India which came into force into force in 1950 is an eloquent 
testimony of the nation's deep commitment to human rights. It proclaims basic human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantees their enjoyment by all, irrespective of 
caste, color, sex or religion. It has also created legal institutions to enforce the 
fundamental rights comprising liberty, equality and social justice.26 
Recognizing the existing realities that the social disparities might imp an full 
enjoyment of these rights by all, the Constitution of India was deliberately framed to 
provide positive discrimination and affirmative action in favors of those who could not 
exercise their human rights amended. There are also Constitutional safeguards to ensure 
                                                 
25  G. S. Bajwa, Human Rights in India; ‘Implementation and Violation, (Anmol Publication, New Delhi,1995),p.10.  
26 Ibid. 
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effective representation of the socially and economically deprived sections of the society 
in the legislatures as well as public services.  
Since independence, India had sought to institutionalize its  commitment of human 
rights by a deliberate choice of an open society and democratic  polity based on universal 
adult suffrage, respect for the dignity of the individual, the rule of law and multi-party 
system.    
India has been steadfast in its conviction that democracy is the best guarantor of 
human rights and it also provides an optimal political framework for development. Poor 
countries like India require a massive social and economic transformation to conquer the 
ancient scourge of poverty. Ignorance and injustice. But India believes that in order to be 
feasible, such basic changes have to be based on free and willing consent of the people 
provided by a democracy. The institutions which India fashioned to sustain as plural, 
multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic and a secular polity had the overreaching 
objective of consolidating the norms and principles of the our  democracy.27 
India has elected parliamentary institutions and conducts free and fair elections — 
local, State and Centre. It has built mechanisms for peaceful and orderly changes of 
government in response to popular will. These mechanisms have been tested time and 
again and have provided their effectiveness. The governmental mechanism such as 
police, security forces are also working to safeguard people's life, liberty and security. 
India's independent judiciary which is the custodian of the people's rights is also acting 
zealously to protect them. Public Interest Litigation (PIL), an additional system of the 
Indian Judiciary, has also been instituted for this cause. 
 A free and vibrant press, existence of various interest groups, strong public 
opinion, an assertive NGO community and above all Rule of Law fortify India's 
democratic system and its legal safeguards. 
India is also a signatory to the UD1IR and party to various international covenant, 
conventions and treaties. Furthermore, greater accesses to the statesmen of various 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
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countries and international human rights agencies have been facilitated. It is to reaffirm 
the atmosphere of freedom and India's commitment to its own catalogue of rights.28 
Despite all these instrumentalities and institutional arrangements meant for the protection 
of human rights standards in our country, there have been large scale reports of violation 
of human rights in different parts of the country. These have been observed particularly at 
three different levels, i.e., individual, society and State. 
In our country majority of the population live in rural areas. As they are poor and 
illiterate and are not aware of their basic rights, they are easily exploited by the better of 
people. So there have been large scale violations of their rights by money-lenders, 
landlords, petty politicians, tribal leaders, rural elites, etc. Child labor, bonded labour and 
migrant labour are some of the examples of this factor. At the societal level, we have also 
a different picture altogether. There are a number of cases of communal riots, caste 
conflicts, dowry deaths, social violence, and criminalization of politics and so on. These 
cases are apparent in certain states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh 
and Tamil Nadu. 
The violation of human rights is a matter of great concern today as the State seems 
to be the worst kind of institution in violating human rights in terms of Army excess, 
custodial deaths and rape inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners, atrocities by 
police and paramilitary forces and above all the existence of certain black laws like the 
Disturbed Areas (Special powers) Act, 1976, Police Act, 1949, Armed Forces (Special 
Powers) Act, 1958, Disturbed Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1976, Arms Act, 1959, etc. In 
addition to these, Maintenance of Internal securities Act, 1971, Essential Services 
Maintenance Art, 1981, Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities Act, 1974 and National Security Act, 1980 are also some of the repressive laws 
of the government which very often violates the fundamental rights and freedom of the 
people. These are certainly a matter of sorrow and need to be checked. 
In order to check these and other forms of violations arising out of numerous 
                                                 
28  Ibid. 
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factors, the Government of India has also take  measured steps in creating institutions and 
reforming laws with regard to safeguard the legitimate rights of the people in general, the 
minorities, the dalits, the backwards, the women and children in particular. Establishment 
of separate institution likes the National Minorities Commission, the National Commis-
sion for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the National Commission for Women, 
etc, on similar causes are also welcome steps in this regard. 
Apart from these governmental and non-governmental institutions meant to 
safeguard people's legitimate rights, the Government of India has constituted the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) for the promotion and protection of the human 
rights. The Commission which came into existence on 12th October, 1993, is statutorily 
autonomous and has the authority to deal with the legal matters concerning the human 
rights cause. It has been endowed with the powers of investigation and recommendation 
to the respective agencies of the government whose task is to enforce its 
recommendations. Its annual reports are submitted to the parliament for scrutiny and 
comments under the watchful eyes of the media and the growing civil and democratic 
rights groups as well as other non-governmental organizations working on human rights 
in the country and abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER – 3 
RIGHT TO LIFE 
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 ‘Life’ is dear, precious, sacred and pregnant with divine potential and it is that 
a Hymn in the Rigveda recites:  
“Grant us a hundred autumns that we may see the many fold World. May we attain 
the long lives which have been ordained as from yore.”1 
 
 Preservation of human life is of paramount importance, because if one’s life is 
lost, the status quo ante can not be restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of 
man.2 An appropriate connotation of the term ‘life’ was given by Field J., where he 
distinguished human life from animal existence and defined the concept with all that 
body and mind and soul could promote happiness and fulfilment, thus:  
“By the term “life” something more is meant than mere animal existence. The 
inhibitions against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which 
life is enjoyed. 3 
The plentitude of possibilities and the fullness of faculties, if life is enriched 
propitious circumstances, persuaded our founding fathers and the United Nations to 
accord the highest priority to the right to life.4 The fundamental right to life is the 
most precious human right and forms the arc of all other rights.5 
Life in its expanded horizons today includes all that give meaning to a man’s 
life including his tradition, culture and heritage and protection of that heritage it in its 
full measure would certainly come within the encompass of an expanded concept of 
Article 21 of the Constitution.6 
                                                 
1 Krishan Iyer, J., The Dialectics and Dynamics of Human Rights in India, (Calcutta: Eastern Law 
House, 1999), p.282. 
2 Paramananda Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039. 
3 B. L. Hansaria, “Right to Life and Liberty under the Constitution - A Critical Analysis of Article 
21”, (Bombay : N. M. Tripathi, Pvt. Ltd, 1993), p.25  
4 Krishan Iyer, J. supra n.1. 
5 Bhagwati .J., in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746. 
6 Per Sabyasachi Mukharjee .J., in Ramsaran v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 549 para 13.   
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To any civilized society, there can be no attributes more important than the life 
and personal liberty of its members. That is evident from the paramount position 
given by the courts to Article 21 of the Constitution. These twin attributes enjoy a 
fundamental ascendancy over all other attributes of the political and social order and 
consequently the legislative, the executive and the judiciary are more sensitive to 
these than to any other attributes of daily existence.7 
 
3.1 Right to life - A Primordial Right 
 
 Doctrine of right is a product of natural law theory, evolved since ancient 
times, which paved way for recognition of individual identity and autonomy. 
Advancement of civilizations and progress of societies was required to keep pace with 
the changing time and therefore, the doctrine of rights has also been changed and 
transformed with the changing time. Majority of the natural lawyers did incorporate 
rights as an integral part of their theories. Natural Law theory though underwent a 
change but few principles of it remain constant, inter alia inalienable rights of 
individual.8 Right to life is one such inalienable basic right of man. Right to life is the 
most important, human, fundamental, inalienable, transcendental right. Naturally and 
logically this right requires the highest protection.9  
 The right to life is, of course, the foremost human right….. ‘Life’ is more than 
mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation or truncation of life 
extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. A dynamic, as 
against a static, view of the quality of life makes it clear that life includes livelihood 
                                                 
7 Per Pathak .J., in Keher Singh v. Union of India,  AIR 1989 SC 653 para 7.  
8 Dr. Dilip Ukey and Tejaswini Malegaonkar, “Right to Life and Personal Liberty challenges and 
Judicial Responses”, Indian Bar Review, Vol XXX (4) 2003, p.539. 
9 Dr. Koteswar Rao, “Criminal Liability of the State for the violation of Life, Liberty and Dignity- 
Need for a Compensatory Legal Policy”, Indian Bar Review, Vol.XIX, 1992, p.100.  
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and opportunities for unfolding personality.10 Thus, the right to life, liberty and 
security of person as a basic human right finds very significant place in the various 
human rights instruments.  Denial of this basic right means denial of all other rights 
would have any utility and existence without it. So, this right has been stressed by 
international,11 Regional,12 and National13 documents.14 It is a primordial right, which 
one should possess in order to enjoy other rights. Primordial rights are those rights 
without which, the enjoyment of other rights is not possible…. (M)ost societies 
recognise right to life as the most basic right. For any human being to survive or exist 
this right is most essential,15 and all other rights depend upon this right. Without this 
right other rights have little or no meaning at all. The inviolability or sanctity of life is 
the basic value of modern civilization. Therefore, today, non deprivation of life is the 
core of the rights of person, recognised by almost every nation of the world.  Right to 
life is so basic in the sense that ‘it is regarded a necessary condition for enjoyment of 
other human rights”.16  
 Indian judiciary has always taken note of international instruments of Human 
Rights, while dealing with cases of violation of human rights in general and of right to 
life in particular. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Krishna Iyer .J., “Human Rights and Inhuman Wrongs”, (Delhi: B.R. Publications Corporation, 
1990), pp 4-5. 
11  Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
12  Article 2(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 1950. 
13  Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  
14  Shailaja Chander, Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, (New 
Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1992), p.159.  
15  Naikar, L.D., The Law Relating to Human Rights, (Bangalore: Puliani and Puliani, 2004), p.224.  
16  Ibid., p.225. 
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3.2 Right to life under International Human Rights Law 
 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, says: “Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person”.17 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, says: 
1). “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.18  
 What Article 6 (1) proclaims is an “inherent right to life”. The right to life as 
“inherent” may be questioned on the ground that legal right never actually inhere in 
nature; they are always created within the framework of legal system. But framers of 
Covenant regarded human rights as pre-existing in a moral order, and emphasised that 
it derives from the very fact of human being’s existence. Today many contemporary 
philosophers agree to the effect that human rights are possessed by virtue of being a 
member of human family.19 
 Under the Covenant, each state party is obliged to have within its internal legal 
system a law protecting the right to life, which may in the larger interest of the society 
be curtailed or regulated. Apart from the protection of life by the state, there needs to 
be met, certain other basic needs like food, shelter, clothing and medical care etc.20 
                                                 
17  Supra n. 11.  
18  Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.  
19  Naikar, L.D., supra n.15, p.226.  
20  These social rights and recognised under Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.  
Article 11- (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions.  The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realisation of this right, recognising to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent.  
(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognising the fundamental right of everyone  to be free 
from hunger, shall take individually and through international cooperation, the measures including specific 
programmes, which are needed:   
(a)  To improve the methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
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Under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights an 
absolute right to life is not granted. Life may be deprived but it should not be arbitrary 
deprivation of life. What is “arbitrary” is difficult to define and is open for different 
interpretations. For some it can simply be “illegal” or “contrary to the national 
legislation”. For others it can be “unjust” and “all legislations must conform to 
principles of justice”,21 and standard of justice may again vary. If states are free to 
determine the scope of their own obligations, international human rights are liable to 
become empty shells. Only an international minimum standard, which operates 
independently of the vagaries of national legal systems can effectively protect human 
rights.22 It was the intention of the drafters to bring national legislations in line with 
an international minimum standard.23   
  It has been argued that the right to life under Article 6 of the International 
Covenant  on Civil and Political Rights is limited only to arbitrary deprivation of life, 
such as by homicide and thus ‘right to live’ is not ‘right to live as one wishes’.24 It is 
conceded that right to life is not right to an appropriate standard of living, as that right 
                                                                                                                                                       
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and 
utilization of natural resources; 
(b)  Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an 
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.  
Article 12 - (1) The State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  
(2) the steps to be taken by the State Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this 
right shall include those necessary for:  
(a) The provision for the reduction of the still birth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child;  
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c)  the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other  diseases; (d) The 
creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness.  
21  UN DOC A/2929, 35. 
22  Hassan, 10, Harvard International L.J. 1969, pp 241-242.  
23  Naikar, L.D., supra n.15, p.227. 
24  Yoram Dinstein, “The Right to Life, Physical Integrity and Liberty”, in L.Henkin (ed.) “The 
International Bill of Rights”, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.115.  
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is recognised in Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1966.   
 
3.3.1 Right to Life: A Fundamental Right under the Indian Constitution 
  
Though India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
in 1979, thereby became obliged to protect and promote the human rights in her 
municipal system, the basic human rights including the right to life got expression in 
the Constitution prior to this. Under the Indian Constitution, Article 21 guarantees 
right to life and Supreme Court after initial narrow, technical interpretation became 
conscious of its own importance and the importance of the right and has given 
substance to this right by its interpretation after a quarter century of passing the 
Constitution in a series of judgements.25 
 Apart from this, as per the provisions of the Constitution, i.e., Article 51 (c), it 
is obligatory for the state to foster respect for international law and treaty 
obligations....26 No explanation is to be found-for separate mention of international 
law and treaty obligations as the latter forms part of the former, - in the Constituent 
Assembly debates also, as to the intent of Article 51. Prof. C. H. Alexandrowicz says 
that the expression ‘international law’ connotes customary international law and that 
‘treaty obligations’ stand for treaties. This interpretation would seem to be the most 
logical in the context of the Article as well as of attitude of the Indian Courts to 
questions of international law.27  Article 51 in so far as it requires various organs of 
state to foster respect for international law and treaties would seem to strengthen 
                                                 
25  Dr.Koteswar Rao, supra n.9. 
26  Article 51 of Constitution of India: Promotion of International Peace and Security – The State shall 
endeavour to: 
(c) foster respect for International law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with 
one another; and  
27  M.K.Nawaz, “International Law on the contemporary practice in India; some perspectives”, Proc. 
ASIL, April 25-27, (1963), p.275 at 278, cited in S.K.Kapoor, “International Law”, 11th ed., 
(Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 1996), pp 100-101.  
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rather than weaken the principle that intentional law is part of the law of the land. 
This is so not with standing the imprecise formulation of Article 51.28   
 This goes to show that, apart from India being member of the United Nations 
since 1945, signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, signing the 
Covenants in 1966 and ratifying them in 1979 and the other instruments on Human 
Rights, the basic human right to life, liberty and security of person was recognised in 
India prior to making of these instruments. Demand for the recognition of this right 
was made during the British rule in India; this right to life was recognised during the 
framing of the Constitution and ultimately found expression in Part III under Article 
21 of the Constitution as an enforceable, fundamental right guaranteed to all persons. 
 The national struggle for freedom was largely directed against racial 
discrimination and to secure basic human rights for all individuals. The Indian 
National Congress at its special session held in Bombay in 1928… made demand for 
writing into the Government of India Bill “a declaration of rights of the people of 
India as British citizens”, including therein among other things guarantee in regard to 
equality before law, protection in respect of liberty,  life and property.29  
 Provisions pertaining to protection of life and liberty were debated in the 
Constituent Assembly. Clause (9) of the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights 
provided that “no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty without due process of 
law”.30 The Drafting Committee substituted the word “procedure established by law” 
for the words “due process of law” and added the qualifying word ‘personal’ before 
‘liberty’, for without the qualifying word ‘personal’ the word ‘liberty’ might be 
construed very widely so as to include even the freedoms already dealt with….31 
Several members objected to the change from ‘due process’ to ‘procedure established 
                                                 
28  S.K.Kapoor, supra n.27, pp 101-102. 
29  Subhash C.Kashyap, “Human Rights and Parliament”, 20 -22 (1978) cited in Shailaja Chander, 
supra n.14, p.159.  
30  Advisory Committee, Fundamental Rights: Interim Report, (Delhi, 1948), Cl (9).  
31  P.Sarojini Reddy, Judicial Review of Fundamental Rights, (New Delhi: National Publishing 
House, 1976), pp 111-112.  
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by law’32, while others33 justified the change. An important advice in favour of such 
change was from Justice Frankfurter of Supreme Court of the U.S.A. who said that 
the ‘due process’ clause would not be helpful and that it had created many 
complications in the U.S.A.34 Justice Frankfurter considered that the power of judicial 
review implied in the due process clause…. was not only undemocratic (because it 
gave a few judges a power of vetoing legislation enacted by the representatives of the 
nation) but also threw an unfair burden on the judiciary.35  Thus, during the 
deliberations of the Assembly, the due process clause was watered down in the light 
of American warnings. In its place, the Assembly approved an “any procedure” clause 
so that the life and liberty of a person could be restrained by “any procedure 
established by law”.36 The Constituent Assembly accepted by a majority vote, the 
clause ‘procedure established by law’, and the Art. 21 of the Constitution of India 
guaranteeing protection of life and liberty was formulated as”, No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by 
law”. 
 The right to life is not merely a fundamental right, but a basic human right is 
well expressed by Justice H.R. Khanna, when he observed that “sanctity of life and 
liberty was not something new when Constitution was drafted. It represented a fact of 
higher values which mankind began to cherish in its evolution from a state of truth 
and law to a civilized existence. Likewise the principle that no one shall be deprived 
of his life arbitrarily without the authority of law was not the gift of the Constitution. 
It was the necessary corollary of the concept relating the sanctity of life and liberty, it 
                                                 
32  Eg.K.M.Munshi supported the ‘due process’ clause, see CAD Vol.VII, 851-3; Pandit Thakur Das 
Bhargava also supported it, see, CAD Vol.VII 848.  
33  Eg. Sir, A.Krishnaswami Iyer, CAD Vol.VII, 853-4; Dr.B.R.Ambedkar, CAD Vol.VII 1000-1.  
34  P.Sarojini Reddy, supra n.31, p.112.  
35  B.Shiva Rao, The forming of India’s Constitution, selects Documents, Vol.II, 1996, quoted in B.L. 
Hansaria, supra n.3, p.7.  
36  B.P. Jeevan reddy and Rajeev Dhavan, “The Jurisprudence of Human Rights”, in D.M.Beaty (ed.), 
“Human Rights and Judicial Review – A Contemporary Perspective”, (London: Martinus –Nijholff 
Publishers, 1994), p.179.  
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existed and was in force before the coming into force of the Constitution.37 For right 
to life like the other human rights guaranteed as fundamental rights under the 
Constitution existed even prior to their recognition as such, as they are natural rights 
and law simply declares them as is done by the Constitution.  
 The above statements can be accepted in the light of the fact that a number of 
civil rights were enjoyed by the individuals in ancient India, though the rights of the 
individuals are to be inferred from the duties of the state. (F)or the first time the 
formation of what may be termed rights even in the modern sense can be found from 
the times of Kautilya, who classified them as “civil rights”, “economic rights” and 
“legal rights”.38  
 In Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.39 Justice Mathew subscribed to 
the view that the fundamental rights are natural rights and are pre-existent and dealt 
with the concept of natural rights elaborately. He observed that natural rights are those 
“rights which are appropriate to man as a rational and moral being and which are 
necessary for a good life”.40 They owe nothing to their recognition in the Constitution 
- such recognition was necessary if the Constitution was to be regarded as 
complete”.40a Hence the fundamental rights are natural rights and the Indian 
Constitution recognises and declares them, to make itself a complete code. The effect 
of this natural rights theory will be that the rights can only be restricted, but they can 
not be abrogated.40b This holds perfectly good with right to life under the Constitution 
                                                 
37  A.D.M. Jabalpour v. Shivkant Shukla,  AIR 1976 SC 1254.  
38 B.A.Selator, “Ancient Indian Political Thought and Institutions”, 249-266, (1963) cited by 
S.Sundar Rami Reddy, “Fundamentalness of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles in Indian 
Constitution, `1980 JI.L.I.., vol.22:1, p.400.  
39  AIR 1973 SC 1461, see at 1938-1944.  
40  Ibid.  
40a  Corwin, “The Higher Background of the American Constitutional Law” quoted by Mathew, J., 
ibid. 
40b  S.Sundara Rami Reddy, supra n.38, p.402.  
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Article 21 provides:  “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law”.40c 
 This provision is in tune with the object of Article 3 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948, and a similar provision is formed in Article 6 of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.   
 Too much content is poured in this short provision of Article 21 guaranteeing 
right to life by the judicial interpretation received at the hands of Judges of the Apex 
Court. Judicial activism has played a great role in moulding the law to meet the need 
of the hour. Regarding interpreting the provisions of law by the judges Lord Denning 
made the historical observation in Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. Asher,41 as follows: 
 “When a defect appears, a Judge can not simply fold his hands and blame the 
draftsmen. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of the 
Parliament….. and then he must supplement the written word so as to give  “force 
and life” to the intention of the legislature… A Judge should ask himself the question 
how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, 
they should have straightened it out? The must then do as they would have done. A 
Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should 
iron out the creases”.42 
 
 The above view of Lord Denning was described by the House of Lords as “a 
naked usurpation of the legislative function”. Same principle was re-stated by him 
after 30 years, in Nothman v. Barnet, London Borough Council.43 In similar way 
ironing out the creases is done by higher judiciary in India. In the same vein Bhagwati 
J., held that Constitutional provisional must be construed not in a narrow or 
constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account 
                                                 
40c  Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  
41 (1949) 2 All.  E.R. 155.  
42  Ibid, at 164, cited in B.L. Hansania , supra n.3, p.19. 
43  (1978) 1 W.L.R. 220 cited in B.L. Hansaria, supra, no.3, pp.19-20. 
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of changed conditions and purposes, so that the Constitutional provision does not get 
atrophied or fossilized, but remains flexile enough to meet the newly emerging 
problems and challenges. The learned judge observed that this applies with greater 
force in relation to a fundamental right.44 
 The right to life which is the most fundamental of all is also the most difficult 
to define. Certainly it can not be confined to a guarantee against taking away life; it 
must have a wider application.45  The term ‘life’ has not been defined in the 
Constitution, hence one has to turn to the judicial interpretation for its meaning. The 
Supreme Court has held that the word ‘life’ as it occurs in the 5th and 14th amendments 
of the U.S. Constitution correspond to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It means 
not only continuance of person’s animal existence, but a right to the possession of 
each of his organs, his arms, legs etc.46  Life is beyond price. Freedom and liberties 
are only for the living. Hence right to life ….. “forms the arc of all other rights.47 
(P)reservation of human life is of paramount importance, because if one’s life is lost, 
the status quo ante, can not be restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of 
man.48  
 The word ‘life’, however does not mean mere animal existence. The 
observations of Field J., in Munn v. Illinois,49 have been time and again, accepted by 
the Supreme Court of India.50 Field, J., spoke of the right to life as follows: 
 “By the term ‘life’ as here used something more is meant than mere 
animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all 
                                                 
44  See Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746.  
45 V.N.Shukla, Constitution of India, 10th ed., M.P.Singh, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company 200), 
pp 164-165.  
46  Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963  SC 1295.  
47  Supra n.44,  para  5.  
48  Paramanada Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989  SC 2039. 
49  1876, 94  US 113  at 142.  
50  First accepted by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., supra n.46; same view was 
taken in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 ; (1978) 4 SCC 494.  
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those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally 
prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, 
or the cutting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the 
body through which the soul communicates with the outer world. The 
deprivation not only of life, but whatever God has given to everyone 
with life, for its growth and enjoyment is prohibited by the provision in 
question, if its efficacy be not fittered away by judicial decision”.    
 
 This statement of Field, J., has been repeatedly quoted with approval by the 
Supreme Court of India.51 The same has been further extended in Francis Coralie v. 
Union of India,52 when it was held that “any act which damages or injures or 
interferes with the use of any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even 
temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21”. Bhagwati J., observed:  
 “…..The question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only 
to protection of limb or faculty, or does it go further and embrace 
something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to live 
with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare 
necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over 
the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in 
diverse forms with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and 
contents of the components of this right would depend upon the extent 
of the economic development of the country but it must, in any view of 
the matter include the right to basic necessities of life, and also the right 
to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum 
expression of human self”.53 
                                                 
51  Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra n.50; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 
(1985) 3 SCC 545; AIR 1986 SC 180, at 194 etc.  
52  Supra  n.44.  
53  Ibid. 
61 
 
 
 As Krishna Iyer, J. aptly observed: ‘life is not vegetable existence, nor ascentic 
isolation, but vigorous social life and the enjoyment of basic minima of creature 
comforts which make life liveable’.54 This new approach to right to life is witnessed 
specifically, since the latter half of the 1970’s.  
 The post Emergency India witnessed a great change in all walks of life and 
judiciary was no exception to this. Concerned as it was with the aftermath of the 
Emergency and, aided by its own conscience coupled with an atmosphere of freedom, 
the judiciary construed Article 21 in the most liberal manner to uphold the ‘rule and 
spirit of law’. This was done by requiring the laws bearing on life and personal liberty 
to pass the tests of Articles 14 and 19. This certainly introduced the ‘due process’ 
clause in the Indian Constitution,55 and also interpreted right to life and personal 
liberty in such a manner as to cover various facets of life which were hither to 
unheeded. 
 In the beginning Article 21 was very narrowly construed, though the term right 
to life was not expressly so construed. However, it was, sort of eclipsed by the 
narrower interpretation of Article 21 as a whole. But the new approach adopted by the 
Court since the last quarter of the 20th century the right to life received a further boast.   
 The early approach to Article 21 was circumscribed by literal interpretation. 
Right from the inception till the revoking of Emergency, Article 21 was construed in a 
very narrow manner.56 But in the course of time the scope of application of the Article 
against arbitrary encroachment by the executive has been expanded by liberal 
interpretation of each of the components of the Article, in tune with relevant 
international understanding. For Article 5157 of the Constitution of India makes it 
                                                 
54  Justice Krishna Iyer, Human Rights and the Law, (Indore: Vedpal Law House, 1986), p.69. 
55  Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978  SC 597; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra 
n.50; Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi: supra n.44. 
56  For example in A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1951  SC 27;  Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., 
AIR 1963 SC 1295; ADM Jabalpur v. Sivakant Shukla, AIR 1976  SC 1207. 
57  Article 51 of Constitution of India, supra n.26.  
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obligatory for the state to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations. 
India is founder member of United Nations Organisation and signatory to Human 
Rights instruments. Though Article 51 being Directive Principle of State Policy is not 
enforceable by court of law, it reflects the spirit of Constitution and persuades the 
courts to take note of it.58 The Supreme Court of India has often referred to the 
provisions of the International Covenants while dealing with violations of human 
rights in general and right to life in particular. Prem shankar v. Delhi 
Adminiistration59 and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration60 are instances where the 
Supreme Court extensively quoted from international instruments on human rights 
while giving expended meaning and scope to right to life. 
 In Board of Trusties, Port of Bombay v. Dillip Kumar,61 the Court said that the 
expression ‘Life’ does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery 
through life; it has a much wider meaning and takes within its fold “some of the finer 
graces of human civilization which makes life worth living”, which would be 
jeopardised if reputation is adversely affected. Further, in Vikram Deo Singh v. State 
of Bihar,62 Pathak C.J., opined thus: 
 “We live in an age when Court has demonstrated while interpreting 
Article 21 of the Constitution, that every person is entitled to a quality 
of life consistent with his human personality. The right to live with 
human dignity is the fundamental right of every Indian citizen, and so, 
… the State recognises the need for maintaining establishments for the 
care of those unfortunates, both  women and children, who are the 
                                                 
58 Justice R.P.Sethi, Human Rights and Judicial Activities, (Dharwad : Jagrut Bharat 1997), p.9 
(Lecture delivered at Hubli Bar Association on 16.8.1997).  
59  AIR  1980  SC 1535.  
60  AIR 1983  SC 1578 pp 1601-1603.  
61  AIR  1983  SC 109, para 13.  
62  AIR 1988  SC 1782  para  5.  
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castaways of any imperfect social order for whom therefore, of 
necessity, provision must be made for their protection and welfare”. 
 
 In Keher Singh v. Union of India,63 he further went to say that “to any civilized 
society, there can be no attributes more important than the life and persona liberty”. In 
its expanded horizon, life would include all that give meaning to a man’s life 
including his tradition, culture and heritage, and protection of that heritage in its full 
measure would certainly come within the encompass of an expanded concept of 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court took much extended view of right to life and 
liberty to include every aspect of it which makes the life meaningful and worthwhile. 
 Same view was held by K. Ramaswamy, J.,  He says: Right to life entrained in 
Article 21 means something more than survival of animal existence. The right to live 
with human dignity with minimum of sustenances and shelter and those rights and 
aspects of life which would go to make a man’s life complete and worth living would 
form part of right to life.64     
 In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,65 Court emphasised that the 
term ‘life’ in Article 21 is not only restricted to the mere animal existence of a person. 
It means something more and “the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to 
all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.66 Further, the right to life would 
include the right to food, clothing, decent environment and reasonable 
accommodation to live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human 
being for shelter has to be kept in view.  For animal, it is the bare protection of the 
body, for a human being, it has to be suitable accommodation which allows him to 
grow in all aspects-physical, mental and intellectual”.67 
                                                 
63  AIR 1989 SC 653  para 7.  
64  Samatha v. State of A.P., AIR 1997 SC 3297  at 3330.  
65  AIR 1986  SC 180; (1985) 3  SCC 545.  
66  Ibid., at 194. 
67  Shantistar Bulders v. N.K.Totame (1990) 1  SCC 520; AIR 1990  SC 630.  
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 In P. Rathinam v. Union of India,68 the Supreme Court interpreted right to life 
as: “right to live with human dignity. It takes within its fold some of the fine graces of 
civilization which makes life worth living and that the expanded concept of life would 
mean the tradition, culture and heritage of the person concerned”.  
 The concept of ‘life’ has been expansively interpreted in recent years implying 
a host of fundamental rights therefrom.69 Thus, the protection against arbitrary 
privation of life no longer means mere protection from death or physical injury, but 
also from invasion of right to live with human dignity and includes all aspects of life 
necessary to make one’s life meaningful and worth living. It now includes right to 
livelihood,70 right to work under fair conditions of labour,71 rights of prisoners,72 and 
right to enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life,73 etc. 
 As to the procedure for deprivation of life or liberty it is now settled that the 
expression “procedure established by law” implicitly requires a procedure which is 
“fair, just and reasonable”, including the right to fair hearing, according to natural 
justice,74 a speedy trial,75 etc. Provisions of speedy trial have been interpreted by 
implication of speedy justice as an obligation of the state.76 For otherwise the 
                                                 
68  AIR  1994  SC  1844 ; (1994) 3 SCC 394. 
69  M.P.Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 5th ed., (Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company, 2003), p.1272. 
70  Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, supra n.51;  Animal and Environment Legal 
Defence Fund v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1071; (1997) 3 SCC  549;  Chameli Singh v. State of 
U.P., AIR 1996  SC1051; (1996) 2 SCC 549;  Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, AIR  1996  SC 1864  
; (1996) 5 SCC 125  Etc.  
71  Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982  SC 1473;  Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802; Mukesh Advani v. State of M.P., AIR 1985  SC 2363. 
72  Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra n.50;  A.K.Roy v. union of India AIR 1982 SC  710 para 
108 etc.  
73   Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991  SC 420;  M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004  
SC 4016  at 4044.  
74 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, supra n.55.  
75  Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360; Madhu v. Union of India, AIR 1989  
SC para 3.  
76  Supreme Court advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, AIR 1994  SC 268; (1993) 4  
SCC 441;  Ankul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 2814; (1997) 6 SCC 1. 
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operation of the legal system would not promote justice which is assured in the 
Constitution.77 
 
3.3.2 Personal Liberty 
 
The expression ‘personal liberty’ got its full meaning in Maneka Gandhi v. 
Union of India.78   In this case the court has given the widest possible interpretation to 
personal liberty. It is only with the decision in Maneka’s case that a new era of 
development has been ushered in. The decision stands as a beacon- light adding new 
dimensions to the interpretation of the fundamental rights. 
If Article 21 is expanded in accordance with interpretative principle indicated 
in Maneka Gandhi, it will read as follows: 
“No person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according 
to fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law”. 79    
Maneka Gandhi has paved the way for realising new vistas of personal 
freedoms like right to speedy trial, right to bail, right to appeal, right to humane 
treatment inside prison, right against torture, right to live with basic human dignity 
and right to compensation to the victims.80 This was done by reading Directive 
Principles into Article 21. The impact of the decision in Maneka’s Case is very 
significant for introducing the concept of reasonableness into procedure established 
by law in Article 21. It brought “due process” into the Article 21 by projecting natural 
law in right to life and personal liberty. 
 
 
                                                 
77  D.D. Basu, Human Rights in Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., (Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company, 2003), 
p.292.  
78 Supra  n.55. 
79 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980  SC 898  at 930. 
80  Shailaja Chander, supra n.14, pp 164-165. 
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3.3.3 Procedure Established by Law 
  
Article 21 makes it clear that a person can be deprived of his life and personal 
liberty only according to ‘procedure established by law’. This expression in Article 21 
is the result of deliberate choice by the Constituent Assembly in place of the phrase 
‘due process of law’. 
 Initial set back to the judicial protection of right to life and personal liberty as a 
human right was suffered by the interpretation of Article 21 by the Supreme Court in 
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. 81  In Gopalan the Supreme Court was divided on 
the meaning of the phrase “procedure established bylaw”. In that case the Attorney 
General had reminded the Judges that the Constituent Assembly had consciously 
rejected ‘due process’ in Article 21 and therefore the unreasonableness of law (of 
Preventive Detention) could not be examined by the court, whatever the procedure 
prescribed by enacted law (even if unfair or unreasonable), that itself was sufficient 
justification for deprivation of life or liberty.82 The majority held that it must mean 
that the procedure prescribed or enacted by the state-either Parliament or state 
legislations. That means any procedure that has legislative sanction. Thus, Article 21 
was to guarantee protection against executive action and possibly against judicial 
action and not against the legislative action, unless legislature transgressed any other 
provisions of the Constitution. Minority opinion was in favour of making principles of 
natural justice applicable as under American Constitutional provisions of due process. 
 The decision of Gopalans case considerably inhibited judicial protection of 
human rights in its first two decades of the working of the Constitution of India. It 
took the Supreme Court more than twenty-five years to free itself from the shackles of 
                                                 
81  AIR 1950 SC 27; 1950 SCR 88.  
82  Fali S.Nariman, “Protection of Personal Liberty in India”, in Reflections on Emerging 
International Law - Essays in Memory of Late Subrata Roy Chowdhury, (Bangalore: National Law 
School of India University), p.5.  
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Gopalan which it ultimately did in Maneka Gandhi’s case in 1978.83 Till then 
Supreme Court did not include principles of natural justice or implications of due 
process clause in Article 21 of the Constitution. In Maneka the majority held that the 
mere prescribing of some procedure can not even meet the mandate of Article 21. The 
procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable and not fanciful, 
oppressive or arbitrary,84 thus substantially introducing the principles of natural 
justice in procedural protection of right to life (and personal liberty). Now procedure 
under Article 21 is fair procedure, and law, reasonable law, not any procedure under 
any enacted piece.85        
 The decision in Maneka became the starting point, the spring board for a 
spectacular evolution of law relating to judicial intervention of individuals human 
rights cases. This fresh look at Article 21 has helped the Apex Court in its new role as 
the institutional ombudsman of Human Rights in India.86  
 The trend initiated in Maneka of reading “due process” in right to life and 
personal liberty is further continued in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,87 wherein 
it was observed that: “The word ‘law’ in the expression ‘procedure established by 
law’ in Article 21 has been interpreted in Maneka Gandhi’s case that the ‘law’ must 
be right just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Otherwise it would be 
no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. If it is 
arbitrary it would be violative of Article 14.”88  
 It was again reiterated in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,89 where the court by 
majority took the view that Article 21 after Maneka would read to say that: “No 
                                                 
83  Ibid., p.10.  
84 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, supra n.55, at.613.  
85  Ibid, per Krishna Iyer J., p.659.  
86  Supra n.82, p.6.  
87  Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, supra n.51. 
88  Ibid., p.49, per Desai. J.  
89  Supra n.11 
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person shall be deprived of his life of personal liberty except according to fair, just 
and reasonable procedure established by valid law”.90  This view makes it clear that 
reasonableness under Article 21 is of procedure as well as of law, and this was 
followed by the courts in Mithu v. State of Punjab91 and T. Sareetha v. T.Venkata 
Subbaiah.92 Now Article 21 is not confined to procedural protection only but also 
covers substantive laws.  
 It has been argued that modern concept of right to life encompasses not merely 
protection against arbitrary deprivation of life, but it also places a duty on the part of 
each government to pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the means 
of survival of every individual. This is because there are two main ways of depriving 
the right to life, firstly by execution, torture and other various forms of killing and 
secondly, by starvation and lack of fulfilment of basic needs such as food, basic health 
care facilities and medical care.93  Hence, the right to life now is taken to guarantee 
protection against deprivation of life by means direct or indirect. The state shall not 
deprive life arbitrarily and it has a positive obligation to protect a person against 
anything that would amount to deprivation of life. 
 Now, this right is not confined to mere physical or animal existence. It 
signifies the right to live with basic human dignity, the right to livelihood, the right to 
a habitation or home, the right to education and the right to a clean, healthy 
environment for, without these there can be no real and effective exercise or 
enjoyment of the right to life. The State must also take all possible measures to 
prevent infant mortality, eliminate malnutrition and epidemics, and increase life 
expectancy through a clean and healthy environment and adequate preventive and 
                                                 
90  Ibid., p.30. 
91  AIR 1983 SC 473; (1983) 2 SCC 277.  
92  AIR 1983 AP 356.  
93  F.Menghistu, “The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements”, in B.G.Ramcharan (ed.), The Right to 
Life in International Law, (Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff, 1985), p.63.  
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curative medical facilities. It must make primary education free and compulsory.94 All 
the above mentioned rights which emanated from the right to life are human rights 
enumerated in major international instruments on human rights and which were 
incorporated as Directive Policies under the Indian Constitution. The right to life 
under Article 21 of the Constitution is the heart of the human rights and it has rightly 
received extensive interpretations.  
When occasions arose, courts in India have adopted a dynamic posture and 
resorted to activist role in the implementation and enforcement of these human rights, 
because of the non-enforceability of Directive Principles contained in the Part IV of 
the Constitution. Of late, and rightly so, the approach of the Courts in India has been 
one of social justice. It is a pro-active and goal oriented approach. It penetrates and 
destroys all inequalities of race, sex, power, position, wealth and it seeks to bring 
about equitable distribution of social, economic and political resources of the 
community.95    
 
The concept of public interest litigation with public spirited persons and 
organisations, and also fostered by judicial activism has been increasingly important 
in setting up very valuable records in the sphere of enforcing human rights, especially 
in making the life of man meaningful and worthwhile for those vulnerable, aggrieved 
and oppressed. Entertaining public interest litigation is also an instance of social 
justice approach of the courts.  Cases of violation of human rights are brought to the 
courts in the form of public interest litigations by public spirited persons or 
organisations.  Whenever the Court entertains any public interest litigation relating to 
human rights violation – it is enforcing the provisions of Constitution or the 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, under which human rights are guaranteed, 
protected and enforced in India. 
                                                 
94  V.Vijayabalan, “New Dimensions of Human Rights”, (2000) C.U,L.R. ,Vol.XXIV, p.11.  
95  Justice R.P. Sethi, supra n.58, p.11.  
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CHAPTER – 4 
RIGHT TO LIBERTY  
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4.1 Concept and Meaning  
 
'Liberty' or 'Freedom'1 is considered as the greatest possession of man. Even 
among animals there is an urge to live unhindered and a captive bird or animal 
attempts to shatter the chains or the cage which captivate it in order to live in an 
atmosphere of its own liking. Among human beings, the urge to acquire freedom from 
restraint artificially imposed has been the commonest feature of the long history of the 
human race.2 
"Man is born free; everywhere he is in chains." This statement of Rousseau 
describes what a man sees in the world. The inner urge for freedom is a natural 
phenomenon of human society." 
Man loves that to which he has become habituated. Respect for the life, liberty 
and property of everyman is today not merely a norm for decision or a policy of the 
state but has actually become a principle of the living law.3 
If there is any cause for which men would fight and die willingly, for which 
they would undergo the severest of hardships, for which they would face the firing squad 
and kiss the gallows with resolute heart and beaming face, it is that of liberty, for they 
look upon it as the very quintessence of a civilized and decent existence, something bereft 
of which life should be without honour and dignity, something without which life would 
lose all significance and meaning.4 
Liberty is one of the most essential requirements of the modern man. It is 
said to be the delicate fruit of a mature civilization.5 
The individual cannot attain to the highest in h im unless he is in possession of certain 
                                                          
1  ‘Personal liberty forms part of the wider concept of liberty. According to Herbert W. Schneider : ‘Freedom’ and 
‘Liberty’ are not synonymous. ‘Liberty has a plural; ‘Freedom’ has none (Is there freedom; what liberties are there). 
The liberty of man , p. 655, but according to Charles A. Bread : The two word ‘Freedom’ and ‘Liberty’ are 
interchangeable. Although, there has been a tendency in the English speaking world to treat ‘liberty’ as ‘something 
French, foolish and frivolous’, and ‘Freedom’ as ‘English, solid and sensible’, there is no ground whatever for this 
distinction, Freedom of course, is older in the Anglo-Saxon tongue, but the two words have been employed in English 
thought as substantially identical in meaning, since the 14th century. In their deeper origins, in fact, they possessed 
strikingly similar characteristics; see Freedom in political thought, p. 288.  
2  Dr. Sharma, B.M. and Dr. Chaudhary, C.P., “Expanding Dimensions of Freedom”, p. 1.  
3  Clarence Morris, “the Great Legal Philosophers”. P. 449. 
4  H.R. Khanna, J.,” Inaugural Address”, All India Seminar on Personal Liberty, KLJ, Vol. 4, (1978), p.1.  
5  John. E.E.D., Action, ”Essay on Freedom and power”, p. 53. 
72 
 
liberties which leave him as it were to breathe and expand.   Moreover, freedom is as 
necessary to man as bread and air.6 Liberty of life and personal freedom are the focal 
points of civil liberty. This liberty sustains other liberties because without liberty of life 
and personal freedom no other civil liberty is possible. Life and personal freedom are 
the prized assets of an individual which are basic and primary. 
Liberty, the life-breath of all hitherto revolutions, aims at not only liberty from 
arbitrary restraint, but also at the securing, of those conditions which are essential for the 
fullest development of human personality. Liberty is the eager maintenance of those 
conditions without which man cannot be at his best. Further, liberty has in view not 
only the external situations in which man seeks to realize himself but also the internal, 
mental, moral, and spiritual aspects of his personality. There is no liberty where mind 
is not free. 
 
4.2 Definitions   
 
"The world has never had a good definition of the word 'liberty' and the 
American people are just now much in the need of one. We all declare for 
liberty but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing."  
Abraham Lincoln spoke these words in 1864 but they are just as valid today as 
they were when he uttered them nearly a century ago. 
There is no word that admits of more various significations and has made more 
different impressions on the human mind than that of' liberty. 
It labors under the disease of manifold meanings. Philosophers have spun a 
tremendous web of confusion around it. But we have no need of venturing on that 
tempestuous sea; we shall deal with the word as it has been used in the political 
idiom.7 
Moreover, liberty no less than democracy is subject to a poetical mythological 
transfiguration and in the hands of politicians not seldom is made to mean the opposite 
                                                          
6  B. mishra, Civil Liberties and Indian National Congress Introduction, p. VI (1969). 
7  Gaetano Salvemini, ”Democracy Reconsidered”, p. 332. 
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of what any honest man thinks when he uses the word. Thus Hitler and Mussolini 
maintained that they were endeavoring to gain liberty for their nations in international 
competition and that whoever hampers their nation in the quest of their "living space" 
commuted a crime against their liberty; in this case liberty becomes what 
Montesquieu described as the 'right to bear arms and of being enabled therefore to 
use violence. 
According to Chamber's 'Twentieth Century Dictionary', Liberty means 
"Freedom to do as one pleases, the unrestrained employment of natural rights, power 
of free chance, privileges, exemption, relaxation of restraint, the bounds within which 
certain privileges are enjoyed, freedom of speech and action beyond ordinary 
civility.” 
Almost every moralist in human history has praised freedom, like happiness and 
goodness, like nature and reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that there is 
little interpretation that it seems able to resist.8 
Liberty is an expression of an impalpable atmosphere among men. It is a sense that in 
the things we deem significant there is the opportunity of continuous initiative,    
knowledge  that  we  can, experiment with ourselves, think differently, or act differently 
from neighbors without danger to our happiness being involved therein. We are not 
free unless we can form our plan of conduct to suit our own character without social 
penalties.9 
Liberty may also be defined as the affirmation by an individual or group of his or 
its own essence. It seeks to require the presence of three factors, a certain 
harmonious balance of personality; it requires on the negative side the absence of 
restraint upon the exercise of that affirmation and it demands on the positive side the 
organization of opportunities for the exercise of a continuous initiative. The 
problem of liberty has always been the prevention of those restraints upon the one 
hand that men at any given period of time are not prepared to tolerate and on the other 
hand the organization of those opportunities the denial of which resulted in that sense 
                                                          
8    Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concept of  Liberty” ,p. 6. 
9    Ibid. p.12. 
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of frustration which when widely felt   leads   to   imminent   or   actual disorder. 
For John Stuart Mill, "all restraint, qua restraint is an evil. Laski takes the same 
line and argues that liberty is essentially an absence of restraint.10 According to Locke, 
the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any person to do or forbear any 
particular action according to the determination ' or thoughts of the mind.11 Freedom 
consists in one being able to act or not to act according as one shall choose or will.12 
By liberty we can mean a power of acting according to the determinations of, the 
will.13 According to Jonathan Edwards, 
 "The plain and obvious meaning of the words, 'freedom' and 'liberty' in common 
speech, is power, opportunity or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases, or, in 
other words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or 
conducting in any respect, as he wills. And the contrary to liberty whatever name we 
call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being 
necessitated to do otherwise”.14  
According to John E.E.D. Acton liberty means  
"The assurances that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his 
duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion."15  
Thus liberty may be said to mean, the absence of all restraints on the power of a 
person to act or not to act according to the determination of his will which implies that 
there will be no impediments to exercise that will. 
Those who hold that an individual's freedom lies in   his ability to do as he 
pleases, look upon the coercive regulation of conduct by government as curtailments 
of individual liberty. Those who hold that a person's freedom lies in his ability to will 
as he ought; they regard the obligations imposed by law as no infringement of 
                                                          
10  Harold J. Laski, “Liberty in the Modern State”, (1954),p.48. 
11  Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, Book 2, Ch. 21; pp. 7-8.   
12  Ibid. p. 28. 
13  Hume, “Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding”, (1951) pp.73. 
 
14  Adler, “Idea of Freedom”, (1958), p. 177. 
15  “Essay on Freedom and Power”, p.55. 
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liberty.16 
What seems to be of the permanent essence, of freedom is that the personality of 
each individual should be, so unhampered in its development, whether by authority, or 
by custom, that it can make for itself a satisfactory harmonization of its impulses. 
Restraint is felt as evil when it frustrates the life of spiritual enrichment.  Freedoms 
are opportunities which history has shown to be essential to the development of 
personality.17 
Liberty always demands a limitation on political authority. Power as such when 
uncontrolled is always the natural enemy of freedom.37 The broader the discretion, the 
greater the chance of its abuse. Where discretion is absplute, man has always 
suffered. Absolute discretion is more destructive of freedom than any of man's other 
inventions. And also absolute discretion, like corruption makes the beginning of the 
end of liberty,  
To Lord Justice Denning, liberty means freedom of every law abiding citizen to 
think, what he will to say that he will and to go where he will on his lawful occasions 
without let or hindrance from any other person. It must be matched, of course, with 
social security by which he meant the peace and good order of the community in 
which he live.18 
In countries where dictators suppressed their subjects, by liberty, according to 
John Stuart Mill, was meant protection against tyranny of the political ruler. The ruler 
was generally regarded as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom 
he ruled. As the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon praying in the flock 
than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of 
defense against .his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of the patriots was to set 
limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the 
community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in 
two ways :  
                                                          
16  Supra note 31, p. 24. 
17  Supra note 27, p. 26. 
18  Supra note 27, p. 30. 
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First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or 
rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe and which 
if he did infringe, specific resistance of general rebellion was justifiable. 
Second, Establishment of constitutional checks by which the consent of the 
community or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a 
necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power.19 
Thus, we can examine from the various definitions of liberty that it has not a 
static or rigid content but its content is ever-changing. To some it means 
something and to others it means entirely different. But one  thing 'is clear that 
liberty of a person consists in doing what he desires but his desires have to be balanced 
with the social control that is the exercise of similar desires of other people so that he 
may , not create nuisance for others. Thus, in short, we can say that liberty' in the 
narrower sense is the antithesis of physical restraint or coercion; and in the wider 
sense it means the liberty of a person to do anything he desires, for example, liberty to 
eat, liberty to sleep, liberty to play and so on. 
Whatever, 'liberty' may mean today, the liberty guaranteed by our bills of rights, 
said Roscoe Pound, "is a reservation to the individual of certain fundamental 
reasonable expectations involved in life in civilized society a(nd a freedom from 
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power and authority of those who are 
designated or chosen in a politically organised society to adjust relations and order 
conduct, and so are able to apply the force of that society to individuals."20 
Liberty postulates the creation of a climate wherein there is no suppression of the 
human spirits, wherein, there is no denial of the opportunity for the full growth of 
human personality, whereto head is held high and there is no servility of the human 
mind or enslavement of the human, body. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 John Stuart Mill on ‘Liberty’, p. 3. 
20  “The Development of Constitutional Guarantee of  “Liberty”, p.1. 
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4.3 Right to Personal Liberty 
 
The primitive man had no notion of Fundamental Rights, though he did, have a 
number (memberless) of freedoms which no civilized man can ever have. But these1 
freedoms had no meaning. They were freedoms in wilderness.21 In the feudal society, 
only the ruler, the nobility and the clergy had rights. The emergence of the natural law 
school led to the recognition of the inherent, inalienable and basic freedoms and the 
rights of man. The state made law should not abridge these rights some jurists trace 
the origin of liberty to the ancient Greek civilisation. State was a necessity only for 
the development of human personality.22 
The idea of defining and declaring the rights of man and of citizens is not a very 
recent contribution to political theory. Since the days of French Revolution, it has 
become article of faith for liberalism. Though the Bill of Rights as conceived and 
formulated by the British and American Revolutions were more in answer to the 
sufferings or grievances of their people against she then Rulers than formal declarations 
of abstract rights, but the rights incorporated therein are such essential claims of 
humanity that their declaration and enforcement must be deemed to be the primary 
function of every civilized government. 
The right to personal liberty is one of the most, if not the most important, of the 
human rights. 
 Liberty is the offspring of high civilization. It postulates the creation of a climate 
wherein there is no suppression of the human spirits, wherein there is no denial of the 
opportunity for the full growth of human personality, wherein head is held high and 
there is no servility of the human mind or enslavement of the human body.23 Absence of 
restraints on liberty is a pointer to the index of maturity of democracy in a society. 
But there can't be absolute liberty. It has to harmonised with duties towards society 
and the liberty of others. In fact, restrictions are essential for the preservation of 
                                                          
21   Dr.P. Diwan,’Abrogation of 42nd  amendment’, p. 40. 
22  Barker, “the Yhe Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle”, p. 77.   
23  Khanna, J., 2 IJIL Vol. 18 (1978), p. 133. 
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liberty itself. But the persons in power may be tempted to increase their power and in 
the process limit the liberty of others. Litigation index is a clear pointer to the fact 
that the people holding state power are the main culprits for violation the liberty of 
the common man in the society, by their action or omissions. To safeguard the liberty 
of individuals, most democratic countries have adopted the easiest mode of 
incorporation the fundamental liberties or freedoms which are regarded as essential, 
inalienable, natural human and basic in their constitutions. This ensures 
governmental adherence to certain norms in its dealing with citizens. 
 
4.3.1 Position in India 
4.3.1.1 Historical 
The rights of man were embedded in highly developed ancient Indian civilisation 
and   religion. The ancient Vedas proclaimed liberty of body, dwelling house and life.24 
Even as early as 2500-2000 B.C., in the Indus civilization, the people of Harappa 
enjoyed freedom of religion and worship, although no documents exist to throw any 
light on this subject. The advent of Aryan changed the structure of the community. They 
called the dark-skinned people whom they conquered as 'Dasyus' or 'Slaves' or 
sometime even 'apes'. They had no rights. With the adoption of caste system, rights 
and duties depended upon the status in the community. 
According to Prof. Altekar, ancient Indian writers describe not the rights of citizens 
but the duties of the state from which rights of citizens are inferred.25 King had a duty 
to please the people by maintaining good government. He was responsible to 'Sabha' 
and 'Samiti', representative bodies of the people.  According to Dr. Saletore, excepting 
the tacit sanction of deposing and even killing a willfully and persistently wicked 
monarch and the right of deserting a tyrannical ruler, there were no other privileges 
which amounted to rights in ancient times. 
Kautilya in his 'Arthasastra'26 conceded three kinds of rights to citizens, namely, 
                                                          
24  Rig veda8/38/12 quoted in P.B.Mukherjee, Civil Liberties, p.22.   
25  A.S.Altekar, State and Govt. in Ancient India, p. 38. 
26  See Arthsastra, BK III Chs. XI, XX, BK. IV Cls. VIII & IX Quoted in Saletores’ Ancient Indian Political Thought and 
Institutions, pp. 249, 262, 264. 
79 
 
civil, economic and legal. 
Civil Rights 
He refers first to rights of women: (a) right to property, (b) right to 
remarriage, (c) right to maintenance, (d) right to earn an independent livelihood, (e) 
right to divorce, and (f) right to freedom from torture. 
Economic Rights 
(a) Right to state relief 
(b) Right to property 
(c) Right to possess rent free land 
(d) Right to personal attention 
(e) Right to medical relief 
(f) Right to graze and fodder 
(g) Right to free movement etc. etc. 
Legal Rights 
(a) Right to have recourse to justice 
(b) Right to fair trial 
(c) Right to produce witnesses 
(d) Right to inheritance 
(e) Right to claim remission of taxes 
(f) Right to receive interest 
(g) Right to summon help in danger etc. 
 
The rise of Buddhism and Jainism were certainly a reaction, against the 
deterioration of the moral order existing in the post-Vedic period as also against the 
rights of the privileged classes. The concept of human rights in Buddhist polity was 
more human and liberal and repudiated caste distinctions. After Buddha, Ashoka 
protected and secured the most precious of human rights, particularly right to equality, 
fraternity, liberty and happiness.27 
                                                          
27  Ibid. p.45. 
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With Muslim Invaders came autocracy, despotism and religious fanaticism. Rights 
of people depended upon the nature of the monarch. Except in case of a very liberal 
ruler, non-Muslims did not enjoy rights in the Muslim state of Middle ages. 
There was no question of enjoying freedoms during the British rule, the object of 
which was to strengthen the glory and might of England and to perpetuate the 
domination1 and exploitation of the people of India. British Government followed a 
policy of repression and suppression', a policy of 'divide and rule'. Whatever meager 
reforms were adopted from time to time were the result of reaction of the people. 
The glaring contrast between the ideal of civil liberty which the Indians got from the 
study of English history and literature and its virtual denial in their everyday life under 
the British rule produced a sense of frustration amongst Indians educated on the 
western line. It aroused the spirit of self-respect, nationalism and patriotism in the 
hearts of Indians.28 They learnt the lesson of liberty and other fundamental rights from 
the English Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution and its Declaration of 
Independence which declared the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness as 
inalienable rights and the French Revolution of 1789 and its Declaration of Rights. 
The people of India under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi launched nonviolertt 
struggle to achieve self-government and fundamental rights for themselves. Though 
some militants took to violence also. Lokmanya Tilak advocated that the freedom is the 
birth right of Indians for which they will have to fight.29 
According to him, the political liberty is the solvent of all social diseases and an 
elixir that cures a nation of its maladies and invigorates it with such thoroughness as to 
make it feel its life in every limit. But the Government passed various repressive 
legislations. 
The Government of India Act, 1919 failed to provide any fundamental rights to 
the people. The Nagpur- Session of the Congress in 1980 demanded repeal of all 
repressive laws. On the basis of the report of Sapru Committee, some of these laws 
were repealed. In 1925, "The Commonwealth of India Bill" containing a Bill of rights 
                                                          
28 B.M. Sharma, Expanding Dimensions of  Freedom, p. 207. 
29  N.C. Kelkar, Life Times of Lokmanya Tilak, Vol. p. 108. 
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was unsuccessfully moved. Bombay session of Congress in 1927 demanded 
inclusion of rights in the future Constitution. The Nehru Committee Report in 1928 
also included fundamental rights which it recommended must be included in the future 
Constitution. The Simon Commission however rejected the demand for the inclusion 
of fundamental rights in the future Constitution of India. In 1930, Congress Working 
Committee gave a call for the attainment of 'Purna Swaraj'. The Government adopted 
more repressive measures. Karachi Session of Congress in 1931 adopted a detailed 
programme of 'Fundamental Rights and Duties'. The White Paper issued by the British 
Government after the 3rd Round Table Conference provided that certain including the right 
to personal liberty may be included in the future Constitution of India. But against the 
Government of India Act, 1935 did not contain a declaration of fundamental rights. 
Rather, more repressive measures were adopted to crush the liberties of the people 
during the Second World War. 
Under the Cabinet' Mission Plan of 1946 Constituent Assembly was 
established to frame the Constitution of India 
 
4.3.1.2 Jurisprudence of  incorporation, Article 21 
 
Since the Indian Independence struggle was also a struggle for securing the fight 
to liberty. So, when the Indians got the privilege and responsibility to draft' their 
own Constitution, it was but natural to expect them and they were also under a 
moral but binding obligation to frame a Constitution which guarantees freedoms or 
liberties to all. 
B.N. Rau, Constitution Adviser, in his note to the members of the Constituent 
Assembly, suggested that provision relating to personal liberty should neither be vague 
nor a meaningless guarantee against the oppressive laws.30 
K.T. Shah pleaded for empowering the courts to protect the personal liberty of all 
persons, citizens as well as non-citizens. 
                                                          
30  B. Shiva Rao, “ Framing of India’s Constitution-Selected Documents”, 1967, Vol. II, pp. 30-32.  
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The Constituent Assembly elected an Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, 
which constituted several sub-committees. 
Rau, the Constitutional Adviser, prepared a draft Constitution. The draft Clause 16 
provided: 
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without due process of 
law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories 
of the federation." 
Thereafter, Rau was asked to proceed to U.S.A., Canada, Eire and U.K. to 
consult jurists, constitutionalists and statesmen on the draft Constitution of India. 
Justice Frank further told him that the due process clause in that Section was not 
only undemocratic but also was unfair and burdensome to the judiciary because it 
gave the judges’ power of voting legislation enacted by the representatives of the nation. 
After a careful scrutiny of the draft, the Drafting Committee prepared a revised 
draft constitution and submitted it to the Constituent Assembly. The right to personal 
liberty was included in Article 15, of the revised draft Constitution which provided: 
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law nor shall any person be denied equality before the 
law or the equal protection of the law within the Territory of India." 
Thus, in the revised draft, the phrase, 'without due process of law' was replaced 
by the phrase 'except according to procedure established by law.' 
In the Constituent Assembly consideration of Draft Art. 15 and the amendments 
proposed was postponed on 3rd December, 1948 at the suggestion of T.T. 
Krishnamachari. It was taken up for consideration on 6th December, 1948.31 
In the Constituent .Assembly the supporters of 'due process' clause made a consorted 
attack on the draft Article 15. Kazi Sycd Karimuddin moved an amendment that the 
word 'personal' used before the word 'liberty' be deleted and for the phrase 'except 
according to procedure established by law' the phrase 'without due process of law' be 
substituted. But due to technical procedural reasons,   no   discussion   could   take   
                                                          
31 Ibid. p.67. 
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place   on   the   question   of the deletion of the word 'personal'. However, regarding the 
second part of his amendment, Karimuddin32 argued that "if the words 'procedure 
established by law' are kept then it will not be open to the courts to look into the 
injustice of a law or a capricious provision in a law. As soon as the procedure is 
complied with, there will be an end to everything and judges will be only spectators." 
So he strongly favoured the use of the phrase'due process of law'. Mahboob Ali 
Baig supported the draft Article which included the phrase 'save in accordance with 
law'. The justification given by him for this was that a person must have the right to 
go to the court to establish his innocence and his arrest is wrong. Any law taking 
away this right should be invalid. Such a right is given under the expression 'without 
due process of law' or 'save in accordance with law'. 
Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava opposed the deletion of the word 'personal' but 
supported the use of 'without due process of law' in Art. 15 as proposed by 
Karimuddhv. By using this phrase he argued, 'We want that the courts may be 
authorised to go into the question of the substantive law as well as procedural law.' 
He wanted that courts should have power to inquire whether a law is good or not, just 
or not, protects the liberties of the people or not'? Similarly, courts may also declare 
whether a procedure is just or not,  He suggested that the phrase 'due process of law' 
should mean the same thing as understood in the American law. Rejecting the criticism 
that this phrase is not certain, he said, so are the phrases 'decency' or 'morality' used 
in the draft Art. 13. Recommending the acceptance of the amendment, he observed : 
"If this amendment is carried, it will constitute the bedrock of our liberties. This 
will be a Magna Carta along with Article 13 with the word 'reasonable' in it. This 
is the only victory for the judiciary over the autocracy of the legislature. In fact, 
we want two bulwarks for our liberties. One is the legislature and the other is the 
judiciary. But even if the legislature is carried away by party spirit and is 
sometimes panicky, the judiciary will save us from the tyranny of the legislature 
and the executive." 
                                                          
32  CAD, Vol. III, p. 843. 
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He further observed, "In a democracy, the courts are the ultimate refuge of the 
citizens for the vindication  of their rights and liberties. I want the judiciary to be 
exalted to its right position of palladium of justice and the people to be secure in their 
rights and liberties under its protecting wings," 
Chimanlal Chakkubhai Shah supporting the amendment said that the connotation 
of the new phrase is that the courts will have power to see not only that the 
propedure is followed but also that the substantive law is just and fair and riot 
unreasonable, oppressive or capricious or arbitrary. He said in American there is no 
uncertainty about this phrase as applied to 'life' or 'liberty'. In India 'liberty' is 
controlled by 'personal'. 
Reacting to the argument that judiciary may not be able to fully appreciate the 
necessities of a law in a time of crisis, he remarked 'Sir' is it not better that nine 
guilty men may escape than one innocent man suffers? That is the worst that can 
happen even if the judiciary takes a wrong view. 
According to K.S. Sharma, the phrase 'due process of law' guarantees a fair trial 
both in procedure as well as in substance. Substantive law must be just and appealable 
to the civilised conscience of the community.33 
K.M. Munshi, speaking in favour of the amendment, said that we want to set up 
democracy, the essence of which is that 'a balance must be struck between individual 
liberty on the one hand and social control on the other. This clause would enable the 
courts to examine both the procedural part and the substantive law, to strike such a 
balance. He disagreed with the feeling that this clause may lead to disastrous 
consequences. He observed, "Human ingenuity supported by the legislature and assisted 
by the able lawyers of each province will be sufficient to legislate in such a manner that 
law and order could be maintained." He further, said that legislatures with large 
majorities have tendencies to pass laws in a hurry which give sweeping powers to the 
executive and the police. There will be no deterrent if these legislations are not 
examined by the courts. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar opposed the amendment and the 
                                                          
33  Ibid., H.V. Pataskar also supported the amendment.   
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inclusion of 'due process' clause. He observed : 
Three or five gentlemen, sitting as a court of law, and stating what exactly is 
'due process' according to them in any particular case after listening to long 
discourses and arguments of the briefed counsels on either side, may appeal to certain 
democrats more than the expressed  wishes of legislature or the action of an executive 
responsible to the legislature.  
Referring to lack of uniformity in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, he 
challenged that let any member say that "there is anything like uniformity in regard to 
the interpretation of "due process'." He wanted the matter to be thoroughly examined 
and observed : "I trust that the House will take into account the various aspects of the 
question, the future progress of India, the well-being and the security of States, the 
necessity of maintaining a minimum of liberty, the need for co-coordinating social 
control and personal liberty before coming to a decision." He, however, noted the 
support which the amendment received revealing the faith in the judiciary. Z.H. Lari 
expressed the view that it is necessary not only in the interest of individual liberty 
but in the interest of proper working of legislatures that due process clause should 
find place in the Constitution. He expressed the hope that the Supreme Court in India 
will recognise the limits of individual liberty as well as the necessities of the state while 
interpreting this clause. 
Legislature, according to Lari, in the last analysis, means only the Cabinet or the 
executive and nothing but the executive. He, thus, posed the question 'whether you 
are going to give such powers to the Executive which can infringe even the 
elementary rights of a person, the elementary rights of personal liberty or whether you 
should not put certain checks on the executive? Finally, he observed : 
"If this clause is accepted then the whole constitution becomes lifeless. The article as it 
stands is lifeless. Unless you accept this amendment,  you would not earn the gratitude 
of future generations." 
The consideration, of Art. 15 was again taken upon 13th December, 1948 when 
Dr. Ambedkar was called upon to reply. Dr. Ambedkar pointed to the two sharp 
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points of view. One supporting the inclusion of due process clause, the other 
opposing, it. The question, he said, was whether the judiciary should be given the 
additional power to question the laws made by the state or the ground that they violate 
'certain fundamental principles or that the legislature ought to be trusted not to make 
bad laws. He confessed. "It is very difficult to come to any definite conclusion there 
are dangers on both sides. For myself, I cannot altogether omit the possibility of a 
legislature packed by party men making laws which may abrogate or violate what we 
regard as certain fundamental principles affecting the life and liberty of the 
individual. At the same time, I do not see how five or six gentlemen sitting in the 
Federal or Supreme Court examining laws made by the Legislature and by dint of 
their own individual conscience or their bias or prejudices be trusted to. determine 
which law is good and which law is bad. It is lather a case where a man has to sail 
between charybdis and scylla."Thus he left it to the house to decide the way it likes. 
 
All the amendments were defeated and Draft Article 15 was adopted without 'due 
process clause'34 as Art. 21 of the Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar, informed the Assembly 
in September 1949, that no part of the Draft Constitution has been so violently criticised 
by the public outside as this Article. 
 
4.3.1.3 Protection of Personal Liberty 
 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India declares: 
 
"No   person   shall   be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law." 
 
This enshrines the high value of human dignity and the worth of human person. 
                                                          
34  Article 21 in the Constitution. 
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The spirit of man is at the root of Article 21. Absent liberty other freedoms are frozen.35 
Article 21 provides the protection to against deprivation of life and personal 
liberty to every person, whether a citizen or not. The right guaranteed by this article 
is, however, not an absolute right to life or personal liberty but a right not to be 
deprived of life or personal liberty without the procedure established by law. On the 
one hand, it recognises the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or personal 
liberty and on the other side; it requires that such a deprivation cannot take place 
except according to procedure established by law and that procedure must be just, 
fair and reasonable. 
Thus the State's authority to deprive an individual of his right to life or personal 
liberty is subject to the following of a just, fair and reasonable procedure prescribed 
by a valid law. The law also must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. 
It is   a   protection   which is both substantive and procedural.  
Article 21, though apparently appears as a shield operating negatively against 
executive encroachment over something covered by that shield, in fact, it is the legal 
recognition of both of protection or the shield as well as of what it protects which lies 
beneath that shield. Article 21 now is not confined to procedural protection only, it 
extends to the substance of the law.36 
Article 21 provides protection not only against executive action but also 
against legislative action. What this article requires is first that for depriving a 
person of his life or personal liberty, there must be a legal authorisation for the 
purpose, and the authority must strictly follow the prescribed legal procedure for the 
purpose, which must be just, fair and reasonable. 
 
4.3.1.4 Article 21 : 'Sole Repository' 
 
Article 21 guarantees protection against deprivation of life and personal liberty 
without which all other rights become meaningless. 
                                                          
35  AIR 1978 SC, 597 at p. 657. 
36  See Mithu v State of Punjab , AIR 1983 SC 473. 
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The first important issue which arises in relation to Article 21 is whether it is the 
sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty or that this right exists 
independent of the Article 21 as a common law right. The Supreme Court thoroughly 
examined this matter in the famous Habeas Corpus case, where the detenu contended 
that right to life and personal liberty is guaranteed not only in Article 21 but also 
under the Common Law and Statutory Law. The right to personal liberty is also 
contained in Articles 19, 20, 22 and therefore Article 21 is not the sole repository of 
the right to personal liberty. Rejecting the above argument Ray, C.J. held that 
Article 21 is the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty against the 
State. It embraces all aspects of personal liberty. The right to personal liberty is 
neither a common law right nor a statutory right nor, a natural right. The learned 
judge observed : 
 
"If any right existed before the commencement of the Constitution 
and the’ same right with its same contents is conferred by Part 
III as a Fundamental Right, the source of that right is in Part III 
and none is any pre-existing right. Such pre-Constitution right has 
been elevated by Part III as a Fundamental Right. 
If there is a pre-Constitution right which has become now as 
Fundamental Right, the Common Law right has no separate 
existence under our  Constitution.37   If there be any right other 
than and more extensive than the Fundamental Right in Part III, 
such right may continue to exist under Article 372." 
 
This view was shared by Chandrachud, J. who observed that whether or not Article 
21 of the Constitution is the sole repository of the right to personal liberty, it! is the 
right of the individual freedom nothing more and nothing less. Bhagwati, J. also 
observed that the principle of rule of law is enacted in Article 21 and it does not exist 
                                                          
37  See also B.S. Rao Badami v. State of Mysore, AIR 1969 SC 45. 
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as a distinct and separate principle conferring a right of personal liberty, independently 
and apart from that Article. 
On the other hand, Justice Johanna, in his dissenting judgment, observed : 
 
“Sanctity of life and liberty was not something new when the 
Constitution was drafted. It represented a facet of higher values 
which mankind began to cherish in its evolution from a state of 
tooth and claw to a civilized existence. Likewise the principle that 
no one shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty without 
authority of law' was not the gift of the Constitution. It was a 
necessary .corollary of the concept relating to the sanctity of 
life and liberty. It existed and was in force before the coming 
into force of the Constitution. Article 21 incorporated that 
principle and makes it a Fundamental Right. It does not however 
follow that if Article 21 had not been drafted and inserted in 
Part 111, in that event, it would have been permissible for the 
State to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty without 
the authority of law.” 
 
Elevating to the status of Fundamental Right, of one aspect of the pre-
Constitutional right cannot have the effect of making that right non-existent, if the 
fundamental right is eclipsed, so far as the sanctity of life and personal liberty , is 
concerned  Khanna, J. further observed : 
It is difficult to accede to the contention that because of Article 21 of the 
Constitution, the law which was already in force that no one could be deprived 
of his life or personal liberty without authority of law was obliterated and ceased 
to remain in force. 
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4.4 Personal Liberty  
 
'Personal Liberty' has both narrow and wider meaning. In its narrow sense, it 
means protection against arbitrary arrest or detention. But in the wider sense, h 
includes all liberties essential in a democracy for the development of human 
personality in its fullest extent and happy life. Its purpose is to help the individual to 
find his own viability, to give expression to his creativity and to prevent governmental 
or other forces from alienating the individual from his impulses. In A.K. Gopalan v. 
State of Madras,38 interpreting the term personal liberty in a most restricted form, 
Mukherjee, J. observed79 : 
 
"In the ordinary language 'personal liberty' means liberty 
relating to or concerning the person or body of the individual and 
personal liberty in this sense is the antithesis of physical restraint 
or coercion. According to Dicey who is an acknowledged 
authority on the subject, 'personal liberty' means a personal right 
not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical 
coercion in any manner that does not admit of legal justification. 
It is, in my opinion, this negative right of not being subject to 
any form of physical restraint or coercion that constitutes the 
essence of personal liberty."  
 
Das, J. interpreted 'personal liberty' in a liberal sense and said that Art. 19 
guarantees only some of the freedoms but it does not means that citizens do not have 
other freedoms like freedom to eat what one likes. His Lordship observed : 
"I cannot accept that our Constitution intended to give no 
protection to the bundle of rights which together with the rights 
mentioned in Art. 19 make up personal liberty. Indeed, I regard 
                                                          
38  Ibid. p.88 
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it as a merit of our Constitution that does not attempt to 
enumerate exhaustively all the personal rights but uses the 
compendious expression 'personal liberty' in Art. 21 and protects 
all of them." 
 
Das, J. further said that whatever the intentions of the Drafting Committee might 
have been, the Constitution as finally passed has in Art.  21   used the words   'personal  
liberty'   which  have  a definite connotation in law. It does not mean only liberty of 
the person but it means liberty or the rights attached to the person (jus person arum). 
Art. 19 protect some of the important attributes of personal liberty as independent 
rights and the expression 'personal liberty' has been used in Art. 21 to include all 
varieties of rights which go to make up the personal liberties of men. 
The majority of judges laid emphasis on the fact that the Constituent Assembly 
qualified the word 'liberty' by the word 'personal'. Patanjali Sastri, J. observed that,  
"whatever may be the generally accepted connotation of the 
expression 'personal liberty', it is used in Article 21 in a sense 
which excludes the freedoms dealt within Article 19." 
 
Fazl Ali, J. in his dissenting judgment explained that the expression 'personal 
liberty' has a wider meaning and a narrow meaning. In the wider sense, they include 
not only immunity from arrest and detention but also freedoms of speech, association 
etc. In the narrow sense, they mean immunity from arrest and detention. The juristic 
conception of 'personal liberty' when these words are used in the sense of immunity 
from arrest, is that it consists of freedom of movement and locomotion. 
Thus Sastri, Mukhcrjee and Das, JJ. confined it to mean freedom for unlawful 
detention. In Klmrak Singh v. State o/U.P.39 the Supreme Court properly reviewed the 
issue and lifted it from the restrictive interpretation of the majority judgments in 
Gopalan's case. The majority of the judges held that the phrase 'personal liberty' is 
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used as a compendious term to include within itself all varieties of rights which 
goto makeup the 'personal liberties of man other than those dealt with in Art. 
19(1). The Court thus declared Regulation 236(b),40 which authorised domiciliary visits 
at night, to knock at the door of the person under surveillance, to awake him, if he 
was asleep, to oblige him to open the door and to let the police satisfy itself about 
him, was void. The power of domiciliary visits includes the right to enter within the 
premises and therefore constitute an invasion on the security to one's house. The 
freedom of a person under Article 21 includes the freedom to be alone in one's house 
or the right to receive such visitors as he liked, except, of course, for criminal purposes. 
The Supreme Court realised that personal liberty must include the 'sanctity of man's 
home' and the immunity from an' 'intrusion' into his personal security and his right to 
sleep which is normal comfort and a dire necessity for human existence. The adjective 
'Personal' is used in Article 21 only to distinguish its scope from that of Article 19, 
which already covers some varieties of liberty. 
The minority view was that the right to personal liberty means not only a right to 
be free from restrictions placed on his movement but also freedom from 
encroachments on his private life, as such any calculated interference with the right of 
privacy would also be a breach.of personal liberty. The minority was of the view that 
Art. 19 is not carried out of Art. 21. Both are independent fundamental rights, though 
there is overlapping. 'Personal liberty' has many attributes, some of which are found in 
Art. 19 also. 
In Maneka case,41 the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the attempt of the 
Court should be to expand the reach and ambit of Fundamental Rights rather than 
attenuate their meaning or content by a process of narrow judicial construction. 
The wave length for comprehending the scope and ambit of the Fundamental Rights 
was set by the Court in R.C. Cooper's case,42  so the court's approach must now be in 
tune with this wavelength. 
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Adopting that approach, Bhagwati, J. observed : 
“The expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 is of the widest 
amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute 
the personal liberty of a man and some of them have been raised to 
the status of distinct Fundamental Rights and given additional 
protection under Article 19. So it means that Article 21 includes 
the freedoms mentioned in Article  19 also.” 
 
4.4.1 Right to Privacy 
 
The right to privacy is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution of India. So 
one has to see whether it is included in the right to personal liberty. 
The right to one's protection is as old as the origin of life itself. 'Might is 
Right', justified in the primitive society, stands replaced by the universally 
recognised state's duty to protect its citizens in a politically organised society. Right 
to life and protection expanded its horizons and came to include the right to enjoy 
life, right to liberty, privacy etc. 
The right to privacy is synonymous with the right to be let alone. It is very 
difficult to give any precise definition of the right to privacy. Louis Henkin has said, 
about privacy, 
“Some may define privacy as sum of all private rights. Many, 
however, obviously, contemplate a discrete private right of 
privacy, though they may differ widely as to its character and 
content. So, we find innumerable references to 'the right to let 
alone'. Some contemplate a right to be alone, to be free from 
unwarranted intrusion, to be secreted and secretive, a right to be 
unknown (Incognita) free from unwarranted information about 
oneself in .the hands of others. Unwarranted scrutiny, unwanted 
publicity, a right to intimacy and freedom to do intimate things. 
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Some offer another kind of definition, a right to be free from 
physical, mental or spiritual violation, a right to the integrity of 
one's personality.” 
 
In its broadest uses, privacy is as old as law, implicated in the concept of the 
individual and all that is ascribed to the individual in laws regulating his status and 
his relations, or protecting his person against assault, his reputation against slander, 
his property against trespass or conversion. Some rights which partake of what all of 
us would call privacy (hard-core privacy) are also old in the law, implied, for 
example, in laws against trespass, ever dropping, peeping etc.  
The right to privacy was judicially recognised, in 1904, in Pavesich v. New England,' 
etc., Co.43 where unauthorised use of portrait in an advertisement was held as violation of 
right to privacy. Where a movie studio released a picture called the 'Red Kimono', 
which described the life of a former prostitute who was now living married life for the 
past seven years, the Court held that it was invasion of her privacy. 
"Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than 
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint, it must include 
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right 
to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. Part of our 
claim to privacy is in the prohibition of the fourth amendment 
against unreasonable search and seizures. It gives the guarantee 
that a man's home is his castle beyond invasion either by 
inquisitive or by officious people. A man loses that privacy, of 
course, when he goes upon  the streets or enters public places. But 
even in his activities outside home he has immunities from controls 
bearing on privacy." 
 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declares: 
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The right of the people to be secure in their personal houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be 
violated and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
One of the Warren court's foremost contribution to the American constitutional 
law was its discovery of constitutional right to privacy. Justice Douglas said, "indeed 
during the last two decades the fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures had become, in short hand terminology, 'right to privacy'." 
In Mapp v. Ohio,44 the appellant had been convicted of knowingly having in her 
possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures and 
photographs in violation of Ohio's revised code. The U.S. Supreme Court held,  
"Having once recognised that the right to privacy embodied in the fourth Amendment 
is enforceable against the States, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty 
promise. Because it is enforceable, in the same manner and to like effect as other1 basic 
rights, secured by the due process clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at 
the whim of any police officer who in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to 
suspend its enjoyment. Our decisions, founded reasons and truth gives to the 
individual no more than the right which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police 
officer, no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled and to the courts, that 
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." 
It was not until 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut,45 that the issue of constitutional 
right to privacy came to the forefront. Referring to this case, Henkin declared that "a 
constitutional 'right to privacy', 'eo nomine' and Fundamental, was born in 1965." In this 
case, a Connecticut statute which made the use of the contraceptives  a  criminal  offence  
wasi1 challenged.    The executive and medical directors of the Planned Parenthood League 
of Connecticut were convicted in the circuit court on the charge of having violated the 
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statute as accessories, by giving information, instruction and advice to the married 
person as to the means of preventing conception. The appellant division of the Circuit 
Court agreed-with the judgment and it was also affirmed by Supreme Court of Errors of 
Connecticut. The Supreme Court of United States, held that the statute was invalid as 
an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons and that 
protection against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and 
privacies of life was fundamental and the privacy is a fundamental personal right 
emanating from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which Americans live. 
The decision in Grieswold's case46 mark the first occasion when the Supreme 
Court discussed a composite right to privacy. The importance of this right was recently 
understood by the Barger's Court's heavy reliance upon privacy to justify limiting of 
State abortion statutes. 
In 1969, in Stanley v. Georgia,47 the court set aside conviction for possessing in his 
house an obscene film for his own viewing. It held, "for also fundamental is the right to 
be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions 
into one's privacy." 
In 1972, the court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,48 invalidated conviction for giving 
contraceptive device to a young woman. The court held, 
 
 "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 
 
In Roe v. Wade,49 an unmarried pregnant woman who wished to terminate her 
pregnancy by abortion instituted as action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Taxas, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Taxas criminal abortion 
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statutes, which prohibited abortions except with respect to those procured or 
attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, were 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said that although the Constitution of U.S.A. does 
not explicitly mention any right to privacy, a guarantee of certain areas or zones of 
privacy does exist under the Constitution and "that the roots of that right may be found 
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights in the Ninth 
Amendment and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by first section of the 14th 
Amendment. The right to privacy encompasses a women's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy'. 
The statute prohibiting abortion was struck down. In the context of the zone of 
privay, Blackman, J. stated:50 
"They (earlier decisions) also make it clear that the right has some 
extension to activities relating to marriage, loving v. Virginia 
(miscegenation); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma (Sterilization); 
contraceptives, Eisenstadt v. Baird; family relationship, Prince v. 
Massachusetts; and child rearing and education."51 
 
Referring to the above cases, Henkin remarked : 
"I will not indulge the Professor's delight in dissecting and to his 
satisfaction—demolishing the premises, the conclusions and especially 
the reasoning of the principal opinion in these cases. Whatever grade 
the professors might give to justice Douglas and others for their 
performance in the art of constitutional interpretation, the result is 
clear: It is no longer necessary to eke out privacy in small pieces as 
aspects of-other constitutional rights : there is now a 
Constitutional Right of Privacy." 
 
In 1979, the court struck down a law which imposed two restrictions on 
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unmarried minor's right   to obtain an abortion namely, parental consent or judicial 
authorisation. 
We will know which rights are and which are not within the zone of privacy only 
case by case, with lines drawn and redrawn, in response to individual and social initiatives 
and imaginativeness of lawyers. 
What the court has been vindicating is not a right to freedom from official intrusion 
but freedom from official resolution (i.e. autonomy). 
The right to privacy aggravated uncertainties in jurisprudence of individual rights 
and public good under the Constitution, limitation on government power are re-examined 
and renovate the light of changing philosophies, of both public good and in dual rights. 
This is done by Constitutional modernization by judiciary. 
Jurisprudence uncertainties are aggravated, said Her because consideration has 
focused1 on defining the private Rig! Privacy with little regard to our; other balance, the 
compt "public good". Answer lies in public good that compete 'privacy' in these cases. 
The "goods" balance has never race refined scrutiny. The Court paid virtually no attention 
to the st possible purpose or motive in outlawing contraception. The c pronounced, without 
really telling us why, that before a fetus is quick the state has no proper interest to deny a 
woman's right g abortion, but that even then the mother's health is a sufficient compelling 
interest justifying at least' some interference with Right to Privacy. 
A jurisprudence of balancing of rights and goods cries thinking about public goods. 
Thus, Henkin has called for limitation on the right to privacy but he too recognised the 
right. 
Under the Indian Constitution there is no specific provision relating to the right to 
privacy. In Gopalan's case,52 the court observed that the personal liberty means freedom 
from phys restraints. Such an interpretation does not include a number personal rights 
which a person enjoys under law. Some of ti personal rights include the right to eat, 
drink, smoke, work, leis play or sleep as much as one likes. These rights would not o 
under any of the clauses of Article 19, nor would they come within the restricted scope of 
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Article 21 as interpreted by the majority the Gopalan's case. 
In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.53,  Mr. Justice Subba rao held that the right to 
privacy was included in the right to personal liberty as guaranteed by Article 21. The 
majority, however, that the right was not guaranteed under our Constitution. T 
nevertheless came to the conclusion that so far as the right of people to be secure is 
concerned, it must be included in Article 21 
In Govindv. State of M.P.,54 the petitioner who was sub to surveillance under 
regulations framed by the Government under the Police Act, challenged   these regulations   
on the ground that his right to privacy cannot be permitted. 
Thus the right to privacy is recognised as part of the fundamental rights to personal 
liberty. However, the question arises whether women have this right in the context of 
family relations in India? 
Under the Shastric Hindu Law, woman was given lower social status and was 
discriminated. She was not entitled to independence. She was always under protective 
umbrella of a male person. 'Father protects her in childhood, husband in her youth and the 
son in her old age', was the view expressed by Manu. Birth of daughter was considered as 
misfortune. Female, infanticide and Sati system were well known and often practised. 
The movements started by social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy and various steps 
taken by the Government succeeded to some extent in saving women from these social 
injustices. But their status continued to be inferior. 
The Constitution of India has guaranteed equality of status and of opportunity  and 
has  promised  to  secure social,   economic and 
political justice for all citizens including women. Discrimination against women is 
not only prohibited but special provisions in their favour are permitted. The state has 
been directed to secure equal pay for men and women, adequate means of 
livelihood, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief etc. The 
newly added provision laying down fundamental duties for the citizens makes it 
obligatory to renounce practice derogatory to the dignity of women. One of the most 
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important fundamental right guaranteed to all is the right to personal liberty and as 
have been seen above it includes right to privacy also, which includes the 
personal intimacies of the home, family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and 
child rearing. 
Privacy also includes control over when and by whom the various parts of 
her body may be seen, heard, touched, smelled or tested. The right to decide when 
to beget a child or not should also be included. 
 
4.4.2 Right to Privacy v. Conjugal Rights 
 
The Conjugal rights i.e., the right of the husband or the wife to the society of 
the other is not the creature of statute. But it is inherent in the very institution of 
marriage itself. The Law Commission of India in 71st Report stated, "The essence 
of marriage is a sharing of a common life, a sharing of all the happiness that life 
has to offer and all the miseries that has to be faced in life, an experience of the joy 
that comes from enjoying the common things of the matter and of the sp i r i t  and 
from showering love and affection on one's offspring.  
The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights had its origin in the ecclesiastical 
law of England. But now it has been abolished in England by the Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act, 1970. In India, it was applied as a part of justice, equality and good 
conscience. However, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 erected it as a statutory remedy. The 
purpose of the remedy is to preserve and not to disrupt the marriage. Cohabiting 
means the husband and wife living together as husband and wife. They must l ive  
together not merely as two people living in one house but as husband and wife. 
Through the decree of Restitution of Conjugal Rights, the withdrawing party is 
ordered to return to the conjugal fold, so that consortium is not broken. Consortium 
means 'companionship, love, affection, comfort, mutual services, sexual intercourse'. 
All these belong to married state. Taken together they make up consortium. 
The question of relations between the right to privacy and conjugal rights arose 
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in recent cases, where the validity of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was 
challenged on the ground of violation of Arts. 14 and 21. 
The Andhra Pradesh High Court expressed the view that sexual cohabitation is 
an inseparable ingredient of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The purpose 
of the decree is to force the party to behave and act as husband or wife with the other 
party which includes the duly to have sex also, and in case of wife, even against her 
free-will and consent. The decree transfer the choice to have or not to have sex 
and the- choice to allow or not to allow one's body to be used as a vehicle for 
another human beings' creation to the State. Thus it offends the inviolability of body 
and mind and offends the integrity of such a person (wife) and invades marital privacy 
and domestic intimacies, of such person. The Court further observed : 
 
"Nothing can conceivably by more degrading to human dignity 
and monstrous to human spirit then to subject a person by a 
long arm of the law to a positive sex act."55 
 
Chaudhry, J. who delivered the judgment stated : 
"It cannot but be admitted that a decree for restitution of 
conjugal rights constitutes the grossest form of violation of an 
individual's right to privacy . . . .  The right to privacy 
guaranteed by Art. 21 are flagrantly violated by the decree." 
 
The Delhi High Court, however, has adopted a contrary view. The High Court 
held fist though sexual relations constitute most important attribute of the concept 
of the marriage, but they do not constitute its whole content. Sexual intercourse is 
one of elements that goes to make up the marriage. But it is not the summum 
bonum.56 According to Rohtagi, J. of Delhi High Court, one great defect of Andhra 
judgment is that it regards marriage as a legalised means of sexual satisfaction and 
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not as a partnership for life. The Andhra judgment according to his Lordship is based 
on misconception of the true end of marriage. A disproportionate emphasis on sex, 
almost bordering on obsession has coloured the view  of the learned judge. Delhi High 
Court upheld Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, But an important observation 
having strong bearing on the decision may be noticed when the learned judge 
observed ; 
"Restitution remedy may appear to be survival of the concept of 
the marital unity. Today, it may appear outdated because law is 
fast changing in response to the changing needs and ideals of 
society. But we have to see it with the Hindu eye of 1955." 
 
Thus the learned judge in 1984 behaved as if he was acting and deciding in 
1955, when the right to privacy was not even recognised. 
The Supreme Court of India got the opportunity in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan 
Kumar57 to consider both the above divergent views. Justice S. Mukherjee, speaking 
on behalf of the court, declared, 
 
"We prefer to accept, the view of the learned   single judge of the 
Delhi High Court." 
  
But unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not consider the question of wife's 
rights to privacy. The court was influenced by the method of execution of the decree 
of restitution of conjugal rights. 
From the above judgments.58 ; it is evident that the question of women as an 
individual, havin'g ' separate entity from her husband, having the right to privacy 
against her own husband, while matrimonial bond continues, has attracted judicial 
attention, though jyith no final determination. Andhra Pradesh High Court has 
adopted the extreme positive view, recognising the right to privacy and declaring 
                                                          
57  AIR 1984 SC 1562 
58  Supra note 21. 
103 
 
the judicial intervention through the decree of restitution of conjugal right as 
barbarous and flagrant violation of the right to personal liberty of the woman. 
 Though the court does not expressly direct the wife to submit herself to the 
lust of her husband but that is implied as she is required to -behave like a wife, which 
phrase implies certain obligations towards the husband. This judgment is 
important not from the angle of more emphasis on sex, nor should it be rejected as 
insignificant because of it. Rather it is important because it has provided an 
important weapon in woman's arms for not only  protecting the existing rights but 
for acquiring more  rights and thereby enhancing their status vis-a-vis men's. 
The Delhi judgment is devoted to the rejection of Andhra Pradesh view. It did not 
go into the question of the right to privacy of a woman as an individual. It opined against the 
introduction of constitutional law in home and compared it with a 'bull in china shop'. It 
observed that in privacy of home, and married life, neither Article 21 and nor Article 14 
have any place. But at the same time, it recognised that in the, home the consideration that 
really obtains should be natural love and affection. That may be accepted but it is only 
where love and affection are missing, it is only where the man, in the present day, continues 
his primitive supremacy and forces his force on the woman forgetting that she is wife, an 
object to be loved and well treated, that the principles of highest law of the land 
guaranteeing certain rights for the protection of one's privacy and also social status 
become relevant.' These rights are not for the one half of the population and thereby 
depriving the other half of their fruits. In the married life, it is companionship, regard and 
affection for each other, which would include enjoyment of each other which is more 
important.  
The Supreme Court  rejected the Andhra view and declared that Section 9 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, if the 
purpose of the decree is understood in its proper perspective and the method of its 
execution, in cases of disobedience, is kept in view. Both the Andhra Pradesh High Court 
and the Supreme Court put emphasis on the method of execution and sanction for 
disobedience. By taking into consideration that sanction is only financial i.e., attachment 
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of property, they treated it as valid. It is, however, submitted that where punishment for an 
offence is only fine and not imprisonment it does not cease to be an offence, nor justified. 
Similarly, if method to execute the decree of conjugal rights is by way of attachment of 
property, it does not cease to be forcible or binding. The woman, who stands the, risk of 
having her entire property attached, certainly would stand compelled to submit to the decree 
and its consequences. 
Thus it is quite obvious that the wife has the right to privacy and decree of 
restitution of conjugal rights may, in certain situations, amount to intrusion into her 
privacy. There is no absolute right to personal liberty under the Constitution and so is 
also the right to privacy. The woman by agreeing to marriage, by going through its 
ceremonies, may be deemed to have accepted restrictions But this is only  so  long  as  
love  and  affection  continues,   mutual affection and regard  continues and  the 
principles  of two —in one-ship continues.   Once all this comes to an end, whether 
resulting in judicial separation or divorce or not reaching that stage, the self-accepted  
restrictions on one's privacy stand restricted. Though the husband is not required to 
get the consent or obtain willingness of his wife, each time, while making  advances  
towards  her  as that  is implied in marriage, but once he is resisted, her privacy takes  
precedence, and he has to  respect  it. She may be tired, sick or otherwise under 
depression and thereby unable to participate, he should respect it and resist himself, 
and otherwise it may amount to violation of her privacy. Wife, also as an individual, 
having her own existence and distinct entity from her husband, has the right to take 
certain decisions, when she is involved or is affected. Sometimes, these may be with 
the concurrence of an in consultation with him.    
But sometimes, these decisions may be against his will. The question as to 
when she should beget a child, or how many children to beget, depending on 
physical, mental or economic conditions, should be decided by both. The man should 
not force his force on her. Whether family planning methods should be adopted or not 
and child, which methods, should also be decided by both. The husband should not 
unreasonably act against her wishes. Even in these matters, in reality, the woman is   
subjected to, inconveniences and sufferings. Most men want their women to adopt 
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family planning and themselves opting out. All these prevailing realities show that   
equal status continued to be denied to women, ignoring their individual personality.   
If the right to privacy of the women is recognized, it would provide a modern 
weapon   in her arm, not only to protect the existing rights and privileges; but also 
further enhancing her social status and personality. 
 
4.4.3 Right to Reputation 
 
The right to personal liberty includes the right to reputation. Any person 
making any defamatory statement against another is liable for action both under 
the Civi and Criminal Law. In Kailash Nath v. State of UP59 where cancellation of 
arms licenses was challenged, the Allahabad High Court held that though there is 
no right to license for fire-arms but cancellation of one already issued with 
opportunity of being heard may violate Art. 21. The Court held that the act or 
cancelling or refusing to renew a license leads to grave consequences. It may 
affect the license-holder's security or protection and 'may even be a slur on his 
reputation'. However, the court observed that if prior opportunity is not possible, 
post-decisional opportunity must be given. 
The question regarding the right-to reputation came before the Supreme Court in 
Sowmitheri Vishnu v. Union of India60 where the petitioner challenged proceedings 
under Section 497 IPC on the plea that, though she is not a party to the proceedings, 
her reputation is being affected. The Court rejected her contention but held that the 
victim of adultery is entitled to defend her reputation in proceedings under Section 
497 IPC. Thus the Court recognised that right to reputation is a part of the right to 
personal liberty. 
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4.4.4  Liberty to Travel Abroad 
 
If right to travel all over the world had not been a human, right and a 
constitutional right, the human heritage would have been more hapless, the human 
family more divided the human order more unstable and the human future more 
murky. 
 
Swami Vivekananda, dwelling on the nation's fall of the last century, observed. 
 
"My idea as to the key note of our national downfall is that we do not 
mix with other nations—that is- the one and the sole cause. We never 
had the opportunity to compare notes. We were kupam-andukas (frogs in 
a well)."61 
 
Personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person. Travel makes liberty 
worthwhile. The spirit of man is  at the root of Art. 21. absent liberty, other freedoms 
are frozen. 
Jurists' Conference at Bangalore in 1969 declared : 
 
"Freedom of movement of the individual within or in leaving his 
own country, in travelling to other countries and in entering his 
own country is a vital human liberty. Moreover in an 
interdependent world requiring for its future peace and progress 
on over-growing measure of international understanding, it is 
desirable to facilitate individual contacts between people and to 
remove all unjustifiable restraints on their movement which 
may hamper such contacts-"  
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In early common law, a British citizen could riot go out of the country without the 
permission of the king, as it deprived the king of his services. The Constitution of 
Clarendon of 166 also forbade clergymen to leave 'England without the license of 
the Crown. The origin of the right to travel abroad may however be traced to 
Magna Carta which declared : 
"In future, it shall be lawful for any man to leave and return to 
our kingdom unharmed and without fear. by land, or water, 
preserving his allegiance to us, except in time of war, for some 
short period, for the common good of the kingdom.” 
But a British citizen can .travel abroad only if he is able to secure a 
passport. In the United Kingdom, granting a passport is entirely a matter of royal 
prerogative which is exercised on behalf of the Queen by the foreign office. Thus, 
in the United Kingdom one can leave the realm only with the royal permission but, 
according to David W. Williams, by convention that permission is hardly refused. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights also provides:  
"Everyone has the right to leave any country including his 
own, and to return to his country.” 
In the United States, the right to travel abroad may be said to be covered by 
the 5th Amendment of the Constitution which guarantees the right to liberty. ^The 
United States Supreme Court held that the right to remove from one place to 
another according to one's inclination is an attribute of personal liberty. 
In Kent v. Dulles,62 where the petitioner was denied passport in pursuance of 
the regulation requiring him to submit an affidavit that he has never been a 
communist, Douglas, J. held : 
"Freedom of movement across; frontiers in either direction and 
inside frontiers as well, wasia part of heritage. . . . Freedom of 
movement is basic in our scheme of values." 
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In Harberi-Apthakar v. Secretary of State,63 the court held that Section 6 of the 
Subversive Activities Control Act, which barred the application for or use of a 
passport by a member of an organisation ordered to register by the board as a 
Communist action organisation, was an undue restriction on the right to travel abroad 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.   Douglas, J. observed ;   
"Freedom of movement at home and abroad is important for job 
and business opportunities for cultural, political and social 
activities for all the commingling which gregarious men enjoy. 
Those with the right of free movement use it at times for mis-
chievous purposes. But that is true of many liberties we enjoy. 
We nevertheless place our faith in them, and against restraint, 
knowing that the risk of abusing liberty so as to give rise to 
punishable conduct is part of the price we pay for the free 
society." 
"Travel abroad is more than a mere privilege accorded to 
American citizens. It is a right, an attribute of personal liberty 
which may not be infringed upon or limited in any way unless 
there is full compliance with the requirements of due process." 
In Woodward v. Rogers,64 the loyalty oath for passport was held to be violative 
of the right to travel abroad under the Fifth Amendment. 
Although the right to travel across the frontiers of nations is now well 
recognised both under the international and municipal laws, but every country 
exercises its inherent power to regulate such crossing of borders, by insisting air 
passports or visas or by laying down other conditions like those of vaccinisation or 
certification about not being affected by contigious diseases like AID. The use of 
passport for travelling across the frontiers became more frequent in the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century. It is only after the First World War that the present 
system of passport was introduced. 
                                                          
63  Ibid. 
64  344 Fed. Sup 974 (1872). 
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A passport is a political document. It is a piece of evidence as to the 
nationality of the holder of the passport and the request by the issuing authority to a 
country to treat him as such and grant him protection and assistance which he may 
need. In modern time, it has become a condition for free travel. In India, before 
1967, there was, no restriction on exist but entry was regulated by the Passport 
(Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the rules made there under. In 1966, Kerala High 
Court interpreted Art. 21 to include the right to travel across the frontier either  side 
and   the right to get  a passport for that. 
In Satwant Singh Sawhney v.D. Ramanathan, Assistant Passport Officer65 the 
Supreme Court held that the right to travel abroad is a fundamental right. Since 
there is no law regulating or depriving any person of such a right, refusal to give a 
passport or the withdrawal of one already given, violated Article 21. The 
expression 'Personal Liberty' in Article 21 includes the right of locomotion and to 
travel abroad, but the right to move throughout the territories in India was not 
covered inasmuch as it was specifically provided in Article 19. Under Article 21, 
no person could be deprived of his right to travel abroad except according to 
procedure established by law. 
Mr. Justice Hidaytullah and Mr. Justice Bachawat did not agree with the 
majority opinion. Hidaytullah, J. speaking on behalf of himself and Bachawat, J. 
observed, "A person is ordinarily entitled to a passport, unless, for reasons established 
to the satisfaction of the court, the passport may be validly refused to him. Since an 
aggrieved party can always ask for a mandamus, if he is treated unfairly 'it is not 
open by straining the Constitution, to create an absolute fundamental right to a 
passport where none exists under the Constitution. There is no doubt a 
fundamental right to equality in the matter of grant of passport exists, subject to 
reasonable classification, but there is no Fundamental fight to get a passport. A 
passport is a political document. The solution of a law of Passport will not make 
things better. Even if a law was to be made the position would hardly change 
                                                          
65 AIR 1967 SC 1836. 
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because the utmost discretion will have to be allowed to decide upon the worth of an 
applicant. Where the passport authority is proved to be wrong a mandamus will 
always set the matter right." 
In 1967, Parliament passed Passport Act, 1967, which regulates the right to 
leave India to travel abroad as well as the right to enter India. It prohibits departure 
of a person from India without a passport. It lays down the procedure for obtaining a 
passport and also the grounds on which it may be refused or revoked or impounded. 
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,66 the right to travel abroad was 
exhaustively considered by the Supreme Court and it was reiterated that the right 
to personal liberty includes the right to go abroad which includes the right to get 
passport. This right, however, may be affected according   to   procedure established   
by   law which  must  be just, fair and reasonable  an not arbitrary  or fanciful. Chief 
Justice Beg observed: 
"It seems to me that there can be little doubt that the right to 
travel and to go outside the country which orders regulating 
issue, suspension or impounding and cancellation of passports 
directly affect must be1 included, in the right to personal 
liberty.” 
The same view was expressed by Justice Bhagwati that Article 21 includes the 
right to go abroad. So after the decisions in Satwant Singh and Maneka, it is settled 
law that right to personal liberty includes the right to go abroad and for this to get 
passport, subject to deprivation according to procedure established by law, which 
must be just, fair and reasonable: Where it is not possible to give reasonable 
opportunity before confiscation of the passport, it must be given immediately 
thereafter, otherwise, it will be violation of Art. 21 as confiscation will be without 
procedure established by law. 
                                                          
66 AIR 1978 SC 597. 
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RIGHT TO EQUALITY 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern democracies such as the Indian Union provide citizens with greater 
social and political rights, a higher standard of living, more leisure and better 
educational opportunities.1 The extension of these benefits to more and more 
citizens during the past hundred years or so has been described as the process of the 
growth of the citizen or basic human equality- the fundamental rights due to 
individuals by virtue of their membership in a State. With the increasing 
democratization of governments, the fundamental problem has been to pull down 
the barriers of segregation and to offer equal opportunities to all. The aim of 
democracy has everywhere been to eliminate "man made, socially fostered, 
discrimination that has enlarged for some and has restricted for others avenues that 
lead to education, income and advancement.2”   
However, this doesn’t mean a refusal to recognize the natural differences in 
character and intellect. Owing to the differences in gifts which nature has bestowed 
on some and denied to others, natural inequality has been and must continue to be 
fact in society. Democracy however believes that in a climate of equal 
opportunities and privileges alone the differences in mental and moral equipment of 
man can best come out. The chief problems, which every government has to solve, 
are to reconcile this natural inequality as a fact with principle of Natural Equality 
Doctrine.3 The author attempts to discuss this reconciliation process in India to 
provide social and legal equality to the citizens. 
 
                                                            
1  Thompson, Dennis F: John Stuart Mill and Representative Government, (Princeton, NJ, 1976), P. 164. 
2  Lipson, Leslie: The Great Issues of Politics, (Bombay 1973), and p.145. 
3  Bryce, James: Modern Democracies, Vol. I, the World Press Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1962. 
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5.1 Ancient India 
 
So far as the Ancient Indian Culture and Civilization is concerned, the 
Vedas and Smritis speak highly of equality and brotherhood-'Vasudhaika 
Kutumbakam (One World One Family)'. "The entire world is a family" was the 
motto of Vedic civilization.4 All had equal opportunity in all walks of life in 
ancient India. The Vedic age was more liberal in providing equal status to the 
people. Buddhism, Jainism, Shaivism, Vaishnavism, Sikhism and other indigenous 
Indian religions also preach the principles of brotherhood and equality.  
In Bhagavadgita, Lord Krishna, the philosopher king and the incarnation of 
the Supreme God, too has preached the equality of all souls. However, the Supreme 
Lord himself created the four hypothetical classes in the human society on the basis 
of Guna, i.e., ability or nature of an individual, and the Karma, i.e., deeds or jobs 
performed by an individual, and not on the basis of birth.5 Whereas the membership 
in a tribe or caste is determined by birth and is different from the membership in 
these classes.  These hypothetical four classes are intellectuals and priests 
(Brahmana varna), rulers and warriors (Kshatriya varna), agriculturists and 
business persons (Vaishya varna), and artisans and other workers (Shudra varna) in 
a given society. These four classes include the thousands of real castes and tribes in 
this world.  Each caste/tribe falls into one of these four hypothetical Vedic classes. 
The so-called casteism or the tribalism is based on the tribal and religious 
differences. Naturally, certain groups have monopolized certain trades. The 
tribalism segregated the society into ghettos of isolation and exclusiveness, sealing 
                                                            
4  Yajur Veda - XXXVI-2. 
5  . Prtabhavananda, Swami and Isherwood, Christopher, ' The Song of God: Bhagavadgita, p. 51. 
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the society into insulated social divisions.  This has been the case in every nation 
and society.  
Added to this were gifts from a millennium of Islamic rule and occupation, 
such as the Purdah system among women and the child marriages. Then British 
rulers created a class of loyalists with an emphasis on communal and feudalistic 
basis and awarded them with titles, patronage and privileges. This created further 
discriminatory dimensions in the Indian society. 
 
5.2  Reformation 
 
Since ancient times, there have been efforts by enlightened Indians to bring 
about equality through social and religious reforms, e.g., Lord Budha (5th century 
BC), Mahavir (5th century BC), Ashoka (2nd century BC), Shankara (7th century 
AD) etc.  In the beginning of the nineteenth century a new process of social 
reforms started which received an impetus at the time of independence movement 
in 20th century. A pioneer among these reformers was Raja Ramamohan Roy.  He 
compiled and edited the Hindu personal law of marriage, inheritance, religious 
worship, woman's status, woman's property and caste system, by introducing the 
most liberal principles of justice and equality. He worked out a synthesis of eastern 
and western social values and postulates against the common background of 
humanity.6  He also started a movement for the emancipation of the oppressed 
classes and urged a return to the original Vedantas and for a total rejection of all the 
religious and social impurities that had crept into Indian society.7 
                                                            
6   Seal, Brajendranath, 'Rammohan Roy: The Universal Man', Raja Rammohan Roy Century Volume, part II, Sadharan 
Brahmo Samaj, Calcutta (1993), pp.108-9. 
 
7  Bose, S.C.; The Indian Struggle, Asia Publishing House, Bombay (1967), P. 20. 
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Swami Vivekananda strongly condemned the social evil of segregation as a 
non-Hindu attitude. He said, "It is not in the holy books," and " don’t touchism is a 
mental disease".8 Mahadev Govind Ranade regarded social advancement as the 
necessary prelude to political emancipation. Under the moral law, all men and 
women are equal and it is the supreme duty of man to love man and God with 
devout sincerity and reverent faith.9 
Mahatma Gandhi fought against the social evils of racism, imperialism, 
communalism and segregation (so-called untouchability). He was very much 
against social injustices, tyrannies and oppressions. According to Mahatma, 
'segregation was not a vital art of Hinduism, but was only an excrescence and a 
plague.10 The list of reformers goes on and on.  It is impossible to describe all 
reformers of even modern age in this essay because of time and space limitations.  
All socio-political changes in any society result from the thoughts of 
eminent thinkers. These thoughts influence not only a particular society or country 
to which a thinker belongs to, but many other parts of the world also. Such has 
been the case with the ideas and means suggested for attaining the social equality 
conceived by western thinkers, as well as their Indian counterparts. With the 
movement of time the notion of equality which was confined merely to social and 
political thinking became a matter of legal consideration. 
As such the awakening in the 19th and 20th centuries are affected by 
consideration of equality which has been incorporated in the Indian Constitution as 
well. Thus equality has a history of its own in becoming a legal doctrine. 
 
                                                            
8  Vivekananda, Swami: India and Her Problems, (Advaita Ashram, Calcutta, 1963) P. 81. 
 
9   Roy, M. N. and Mukherji, A; India in Transition (Geneva< Edition Se la Libraire, J. B. Target, 1922) P. 177. 
10  Gandhi, M. K.: the Voice of Truth, Vol VI (1968). Gandhi, M. K., The Removal of Untouchability, (1954) P. 20. 
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5.3  Principle of equality  
 
Equality is a very vital principle of social justice. While it is a boon to the 
poor, the oppressed and the downtrodden, it is dreaded by the rich and prosperous 
section of the society, because it can be stretched beyond the limits of justice. As 
Hobhouse has observed:- 
 
"Justice is a name to which every knee will bow. Equality is a 
word which many fear and detest". 
 
The problem of equality has baffled political thinkers and social reformers 
from the earliest time. Aristotle defined equality as treating equals equally and 
unequals unequally. The modern idea of equality on the contrary focuses attention on 
its substantive aspect and seeks correction of inequalities in so far as they are unjust 
and alterable according to prevailing social consciousness. The French declaration of 
the rights of man and citizen read: 
 
"Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions 
can be based only on public utility." 
 
Law is the expression of the general will. It must be the same for all whether 
it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in its eyes, are equally eligible to all 
public dignities, places and employments according to their capacities and without 
any other distinction then that of their virtues and talents. 
Mere formal equality is not enough for oppressed and exploited sections of the 
society which not only need to protection but in substance it requires removal of unjust 
and oppressive conditions which are capable of alteration. The principles of equality 
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demands that we may concede to only such discrimination as is based on rational 
grounds. What is rational depends on the level of prevailing social consciousness. 
 
5.4  Equality before the law   
 
Article 14 of the Constitution provides:11 
"The State shall not deny to any person equality before the 
law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of 
India."  
Thus the Indian Constitution uses two expressions: “Equality before the 
law" or "the equal protection of laws". Whereas the term 'equality before the 
law' owes its origin to the English Common Law and has been incorporated in 
almost all written Constitutions that guarantees the right to equality; 'equal 
protection of the laws' is indebted to the American    Constitution.     Generally    
speaking,   the terms 
'Equality before the law' and 'equal protection of the laws' are 
apparently identical, but in fact they carry different meanings. The 
expression 'equality before the law' means absence of any privileges in 
favour of any person and hence it seems to be somewhat a negative concept. 
The Nagpur High Court in Sivshankar v. Madhya Pradesh State Government 
distinguished between the two expressions, namely, equality before the law 
and the equal protection of the laws, as thus, "while both the expressions 
aim at establishing what may be regarded as equality of legal status for all, 
there is some difference between these expressions. The former expression 
is somewhat a negative concept implying the absence of any special 
                                                            
11  The Constitution of India ( op.cit.), p. 4. 
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privilege in favour of any individual, while the latter is a more positive 
concept implying equality of treatment in equal circumstances".12 
All that is meant by equality before law is that the state shall not by 
any promulgation of laws or in the application of a law discriminate 
between citizens similarly placed. Equal justice and equal treatment is 
guaranteed by the state.13 Ivor Jennings has defined the term Equality 
before law as the following: 
 
"Equality before the law meant that among equals the 
law should be equally administered, that like should be 
treated alike . . . .  The right to sue and be sued; or to 
prosecute and be prosecuted, for the same kind of action 
should be the same for all citizens of full age and 
understanding and without discrimination of race, 
religion, wealth, social status or political influence".14 
 
Likewise in Chiranjit Lai v. Union of India, it was held that there 
should be no discrimination between person and person holding similar 
positions vis-a-vis any legislation.15 
Dicey enunciated his principle of the 'rule of law' as thus; 
 
"Supremacy or predominance of law as distinguished 
from mere arbitrariness. . . .  It means again equality 
                                                            
12  Indian law reports, 1951, Nagpur, p. 646.  
13  Ramchandran, V.G. : Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Remedies,Vol. 1 (Lucknow, 1972) p. 211. 
14  Jennings, Ivor : The law and the Constitution, London, 1955, Edition, p.49.  
15  A.I.R. 1951, S.C., p. 41. 
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before the law or equal subjection of all persons to the 
ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary 
law Courts. . . .  It means that in England no man is 
above the law but every man whatever his rank or 
condition may be is subject to the ordinary law of the 
land".16 
 
Nevertheless this equality before law is not absolute but is subject to as 
provided under the Constitution of Eire, to 'differences of capacity physical and 
moral and of social functions'. Any wrongful act or breach of the law will be 
dealt with in similar way whether the offender is a peasant, Public Officer, or a 
man of high social position. May be each in his sphere may have his own vast 
powers but in the eye of law they are all equal. However, certain privileges and 
immunities are given to heads of States, foreign sovereigns, and Ambassadors. 
Article 361 of the Constitution clearly provides exceptional treatment to executive 
heads of the Union and the States, Public Officials etc. Further, Parliament has the 
power under Article 246 to legislate in respect of foreign ambassadors (Entry 1, of 
list 1 of 7th Schedule) and of foreigners (Entry 17 of list I of 7th Schedule).17 
Equality before the law signifies equal justice to all. Right to equal 
access to Courts is a natural corollary to the equal protection clause.18 Equal 
availability of the legal aid is next important principle to bring about equality in 
true sense of the term. Consequently, in England the necessity arose for the 
passing of the Aid and Advice Act, 1949. Such legal aid to the poor in India is 
equally essential for the guarantee of equality before the law. In other words 
                                                            
16  Ramchandran, op. cit. p. 211. 
17 Ibid.  
18  Barbier v.Connelly ( 1885  ), 113, United State, p. 27. 
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law must be within the easy reach of all to enjoy the benefits thereof. 'By its 
costliness or cumbersome procedure, the poor or the ignorant should not be 
denied the opportunity to reap the benefits of equality before the law'. Further, 
no one only on grounds of his superior social status, position or wealth should 
have a special treatment under the law of the land at the cost of justice. 
Furthermore, no individual should have a differential treatment as compared to 
other individuals in similar circumstances and possessing the same qualifications.19 
The term equality before law does not mean absolute equality or 
identical treatment. It more or less implies absence of privilege on grounds of 
birth, religion, race etc. It further means that among equals the law shall be 
equal and shall be equally administered. 
It may be noted here that   the   word used in Article 14 is 'person' and 
not citizen. Hence, the right to equality is provided to every Indian not as a 
citizen but as a human being. Moreover, the Courts held that 'law' in Article 14 
was not confined to the law enacted by a legislature but also includes an order 
or notification of the executive.20 
This may be regarded as the correct interpretation of the provision under 
Article 14. Moreover, the Constitution provides safeguards only against 
discrimination in the sphere of state actions and has nothing to do with the 
discrimination made by private individuals.21 However, right to equality before 
law is also applicable to non-citizens as well as aliens excepting enemies of war. 
But the State can pass legislation which may affect the status of aliens and also 
                                                            
19  Ramchandran, op. cit., p. 221. 
20  The state of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, S.C.R., 1952, p. 28.  
21  P.D. Shamdashani v. The central Bank of India, Ltd., A.I.R.,1952, S.C. p. 59. 
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can make discrimination in favour of one class of aliens as against the other 
under different circumstances’.22 
5.5 Provisions against discrimination on grounds of religion, race caste, sex or 
birth 
 
The Constitution of India devotes a separate article for preventing any 
kind of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth 
or any of them. Article 15 consists of four clauses out of which first two provide 
against discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth in 
different spheres and the rest deal with the exceptions to which the main provision 
will not apply. Originally this article had only three clauses and the State was 
permitted to make special provision for women and children. Meanwhile the 
Supreme Court declared "the Madras Communal Government Order" as ultra 
vires in The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorai Rajan case as it violated the 
provision under clause 1 of Article 15.23 This judgment of the Supreme Court 
resulted in the First Amendment Act of 1951 which added clause 4 in Article 15. 
This new clause has practically cooled down the spirit of the Article itself since 
right to equality cannot prevent state to make special provision for the 
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes In a caste-
ridden society like India classes have been identified with castes, sub-castes, and 
communities. On the importance of caste system in India J.H. Morris Jones has 
significantly remarked "caste (or sub-caste or communities) is the core of 
traditional politics. To it belongs a complete social ethos. It embraces all and is 
all embracing. Every man is born into particular caste or group and within it 
                                                            
22  Ramchandran, op. cit. p. 222. 
23  S.C.R., 1951, p. 525. 
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inherits a place and situation in the Society for which his whole behavior and 
outlook in ideas, at least, to be derived."24 
Article 15 of the Constitution25 lays down: 
 
"(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race,  caste, sex, place of 
birth  or any  of them be subject to  any disability, liability, restriction 
or   condition with regard to — 
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public 
entertainment, or 
(b) the use of wells,  tanks,  bathing ghats,  roads and places of public 
resort maintained wholly or partly out of state Funds or dedicated   
to  the use of the general public. 
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from  mak ing any provision 
for women and children. 
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29   shall prevent the State 
from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially 
and educationally  back ward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled  
Castes  and the Scheduled Tribes." 
 
Clause 2 of Article 29 provides that "No citizen shall be denied 
admission into any educational institution maintained by the state or receiving aid 
out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of 
                                                            
24  Quoted by Sir Sik, V.M., Political Behavior in India, University of Puna, 1965, pp. 246‐47. 
25  The Constitution of India, op. cit., pp. 4‐5. 
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them". Here the word 'State'in relation to Fundamental Rights connotes "the 
Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the legislature of 
each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India 
or under the control of the Government of India."26 
The word 'discrimination', according to the Oxford Dictionary, means 
to 'make an adverse distinction with regard to or distinguish unfavourably from 
others'. The prohibited discrimination under Article 15 is limited to specific 
grounds, e.g., religion, race-, caste, sex or place of birth. Any discrimination 
other than those mentioned above has to be viewed under the general Article, i.e., 
Article 14, if it is consistent and reasonable or not. If it is to be found that it is 
inconsistent and unreasonable with the demands of the changed situation than 
Article 14 prohibits it. A prohibition, for example, to employ children below a 
certain age will not be valid as it will be injurious to their health. Women may 
also be prohibited from working in mines as that is unsuited to their strength and 
health. In this connection, to fix physical fitness as a criterion for entry to certain 
kinds of employment is quite reasonable. 
A perusal of Article 15 reveals that whereas its first clause specifies various 
prohibitory grounds for the State within its competence, the second clause 
restraints both the State and the private individual whoever may be in control of 
the public places, as mentioned in the clause concerned. But the third clause 
provides special power to State to protect women and children. And a special 
clause four has been added to Article 15 by the First Amendment Act, 1951, so 
as to provide particular attention to socially and educationally backward classes. 
Discrimination is prohibited against any citizen or grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. It is, however, permitted 
in favour of women and children for obvious reasons, and special provision may 
                                                            
26  Article 12 of The Constitution of India. 
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be lawfully made for them. This is quite in accordance with the basic purposes of 
Constitution as outlined in its preamable, and also follows as an essential 
corollary to the principles of secular democracy. Following are certain points in 
clause (i) of the Article 15 which requires further explanation. 
That, Article 15 is meant only for Indian citizens. Resident aliens in India 
do not come with its scope.27 However, this may not deter others from painting 
out to the Court when they are directly affected (or prosecuted) that the law in 
question is void under the Constitution.28 Then can, in their defence, plead the 
law to be void under article 15, but they cannot enforce a fundamental right under 
that article.29 In United States of America persons other than discriminated against 
can raise the question of validity of statute or law.30 But in India, only the affected 
persons, under Article 32, can move to the Supreme Court.31 
5.6 Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment 
 
Equality of opportunity in matters of Public employment may be 
regarded as an important right of citizens in a democracy which seeks to create a 
social order in which social, economic and political justice is attained for all. The 
Constitution of India provides this right under Article 16 which contains five 
clauses. The first two clauses lay emphasis on equality of opportunity in matters of 
employment without any discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, 
                                                            
27  Banerjee, op. cit., p. 76. 
28  Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1951 Bombay, p.470.  
29  Ramchandran, op. cit., p. 449. 
30  Buchanan v. Warley, (1917) 62. Law Ed. P.149. 
31  Nain Sukh Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1953., S.C., p.384. 
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descent, place of birth or residence. Other clauses however, provide certain 
exceptions to which equality of opportunity for all citizens shall not apply.  
The different clauses of Article 16 are as follows:-32   
"(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters 
relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." 
"(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, 
place of birth, residence or any of them, be intelligible for, or discriminated against 
in respect of, any employment or office under the State." 
"(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any 
law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment 
to an office,33 (under the Government of or, any local or other authority within a 
State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or 
Union territory) prior to such 
"(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any 
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented 
in the Services under the State."  
"(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which 
provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any 
religion or denominational institution or any member of the governing body 
thereof shall be a person professing a particular denomination." 
Prior to enactment of the Constitution, equality of opportunity in matters 
of public employment was guaranteed under section 275 and 298(i) of the 
                                                            
32  The Constitution of India op. cit., p. 5. 
33  Subs. By the Constitution on (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, Sec. 29 and Schedule for “Under any 
State specified in the First Schedule or any local or other authority within its territory, any requirement  as 
to residence within the state”.     
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Government of India Act, 1935. Section 275 laid down that—"A person shall not 
be disqualified by sex for being appointed to any Civil service of or Civil post 
under the Crown in India. . ." Section 298(i) further provided that "No subject of his 
Majesty domiciled in India shall on grounds of religion, place of birth, descent, 
colour or any of them be inelli-gible for office under the Crown in India."  
In this connection reference34 may also be made to Article 335 of the Constitution 
that runs as follows: 
"The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, 
consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administra-
tion in the making of appointments to services and posts in 
connection with the affairs of the Union of a State."35 
 
After a good deal of analysis of Articles 15 and 29(2; in the foregoing chapter 
clause (1) and (2) of Article 16 do not require further explanation. In nutshell it 
can be said that the aim of these clauses is to provide equality of opportunity to 
each and every citizen of India in matters of public employment, irrespective of 
his religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. No discrimination is ordinarily 
permissible on ground of residence but Parliament may frame a law under clause 
(3) providing for a residential qualification as essential for certain types of 
appointment as stated in the clause concerned. The word residence in Clause (2) 
and Clause (3) was inserted in Article 16 by the Constituent Assembly only on 
November 30, 1948  through an   amendment based on the motion of Yaspat Roy 
                                                            
34  It is important to note that special provision has already been made in the Constitution for the 
appointment of members of the Anglo‐Indian Community to posts in certain services. See Article 336 of the 
Constitution of India, op. cit., p. 95.  
35  “United Provinces : General.” 
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Kapoor and views expressed by K.M. Munshi and Alladikrishna Swami Ayyar.36 
While insisting for insertion of the word residence in Clause (2) of Article 16 
Kapoor observed that his object was to ensure that "every citizen of the country, 
wherever he might be living should have" an "equal opportunity of employment 
under the State . .. any where in the country".; and that "there being only one 
citizenship of the whole country it should carry with it the unfettered right and 
privilege of employment in any part and in every nook and corner of the 
country."37 
Unluckily, he proceeded, "for some time past we have been observing that 
provincialism has been growing in this country. Every now and then we hear the 
cry, 'Bengal for Bengalis' 'Madras for Madrasis' and so on so forth. This cry is 
not in the interests of the unity of the country or in the interests of the solidarity of 
the country. I can easily understand a Provincial Government laying it down as a 
rule that only those who possess adequate knowledge of the provincial language 
shall be eligible for employment in the province. I can also understand a rule 
being laid down that a person who wants employment in the province should 
have adequate knowledge of local conditions. All that is easily understandable in 
the interests of efficiency of the services. I, therefore, submit that is the matter of 
employment there should be absolutely no restriction whatsoever unless it is 
necessary in the interests of the efficiency of the services. The unity of the 
country must be preserved at all costs. We must do everything in our power to 
preserve the unity of the country, and the amendment that I have moved aims at 
this and is a step in this direction."  
                                                            
36  C.A.D., 30th November, 1948 pp. 676‐78 and pp.699‐703. 
37  Ibid., p. 108. 
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Dr. Ambedkar while accepting the motion of Kapoor as amended by K.M. 
Munshi and Alladi Krishana Swami Ayyar significantly observed :38 
"It is the feeling of many persons in this House that, since we 
have established a common citizenship throughout India, 
irrespective of the local jurisdiction of the provinces and the 
Indian States, it is only a concomitant thing that residence 
should not be required for holding a particular post in a 
particular State because, in so far as you make residence a 
qualification, you are really subtracting from the value of a 
common citizenship which we have established by this 
Constitution or which we propose to establish by this Con-
stitution. Therefore, in my judgment, the argument that 
residence should not be a qualification to hold appointments 
under the State is a perfectly valid and a perfectly sound 
argument. At the same time, it must be realised that you 
cannot allow people who are flying from one person to 
another, from one State to another, as mere birds of passage 
without any roots, without any connection with that particular 
province, just to come, apply for posts and, so to say, take 
the plums and walk away. Therefore, some limitation is 
necessary. It was found, when this matter was investigated, 
that already today in very many provinces rules have been 
framed by the provincial governments prescribing a certain 
period of residence as a qualification for a post in that 
particular province. Therefore, the proposal in the 
amendment that, although as a general rule residence 
                                                            
38  Ibid., pp. 108‐109. 
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should not be a qualification, yet some exception might 
be made, is not quite out of the ordinary. We are 
merely following the practice which has been already estab-
lished in the various provinces. However, what we found 
was that while different provinces were laying down a 
certain period as qualifying period for posts, the periods 
varied considerably. Some provinces said that a person 
must be actually domiciled. What that means, one does not 
know. Others have fixed ten years, some seven and so on. 
It was, therefore, felt that while it might be desirable to fix a 
period as a qualifying test, that qualifying test should be 
uniform throughout India. Consequently, if that object is to be 
achieved, viz., that the qualifying residential period should be 
uniform, that object can be achieved only by giving the power 
to Parliament and not giving it to the local units, whether 
provinces or States. That is the underlying purpose of this 
amendment putting down residence as a qualification". 
 
5.7 Abolition of  untouchability  
  
The Constitution of India makes a provision for the abolition of 
untouchability—a social evil practiced in this country from time immemorial. 
Article 17 provides39 that 
"Untouchability" is abolished and its practice in any form is 
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 
                                                            
39  The Constitution of India, op. cit. p. 5.  
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'untouchability' shall be an offence punishable in accordance 
with law." 
 
A perusal of the above article shows that it prohibits 'untouchability' and 
practice of it in any form is made an offence punishable under the law. This is the 
unique feature of the Indian Constitution since in no other country of the world 
social evil has been abolished through a Constitutional provision. Sir Ivor 
Jennings considers it a bad taste on the part of the framers of Indian 
Constitution. According to him social evils in a country should be mitigated 
through social reforms and should have no place in a Constitution which is 
fundamental law of the land. Sometimes critics of the Constitution put the 
question : 'what is the right that is created by this article ? It is true that it does 
not create any special privilege for anyone. Yet, it is a great fundamental right, a 
charter of deliverance to one-sixth of the Indian population from perpetual 
subjugation and despair, from perpetual humiliation and disgrace.40 Right, in 
fact, is a remedy against a disability. The abolition of untouchability is thus a 
fundamental right in true sense of the term. 
'Untouchability'—the very word is obnoxious—has been a custom left 
over on the Hindu institution of Varna or the four caste groups of the post- 
Vedic age. Those at the top of the caste hierarchy, denied every human right to 
the so called 'untouchables' —except to live and serve the rest of the 
community on terms commanded by the former.41 This custom of 
untouchability had not only thrown millions of Indian people into 
darkness but it had also eaten into the very foundation of the nation. 
The framers of the Constitution, therefore, thought it proper to eradicate 
                                                            
40  C.A.D., Vol. VII, p. 665. 
41  The Indian Nation (Patna) July 3, 1977, pp. 7‐8. 
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the evil by incorporating a separate article into the Chapter on 
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution.42 
This article is a very important provision of our Constitution and its 
object is to uproot some scandalously unreasonable social customs and 
disabilities from our nation. This provision stipulates to secure to all the 
citizens 'social justice' and 'equality of status' as outlined in the preamble of 
the Constitution. Article 17, if properly implemented, will definitely help 
to achieve these objects. Owing to some difficulties in the way of any 
definition or clear description that can comprehend all possible cases of 
'Untouchability'. The word 'Untouchability' has not been defined in the 
Constitution. Since, the term 'Untouchability' has not been defined either in 
Article 17 or in the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, judicial 
decisions have clarified the meaning of the word 'Untouchability'. In 
Devarajah v. Padmanna, the Mysore High Court held that the term is not 
to be understood in its literal sense and that the word 'Untouchability' in 
the Act refers to the social disabilities historically imposed on certain castes 
and does not include an instigation of social boycott by reason of the 
conduct of certain persons.43 According to Dr. Ambedkar instead of 
leaving it to our Parliament or to a State legislature to make the 
enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability a crime, itself 
declares any such enforcement an offence punishable by law".44 
Article 17 contains two main provisions regarding untouchability. 
First, it says that 'Untouchability' is abolished and its practice in any form 
is forbidden, and secondly, it declares that the enforcement of any 
                                                            
42  For a detailed discussion of this topic, pl. See States and Minorities 1947 by Ambedkar B.R. 
43 A.I.R. 1958,Mysor, p.84.  
44  C.A.D. 29th November, 1948, 661. 
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disability arising out of 'Untouchability' shall be an offence punishable in 
accordance with law. It may be mentioned here that the word 
"Untouchability" is enclosed in inverted commas which indicates that the 
theme of the article is not untouchability only in its literal sense but also 
the practice as it has developed historically in this nation. The term consists 
persons who are treated as untouchables either temporarily or otherwise for 
various reasons such as social observance, associated with birth or death or owing 
to social boycott resulting from caste etc. In Banglore W.C. & S. Mills v. 
Mysore State, it was held that imposition of untouchability in such 
circumstances has no relation to the causes which relegate certain classes of people 
beyond the pale of caste estimate.45 
Mahatma Gandhi was the Chief exponent of abolition of untouchability and 
stood for total eradication of this evil. He was a great champion of the cause of 
Harijans and once remarked “I do not want to be reborn, but if I am reborn, I 
wish that I would be reborn as a Harijan, as an untouchable, so that I may lead 
a continuous struggle against the opposition and indignities that have been heaped 
upon these classes of people”46 "It was an irony of fate that a man (Dr. Ambedkar) 
who was driven from one school to another, who was forced to take his lessons 
outside the class-room and who was thrown out of hotel in the dead of night, all 
because he was an untouchable, was entrusted with the task of framing the 
Constitution which embodies this article and which dealt the death-blow to this 
pernicious social custom." 
A vigorous movement, with the fast of Mahatma Gandhi in 1932 against 
the'Communal award, was launched against untouchability throughout the country. 
This movement had some positive result and untouchability was considerably 
                                                            
45  A.I.R., 1958, Mysore, p. 85. 
46  Pylee, M.V., Constitutional Government in India by (Asia Publishing House, 1965) p. 215. 
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eradicated in Urban areas particularly. But the evil continues to exist in rural 
areas and even after 30 years of independence atrocities on Harijans have 
become a regular feature in village life. The Home Minister of India, while 
speaking on the untouchability Offences Bill which was passed into an Act in 
1955, very rightly observed: 
"This cancer of untouchability has entered into the very 
vitals of our society. It is not only a blot on the Hindu 
religion, but it has created intolerance, sectionalism and 
fissiparous tendencies. Many of the evils that we find in our 
society today are traceable to this heinous monstrosity. It 
was really strange that Hindus with their sublime philosophy 
and their merciful kind-heartedness even towards insects 
should have been party to such an intolerable dwarfing of 
manhood. Yet untouchability has been there for centuries 
and we have how to atone for it. The idea of untouchability 
is entirely repugnant to the structure, spirit and provisions 
of the Constitution”.47 
 
The Untouchability Offences Act which may be said as a supplement of 
Article 15 of the Constitution came into force in June 1955. The Act meant for 
prescribing "punishment for the practice of 'Untouchability," for the enforcement 
of any disability arising there from and for matters connected therewith. The Act 
provides punishment for enforcing certain religious social and other disabilities 
on the ground of untouchability. It further provides that whosoever even abets 
any offence under this Act is "punishable with the punishment provided for the 
offence". Some other legislative measures such as the Madras Removal of Civil 
                                                            
47  Ibid. 
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Disabilities Act XXI of 1938, the Madras Temple Entry Act 22 of 1939 and Act 
V of 1947, the Bihar Harijan Removal of Civil Disabilities Act of 1949 etc., 
have also attempted to eradicate the social disabilities arising out of 
untouchability. Before the passing of Untouchability Offences Act there were more 
than twenty such legislative enactments framed by different Stale legislatures to 
deal with the problems arising out of untouchability. The Bengal Hindu Social 
Disabilities Removal Act, 1948 was one of them which were challenged in a 
famous case Banmali Das v. Pakhu Bhandari on grounds of constitutionality.48 
The facts of the case in brief were as follows: 
Banamali Das, who was a Harijan (Cobbler by caste), filed a complaint 
against Pakhu Bhandari and others alleging that the accused had refused to cut 
his hair and also to render similar services to other members belonging to Harijan 
community. On behalf of defendants it was argued that the Bengal Hindu Social 
Disabilities Removal Act, 1948 was violation of constitutional provision since it 
imposed unreasonable restriction on barbers while exercising their profession. It 
was also alleged that the validity of the Act was discriminatory in its tendency. In 
an unanimous decision, the Calcutta High Court rejected this contention. It 
held that there was nothing in the Act which cut down the right to carry on the 
profession of a barber. "All it does is to prohibit him from discriminating 
between one Hindu and another in carrying out his duties as a barber. It does not 
deny any person equality before law. It tends to make all persons equality in 
society and before the law and it cannot possibly be argued that this Act denies 
any person equal protection of laws." 
Likewise, the U.P. Removal of Social Disabilities Act, 1947 was 
challenged in the Allahabad High Court in State v. Bandari case.49 This Court also 
                                                            
48  A.I.R.,1951, Calcutta, p. 167.  
49  A.I.R. 1951, Allahabad, p. 615. 
  
135 
 
unanimously upheld the Act and observed that the petitioners had no right to 
refuge to render their services to Harijans. 
In P.S. Charya v. State of Madras,50 the Madras High Court held that the 
Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947, as amended in 1949 was not 
repugnant to any of the provisions of the Constitution. To prevent certain classes 
of Hindus who were once called depressed classes from entering into a public 
meeting was certainly to practice untouchability. What was provided in the Act 
of 1947 was merely the fulfillment of the directives given under Article 17 of the 
Constitution. 
However, Article 17 suffers from some serious drawbacks. The word 
"untouchability" lacks precision since it has not been denned under the 
Constitution. Legally it means untouchability on grounds of descent, caste, race 
or religion. But untouchability is prevalent throughout the country in much 
devastating form. The whole society suffers from this evil and untouchablity has 
been a great obstacle in securing social, political and economic equality in caste-
ridden society like ours. Likewise, the expression "any disability arising out of 
untouchability" needs a clear definition or an illustratives elucidation for the 
enlightenment of both the judiciary and the general public. The Constitution, how-
ever, authorizes parliament to make law prescribing punishment for any offence 
envisaged by Article 17 except as otherwise provided in clause (b) and sub-clause 
(li) of clause (A) of Article 35. This power was assigned to Parliament alone and 
not to the state legislatures with a view "to ensuring uniformity of legislation on 
the subject throughout the nation"51 according to Dr. Ambedkar. 
In spite of these constitutional and several legal provisions India cannot 
claim to have uprooted the evils of untouchability which has become a cancer on 
                                                            
50  A.I.R. 1956, Madras, p. 541. 
 
51  Dr. Ambedkar said in the Constituent Assembly Debates 0n 29th November. 1948 with reference to Art. 
27 of the Drafting Constitution of India, 1948 which correspond to art. 35 of the Indian Constitution. 
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our body-politic. As a matter of fact, legislation is not the only remedy since the 
abolition of untouchability requires active public co-operation. In recent years 
atrocities on Harijans are on increase and have taken a menacing form. Thus 
abolition of untouchability badly needs sincere efforts not only on the part of 
government but also from the general public as well. The government with the 
active support of the public leaders, social reformers and people in general must 
create a social order in which Harijans can live as rightful citizens of a free and 
democratic country. Until this condition is not created we cannot claim to be a 
democratic sovereign republic. 
 
5.8 Abolition of titles  
 
In a democratic society in which social, economic and political equality is 
the axis, it is not desirable to confer titles on some individuals and thereby 
create artificial distinction among members of the political system. During the 
pre-independence days titles were conferred by British masters on ardent 
supporters and government officers in order to create a gulf in the society. After 
independence when the policy of divide and rule was finally abandoned, the framers 
of the Constitution decided to abolish such titles through constitutional provision 
and Article 18 under the Chapter fundamental rights was inserted accordingly. 
Article 18 which deals with abolition of titles is as follows: 
 
"(1) No title, not being a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by 
the State. 
"(2) No citizen of India shall accept any title from any foreign State. 
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"(3) No person who is not a citizen of India shall, while he holds any office of 
profit or trust under the State, accept without the consent of the President 
any title from any foreign state. 
"(4) No person holding any office of profit or trust under the State shall, 
without the consent of the President, accept any present, emolument, or 
office of any kind from or under any foreign State."52 
The above Article of the Constitution is so designed as to abolish all sorts 
of titles which may lead to social and political inequality. During British rule 
conferment of titles was primarily based on the policy of divide and rule. It further 
led "to social inequality, because as the number of title holders increased, it 
created a class by itself ".53 However, under the free India Constitution military and 
academic titles have been retained so as to provide incentive and encouragement 
in the defence forces as well as academic world, The analysis of Article 18 is 
as the following :  
 
“The State as mentioned in Article 12 cannot confer any 
title which is not of a military or academic distinction. It 
means that the Government of the Union, State, their 
legislatures, local bodies etc. is restrained from bestowing 
titles other than military and academic to any one. However, 
a university or any other academic institution can confer a 
degree of distinction for achievements in the academic field.  
Likewise the government of India may confer military titles 
on the personnel of defence forces for their gallantary and 
heroic deeds.” 
                                                            
52  The Constitution of India op.cit., p. 5. 
53  Allahabad law Journal, 1967 Vol. LXV, No. 22, p.29. 
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Secondly, no Indian citizen will accept any title from a foreign State. 
This provision is definitely "very wholesome as it tends to make the Indian 
citizen wholly Indian in outlook, thought, ambition and action". Such foreign 
recognition will, in fact, reduce the intensity of the citizen's loyalty to his 
motherhood. 
Thirdly, even a person who is not a citizen of India shall not accept title 
from any foreign State without the consent of the President of India if he holds an 
office of profit or trust under the State as defined under Article 12. "This is to 
ensure loyalty to the Government he serves for the time-being and to shut out 
all foreign influence in Governmental affairs or administration".54 
Finally, no person, whether a citizen of India or non-citizen shall accept 
any emolument or office of any kind from or under any foreign State without the 
consent of the President of India while holding an office or trust under the State. 
It may be noted here that a citizen of India who does not hold an office of profit 
or trust under the State can accept emoluments or office of any kind under a 
foreign State and consent of President is not required in such a case. 
But curiously enough, soon before the enforcement of the present 
Constitution the government of India started conferring titles like Bharat Ratna, 
Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhusan and Padma Shri on political leaders, artists and 
academicians. It was argued with great pains that a title was something which 
'hangs to one's name as an addition' and as the above ones are not meant to be so 
used, they are not titles? They have been advocated to be mere awards and not 
titles.55 In this connection, late Pandit Nehru, while defending these titles in Lok 
                                                            
54  Ramchandran, op. cit., 178. 
55  Tope op. cit., p. 65.  
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Sabha tried to distinguish these awards from titles and maintained that the 
conferment of such awards was within the provision of the Consitution.56 
However, the recent decision of Janta government regarding abolition of Bharat 
Ratna, Padma Bibhusan etc. is a right step in the right direction. 
The prohibition in this connection in U.S.A., Germany, Japan and 
Ireland is only against the conferment of the titles of nobility and the original 
intentions of the makers of the Indian Constitution had also been to abolish only 
the hereditary titles.57 But by professing abolition of titles, the framers did not 
express their intentions in explict terms. In this connection, the views expressed 
by Sir Ivor Jennings are as follows : 
 
"The rule in Article 18, incorrectly summarised by the 
marginal note as abolition of title, that no title, not being a 
military or academic distinction shall be conferred by the 
State, is apparently part of a 'right to equality'. It seems to 
be no breach of the right to equality if Sri John Brown 
becomes Dr. John Brown, or General John Brown, or even 
Sir John Brown, M.B.E. or if he roles around a gold plated 
car or loads his wife with jewellary and silk sarees; but if, like 
the present lecturer, he becomes an impecunious knight, the 
right to equality is broken. In whom is this right vested ? It 
cannot be in Sir John Brown, it is neither in rem nor in 
personam, neither corporeal nor incorporeal. It is in fact not 
                                                            
56  See V.K. Rao, ‘Parliamentary Democracy in India, 1965, p. 163, note 1.   
57  See C.A.D., Vol. VII. 
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a right at all, but a restriction on executive and legislative 
power”.58 
 
Moreover, the abolition of titles has nothing to with the existing titles of 
the rules of the former Indian States, which have been safeguarded to them 
under Article 362 of the Constitution.  
The above Article, directs the legislatures and the executives to respect the 
guarantees and assurances given under any covenants and agreements as are 
referred to in Article 291 (dealing with the Privy Purse of the former Indian 
rulers) with regard to their personal rights, privileges and dignities (including the 
titles) of the former rulers of Indian States. However, the Supreme Court 
advocated for the abolition of such privileges. In Narottam Kishore v. Union of 
India59 the Court went on to observe that  
 
"considered broadly in the light of the basic principles of 
equality before law, it seems somewhat odd that Sec.  87. (of 
the C.P.C. conferring certain privilege and immunities upon 
the former rulers of Indian States) should continue to operate 
for all times.  With passage of time, the validity of the 
historical considerations on which Sec, 87 is founded, will 
wear out and the continuance of the said section in the 
C.P.C. may later be open to serious challenge”.60 
 
                                                            
58  Jennings, Ivor, Some Characteristics of Indian Constitution, 1953, p. 18. 
59  A.I.R., 1964 S.C., p. 1590. 
60  Ibid. 
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Further, Clause (2) of Article 18 provides an absolute ban on a citizen of 
India to accept any title from any foreign state. The purpose of this clause is to 
make a citizen loyal to his native country by all means. If this is the aim of this 
clause, it can be said that it has not served the purpose, for it is difficult to find a 
man in modern societies wholly indigenous in 'out look, thought, ambition and 
action'. 
Clause (3) of Article 18 is again "out of place in a Chapter on fundamental 
rights. The argument that only titles accepted by such foreigner will, increase 
foreign influence in governmental affairs, and not their very presence and advice, 
is, illogical. A title is a personal matter which has nothing to do with one's 
influence in governmental affairs. It is difficult to conceive how the acceptance of 
a title by a foreigner can increase his influence in governmental affairs".61 
In Clause (4) of Article 18, the prohibition is only against persons holding 
any office of profit or trust under the State, and it does not restrict to private 
individuals. "But though the prohibition with respect to holding of any office 
may be good, it is not very reasonable to prohibit the receipt of presents or 
emoluments. Such a provision also comes in conflict with the right to equality and 
liberty of a governmental employee”.62 
Moreover, the Article does not prohibit the conferment of titles by private 
bodies and individuals; e.g., Vidwat Sammelanum, Heads of Muths, literary and 
scientific bodies, music, art, academics etc. "Though the degree of affect may vary 
according to the status and nature of such private bodies, such titles do also have 
a similar effect as those conferred by the State, and so they do not vary much help 
the attainment of the object enshrined in the Article".63 The argument that "state 
                                                            
61  A.L.J., 1967, Vol. LXV No. 22. P. 31. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Ibid. 
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titles alone tend to foment nepotism, corruption, social arrogance or conceit 
etc”.64 is baseless. 
However, Article 18 unlike the provision for the abolition of untouchabilty 
does not prescribe any action to be taken in case of its violation. On its very 
appearance, the Article seems to be only a prescription of prohibition 
observable and enforceable by the persons and bodies concerned only as a 
moral obligation.65 No penalty is prescribed for the violation of the said 
prohibition. Unlike Article 17, it does not confer any legislative powers to 
punish its violations. Although Article 35(a)(2) authorises Parliament to 
make laws for punishing acts declared to be offensive under Part III of the 
Constitution, it can be of no use in the present situation, for Article 18 does 
not declare any act to be offensive. It may be possible that a government 
employee may be dismissed from his job if he commits any breach of the 
provisions, but in respect of other persons no action can be taken against 
them. 
Another issue may arise with regard to the nature of the offence, the 
authority to prosecute and punish, and the governing them.66 In this 
connection Dr. B.R. Ambedkar expressed the view in the Constituent 
Assembly that Parliament might, while enacting the law of citizenship, 
disqualify a person who had received a title in violation of the Prohibition. 
He pointed out: 
“The non-acceptance of titles is a condition of 
continued citizenship; it is not a right; it is a duty 
                                                            
64  Rarmchandran, p. 190. 
65  Raghavacharya, The Constitution of India, p 57. 
66  It is somewhat astonishing that no case under article 18 as so far comes before any court of tribunal in 
India.   
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imposed upon the individual that if he continues to be 
the citizen of this country, then he must abide by certain 
conditions. One of the conditions is that he must not 
accept a title if he did, it would be open for Parliament 
to decide by the law what should be done to persons 
who violate the provisions of this article. One of the 
penalties may be that he may lose the right of 
citizenship”.67 
Thus under Article 18 the State is prohibited to confer titles except 
education and military one on any individual. The citizens are also not 
allowed to accept any title from a foreign State without the consent of 
the President of India.  
The violation of this provision may result loss of citizenship. But 
the citizenship Act (1953) does not provide termination of citizen in case 
of acceptance of title from a foreign State without the assent of the 
President. Moreover, prohibition of conferment of titles under Article 18 
may be enforced against the Slate under Article 32 or 226 only which 
guarantee fundamental rights in general to all citizens. In other words, the 
constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 is available only for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this part (Part III).  According to 
Dr. Ambedkar Article 18 only imposes a duty on a person not to receive a title. 
The underlying principle of Article 18 is that  
 
"in a democratic republic vested interests must not be allowed 
to grow as a mass affecting the nascent evolution of the 
people as a whole. If awards are merely restricted to military 
                                                            
67  C.A.D., Vol. VII. P. 709. 
  
144 
 
and academic distinctions the country is bound to advance in 
those directions and all fissiparous tendencies will vanish for 
the betterment of the body politic”.68 
 
A more important point in this connection is that a writ is available to a 
person to prohibit the State from conferring titles only when the Court takes the 
Stand that every person has a right to enforce the mandatory provisions of the 
Constitution. This is perhaps the main reason why award of decorations is not 
challenged in the law Courts. Critics point out that award of decorations is a clear 
infringement of Article while the government held the view that since the 
decoration cannot be used by recipient against their names it is not violation of 
Article 18. 
Meanwhile, the leaders of Janata Government rightly felt that such 
decorations awarded in recognition of  
 
"public service in any field, including services rendered by 
government servants" was infringement of true spirit of 
democracy underlined in Article 18. Therefore, it "decided 
to discontinue institutions of national awards”.69   
"Those who are already in receipt of such awards have been 
asked not to use these awards as titles on signboards, 
stationery or in any other manner. If any such recipient is 
found using the award as title it will be withdrawn”.70 
 
                                                            
68  Ramchandran, op. cit. p. 101. 
69  The Indian Nation, Patna, July 14, 1977. 
70  Ibid. 
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Just after assuming the office the Prime Minister stated: 'We had the question 
examined whether the institution of Civil awards namely Bharat Ratna and Padma 
Shri awards was in conformity with the Article 18 of the Constitution." The 
Attorney-General of India was consulted on this matter and his advice was that "a 
harmonious interpretation" of the word 'title' in Clause (1) of Article 18 as well 
as clauses (2) and (3) thereof, the Bharat Ratna and Padma Awards would fall 
within the prohibition of grant of titles and would in his view be 'contrary not 
only to the letter, but spirit of Article 18(1). The Government accepted the advice 
of the Attorney-General and accordingly decided to discontinue the awards. This 
led to the end of all controversies on this issue and the provision of Article 18 
was enforced by the government in true spirit for the first time since the 
enforcement of the Constitution. This decision of the government is rightly 
regarded as a great landmark in the history of Constitutional rights. 
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6.1 Right to Human Dignity 
 The preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
mentions that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all the members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world” and recognizes “that these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person.” Everyone – including those deprived of their liberty1  -
has a right to be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.  
 The Constitution of India has not expressly enumerated this right as a 
fundamental right, but the Supreme Court has recognized this right to dignity as 
emanating from Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19. 
 In Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi,2 the Supreme Court enunciated 
the law that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is not 
confined merely to right to physical existence, but also included within its fold, the 
right to the use of every faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed as well as the 
right to live with basic human dignity. This decision of the Supreme Court upheld the 
human right guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, to the status of fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The 
Court observed that no one can be deprived of his right to live with basic human 
dignity except by just, fair and reasonable procedure prescribed by law. Indeed no 
procedure which deprives a person of his right to live with human dignity can 
possibly be reasonable, fair and just. Therefore, the State can not by law or otherwise 
deprive any person of the right to live with basic human dignity. Such a law and the 
action of the State which encroaches human dignity is not permitted under Article 21 
of the Constitution. Thus judicial decisions of the Apex Courts and different High 
Courts, which are judge made laws have added to a new vista and dimension to the 
                                                 
1 See Article 10 (1) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
2 AIR 1981 SC 746. 
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protection of human rights against their possible encroachment and infraction, even 
from inconceivable quarters.3 
 In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,4 the Supreme Court 
held that non-payment of minimum wages to the workers employed in various Asiad 
Projects in Delhi was a denial to them of their right to live with basic human dignity. 
Bhagwati, J., speaking for the majority held that the rights and benefits conferred on 
workmen employed by a contractor under various labour laws are “clearly intended to 
ensure basic human dignity to workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any of 
these rights and benefits, that would clearly be a violation of Article 21.” Thus non-
implementation by the private contractors and non-enforcement by the State 
Authorities of various labour laws was held violative of the fundamental right of 
workers to live with human dignity. The Court has held that everyone in this country 
has a right to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. This right enshrined in 
Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles in Articles 39 (a) and 
(f), 41 and 42.5  Even failure to rehabilitate the bonded labourer, the Court held, 
would amount to violation of Article 21 which guarantees the right to a dignified life.6  
 In State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of Student of Medical College 
Shimla,7in a letter by a parent to the Shimla High Court, it was complained of rampant 
ragging of freshers in the Campus of Medical College, Shimla. High Court pressed 
the Chief Secretary to pass a law to prevent ragging. State of Himachal Pradesh 
preferred an appeal.  The Supreme Court in this case observed that ragging is 
subversive of human dignity and prejudicially affects the students.  
                                                 
3 Hridaya Ballab Das, “Human Rights-A Dicta of Civilized Society,” AIR 2004 Jour p.60 at 61-2. 
4 AIR 1982 SC 1473. 
5 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802; (1984) 3 SCC 161; also Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v. State of TamilNadu,1986 supp. SCC 541. 
6 Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1984 SC 1099; (1984) 3 SCC 243. 
7 (1985) 3SCC 169. 
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 In Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar,8 it was brought to the notice of 
the court that the female inmates of the ‘Care home, Patna’ were compelled to live in 
inhuman conditions in an old ruined building. They were ill treated and provided 
insufficient and poor quality food and no medical attention was provided to them. The 
Supreme Court held that, ‘the right to live with human dignity is the fundamental 
right of every citizen and the State is under a duty to provide at least the minimum 
conditions ensuring human dignity’. Accordingly the court directed the state to take 
immediate steps for the welfare of the inmates of the care home. The Court also 
directed that until a new building is constructed, the existing building must be 
renovated and sufficient necessary amenities must be provided. 
 In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan9 also, the court emphasized on the right to live 
and right to work with dignity. It held that each incident of sexual harassment results 
in the violation of fundamental right to life. Right to life means the right to live with 
human dignity and an indignified life at one’s workplace means deprivation of one’s 
precious right to life, freedom to choose one’s profession. In Vishakha a writ petition 
was filed by Vishakha a nongovernmental organization by way of public interest 
litigation seeking enforcement of fundamental rights of working women under 
Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution. Court relying upon International 
Conventions and norms which are significant in interpretation of rights held that right 
to life with human dignity as well as right to work with human dignity as included in 
Article 21 
6.2 Right to Privacy 
 Respect for ones privacy is an inherent expectation of human being10 as it is 
important for the mental, spiritual and physical well being of the individual. Privacy 
                                                 
8 AIR 1988 SC 1782. 
9 AIR 1997 SC 3011. 
10 Divya Bhardwaj , “Right to Privacy : Are We Ready for it,” AIR 2004 Jour 307. 
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secures to protect relationships between individuals.  Privacy is not just one possible 
means among others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to 
ends and relations of the most fundamental sort, respect, love, friendship, and trust.11  
 However, there is no right to privacy in the Indian Constitution .Right to 
privacy being an integral part of ones right to life and personal liberty has to be given 
due importance .The recognition of right to privacy as a part of our constitutional 
right to life and personal liberty is considered as an illustration of progressive 
development.12 In its present form the right to privacy is commonly understood as the 
right to be let alone and is broadly described as the right to an inviolable personality.13 
 Privacy is “a condition people maintain by controlling who receives 
information about them and the terms on which others receive it. Importantly, privacy 
is a subjective condition. One person can not decide for another what his or her sense 
of privacy should be.”14  The right to privacy is part of the right to human dignity and 
the public law on information must frown on the violation of that intimacy of life 
which is the core of individuality of being. 15  Thus, the constitutional right to life and 
personal liberty secures the right to live in seclusion or in public gaze, as one chooses 
so long as one does not interfere with the right of others.16  It can thus be deduced that 
privacy is a state of separateness from others. The right to privacy encircles within it 
the concept of dignity and decency also. This right has an element of secrecy or 
confidentiality. The right to privacy implies the right not merely to prevent incorrect 
portrayal of private life but to prevent its being depicted at all. The right has multi-
                                                 
11 Charles Fried , “Privacy”,  77  Yale L. J. 475, at pp. 477-478. 
12 A.R. Desai, & Chidanand Reddy S. Patil, “Contours of Privacy and Defamation vis-à-vis Free 
Speech”, (1996) C.U.L.R.., p 187. 
13 Ibid p 188. 
14 www.privacilla.org, cited in supra n.121. 
15 V. R. Kirshna Iyer, “The Right to Know is Fundamental’’ in Salvaging Democracy, (Delhi: Konark 
Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1990),  p.119. 
16 Chidananda Reddy, “Privacy Rights of the Citizens Vs Executive Government,’’ The Lawyers, 
(1990) Feb . p. 22. 
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pronged dimensions. In personal intimacies, it extends to home, family, marriage, 
motherhood, procreation and child bearing, consistent with dignity and decency.17 
However, the term privacy has not been specifically defined in the Constitution of 
India, or under any other statutory provisions. 
 Privacy is claimed to be one of the fundamental human rights available to all 
human beings. This is very much evident from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which recognizes right to privacy as a fundamental human right. Further the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also recognizes the right to 
privacy. 
 The right to privacy is directly spelt in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as follows, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, not to attack upon his honour and 
reputation. Every one has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.’’18  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
1966 provides for rights to privacy in Article 17. It reads as follows: 
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home, correspondence, not to unlawful attacks on his honour 
and reputation.” 
(2) Every one has the right to protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.”19   
Constitution of India does not expressly provide for the right to privacy as a    
fundamental right. But it is protected as a legal right under different statutes under 
different expressions like, privileged communication, matrimonial rights etc. 
However, the Supreme Court has considered the right to privacy as part of the 
fundamental right to life under Article 21. Although the Constitution does not 
expressly declare the right to privacy as a fundamental right the said right is an 
                                                 
17 Raghavendra Kumar, “Right to Privacy: Juridical Vision”, AIR 2004 Jour p.195. 
18 Article 12 of Universal Declaration of Human Right, 1948. 
19 Article 17 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. 
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essential ingredient of personal liberty. The object behind Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution is to prevent encroachments upon the personal liberty by the executive 
except in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions thereof.20 The 
right to privacy is granted to the citizens of India as one of the unenumerated rights 
read into the fundamental rights under the Constitution by the courts, in later 
decisions on the subject. 
 Initially, the court did not recognize the right to privacy. In M.P. Sharma v.  
Satish Chandra,21 the Court made it clear that when the Constitution makers have 
thought fit not to recognize a right to privacy, the court has no justification to import 
it, thereby refuse to recognize the right to privacy. In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh,22 the Supreme Court by majority held that the right to privacy is not a 
guaranteed right under our Constitution and therefore, the attempt to ascertain the 
movements of an individual, which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is 
not an infringement of fundamental right guaranteed by the Part III. It was in Govinda 
v. State of Madhya Pradesh23 that the Court took a pioneering view and recognized 
the right to privacy as a fundamental right. 
 In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,24 a public interest 
litigation was filed by the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties under Article 32 of the 
Constitution, highlighting the incidents of telephone tapping and citing from a CBI 
report published in the Magazine “Mainstream”, the Court held that right to privacy 
which includes the right to hold telephonic conversations in privacy is a fundamental 
right protected under Articles 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21 of the Constitution as also under 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Article 17 of the 
                                                 
20 N. K. Raha, “Right to Privacy under Indian law,’’ AIR 2001 Jour, 51. 
21 AIR 1954 SC 300. 
22 AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
23 AIR 1975 SC 1378; while recognizing the right to privacy as fundamental right the Supreme Court 
of India has often considered the US position on the subject like the decisions of American Courts. 
E.g. Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113. 
24 (1997) I SCC 301; AIR 1997 SC 568. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court also held that Section 
5 (2) of the Telegraph Act permits the tapping of telephones – however it can only be 
resorted to in conformity with fundamental rights. The Supreme Court further 
observed: “We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that right to privacy is a part 
of “right to life” and “personal liberty” enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Once the facts in a given case constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is attracted. The 
said right cannot be curtailed ‘except according to procedure established by law’. 
 The National Commission to review the working of the Constitution in its 
report has recommended the inclusion of a separate fundamental right to privacy in 
the Constitution in the following pattern:  
Article 21-B : “(1) Every person has a right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home, and his correspondence. (2) Nothing in the clause (1) shall prevent the state 
from making any law imposing reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right 
conferred by clause (1), in the interest of security of the State, public safety or for 
prevention of disorder or crime, or for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedom of others.”25 
6.3 Right to Education 
 Article 45 of the Constitution as it originally stood, imposed an obligation on 
the state to provide free and compulsory education up to the age of fourteen years by 
1960. Due to problems of resources and determination of priorities in respect of 
different levels of education, this goal could not be achieved even after fifty years of 
adoption of the Constitution. However to secure elementary education in pursuance of 
the Directive principles all the State governments enacted laws declaring free and 
compulsory primary education. Accordingly, primary education up to the age of ten 
years, it was made free in all states and for age groups from eleven to fourteen it was 
                                                 
.I (Universal Law Publishing Company 2002), ed. p.62.25 Report of the National Commission to 
Review the Working of the Constitution, Vol.I (Universal Law Publishing Company 2002), ed. p.62. 
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made free in all except Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. In these states, girls 
and members of the scheduled castes, and tribes get free education, and incentives 
such as mid day meals, free books and uniforms. At secondary stage several states 
have free education for all children and those states that do not make free education 
available to all did so for girls, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.26 
 In case of higher education the State’s obligation is not absolute. State’s failure 
in securing the basic education and the growing awareness led the people to seek 
court’s intervention and the judicial activism on part of the court in turn led to the 
assertion of right to education as a justiceable right emenating through Article 21, as 
the Constitution had not guaranteed a fundamental right to education. 
 The right to education is recognized as a human right under the international 
human rights law. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides 
that, ‘1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. 
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher 
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit; 2) Education shall be 
directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms…… 3) Parents have a prior right 
to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children’.27 Similar right is 
included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.28With a view to achieve full realization of this right it further recognizes that: 
a) “Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; 
b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational 
secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by 
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
education; 
                                                 
26 See N.B.Tarrow , Human Rights and Education, vol.3, (Delhi: Prentice Hall, 1980), p.4. 
27 Article 26 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
28 Article 13 (1) of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, 
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of 
free education; 
d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for 
those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their 
primary education;  
e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of 
teaching staff shall be continuously improved.”29 
Article 41 of the Constitution lays down that the State shall within the limits of 
its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right 
to education. Article 45 of the Constitution provided that “the state shall take steps to 
ensure free and compulsory education for all children up to the age of fourteen years.”30 
Article 46 speaks about promotion of educational and economic interest of scheduled 
caste, scheduled tribes and other weaker sections. Moreover, Articles 29 and 30 which 
are incorporated in Part III as fundamental rights also lay down following provision 
regarding right to education- 
a) No Citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution 
maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State fund on the grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.31 
Till the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act 2002, right to education 
was not specially guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Constitution. It was the 
Supreme Court which declared it as part of fundamental right. The Supreme Court has 
often asserted the right to life as inclusive of many other rights and as deriving its life 
                                                 
29 Article 13 (2) ibid. 
30 Article 45 of Constitution of India. 
31 Article 29(2) ibid; Article 5 of the International  Convention  on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination also guarantees similar right. 
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breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy. In Mohini Jain v. State of 
Karnataka32  Kuldip Singh J., observed: 
 
 “Right to life is compendious expression for all those rights 
which the courts must enforce because they are basic to the 
dignified enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of 
conduct which the individual is free to pursue. The right to 
education flows directly from the right to life. The right to life 
under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual can not be 
assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education”. 
 
It can be respectfully submitted that the court’s view of right to education as a 
fundamental right as held in Mohini Jain was too wide to be practicable. However, the 
decision was reviewed the very next year in UnniKrishnan v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh.33 Though the Court here recognized right to education as a fundamental 
right it limited the scope of the same by holding as under: 
 
“Right to education, understood in the context of Articles 41 
and 45 means (a) every child/citizen has a fundamental right 
to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years, 
and (b) after a child/citizen completes fourteen years, his right 
to education is circumscribed by the limits of the economic 
capacity of the state and its developments.” 
 
Thus the right to education as a fundamental right was restricted only to 
primary education, the court here established that free and compulsory education up 
                                                 
32 AIR 1992 SC 1858; (1992) 3 SCC 666. 
33 (1993) I SCC 645; AIR 1993 SC 2178. 
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to the age of fourteen years was fundamental right and it was the duty of the state to 
provide it. These decisions prompted the introduction of Constitution Eighty-Third 
Amendment Bill to make the right to education up to the age of fourteen-as held by the 
Court a fundamental right. Clause 2 of this Bill proposed to insert Article 21-A to the 
effect that “1) the State shall provide free and compulsory education to all citizens of 
the age six to fourteen years. (2) The right to free and compulsory education referred 
to in clause (1) shall be enforced in such manner as the State may, by law determine. 
(3) The State shall not make any law, for free and compulsory education under Clause 
(2), in relation to the educational institutions not maintained by the State or not 
receiving aid out of State funds.” 
Thus it was only the Court which had widely interpreting Article 21 recognised 
right to education as one of the aspects of personal liberty. This was done by the 
judiciary exercising its role of judicial activism and not by legislators who are deemed 
to be reflecting the wishes of the people. However, though subsequently, right to 
education has been made by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act 2002, a 
fundamental right. A fundamental duty has also been cast regarding this upon the 
parents and guardians.34 After the Amendment, the newly substituted Article 45 now 
provides for provision for early childhood care and education to children below the 
age of six years. It says that the State shall endeavour to provide early childhood care 
and education for all children until they complete the age of six years.35 And the new 
Article 21-A guaranteeing the right to education provides that,  
“The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all 
children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as 
the State may, by law determine.”36 
                                                 
34 Swarupama Chaturvedi, “Right to Educate and Be Educated under Indian Constitution” 
Ind.Bar.Rev. vol. XXX (4) 2003,  p.557 at 564. 
35 Article 45, Substituted by Constitution (Eighty Sixth Amendment) Act 2002, for Article 45. 
36 Article 21-A, of the Constitution, Inserted by Constitution (Eighty - sixth Amendment) Act, 2002. 
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The Court had thus, considered the vital importance of education and the need 
for its promotion and regulation as conceived by the framers of the Constitution and 
had aptly declared the right to education as a fundamental right, emanating from right 
to life. This has resulted in insertion of an express fundamental right to education in 
Part III of the Constitution. It is submitted that this proves the effectiveness of the 
Courts’ decision. The role of courts in stimulating the other organs of the State 
vindicate human rights of the people, has been very successful.  
6.4 Right to Speedy Trial 
In India it is not uncommon to have long delays in judicial administration. A 
trial often continues for an unreasonably long time. It is the constitutional obligation 
of the state to devise such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial for the accused. 
When there is breach of this obligation and there is no speedy trial, there are public 
spirited people who have brought the matter to the notice of the courts and the courts 
acted in this regard. Thus public interest activists and the Courts make the obligation 
of speedy trial fulfilled, by securing it as a right of the persons concerned. 
The human rights of the accused as well as victims find place in Constitution 
and other enactments. The principle of openness of judicial proceedings acts as a 
check against caprice or vagaries and builds up confidence of the public in judicial 
administration. Provisions of Articles, 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21 are means to achieve this 
end. Though there are no specific provisions for a speedy trial in the Indian 
Constitution, by judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court has held that Article 21 of 
the Constitution confers this right on the accused.37 Section 309 of Criminal 
Procedure Code38 also is an importance provision in this regard. 
Thus the right to speedy trial is not a specific right either under the 
Constitution or under Criminal Procedure Code or any other enactment. However, 
                                                 
37 Justice Arun Madan, “Human Rights and Social Legislation,” AIR  2001 Jour 138, at 143. 
38 Infra n. 154. 
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Courts have recognized this cardinal principle of law that speaks of speedy trial 
namely: “justice delayed is justice denied.” The Supreme Court of India also adopted 
an activist approach and took positive steps in the direction of implementing Article 
14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which lays down 
that everyone shall be entitled in the determination of any criminal charge against him 
“to be tried without undue delay.” Article 16 of the principles on equality in the 
administration of justice reiterates that everyone shall be guaranteed in the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, the right to a prompt and speedy 
hearing.39 
The following two provisions of International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights refer to speedy trial. Article 9(3) provides that any one arrested or detained on 
a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized 
by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release (emphasis added). It shall not be the general rule that persons 
awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to 
appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion 
arise, for execution of the judgement.40 
Article 14 further provides in para 3, clause (c) that: In the determination of 
any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the certain minimum 
guarantees, in full equality, inter alia  “to be tried without undue delay.”41 
Under the Indian Constitution the right to speedy trial has been held as a 
fundamental right arising within the scope of Article 21.42  Section 309 of Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that “in every enquiry or trial, the proceedings 
shall be held as expeditiously as possible. In particular, when the examination of 
                                                 
39 S.A.K.Azad, “Judicial Activism-Indian Judiciary-A Saviour of Life and Personal Liberty,” AIR 
2000 Jour.p.11 at 12. 
40 Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
41 Art.14 (3) (c) ibid. 
42 Sheela Barase v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 632. 
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witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the 
witnesses have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournments of the same 
beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.43 
Apart from a number of adversarial matters the Courts got to deal with the 
right of speedy justice in many public interest petitions. In Hussainara Khatoon v. 
State of Bihar44 and Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar45 the issues pertaining to 
shockingly large number of undertrial prisoners in the jails of various states and the 
State of Bihar in particular were highlighted. In Hussainara Khatoon the Supreme 
Court referred at length to the information contained in the issue of “The Indian 
Express,” dated 8th and 9th January 1979.  
It issued notice to the State of Bihar and directed the concerned authorities that 
they place before it all information, particulars and numbers of undertrial prisoners 
languishing in the state jails. The lists and charts of such prisoners kept and lodged in 
several jails showed that their number was really large. The Court found that these 
prisoners were kept in jails in violation of directory provision of Section 167 (2) of 
Code of Criminal Procedure, without they having been produced regularly before the 
appropriate magistrates, or without being remanded by the magistrates, often for 
periods longer than the maximum term for which they could be sentenced on 
conviction and without their trial having been commenced. Even though many among 
them were charged with bailable offences, they had not been released because, for 
reasons of lack of legal aid bail applications had not been made on them behalf, or 
they being poor themselves were unable to furnish bail.46 
The Supreme Court further held that, ‘the right to speedy trial is a fundamental 
right implicit in right to life and liberty of person.’ Fair trial implies a speedy trial. No 
                                                 
43 S.309 of  Criminal Procedure Code. 
44 AIR 1979 SC 1360. 
45 AIR 1982 SC 1167; (1983) 2 SCC 104. 
46 M.C.Jain Kagzi, The Present Constitutional Issues and Views, (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. 
Pvt. Ltd., 1987),  pp.210-211. 
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procedure can be reasonable, just or fair unless that procedure ensures speedy trial for 
determination of guilt or innocence of the person accused.47 It was observed by 
Bhagwati J., that: “A procedure which does not ensure a reasonably speedy trial and 
holds the detenue behind bars for long time without trial can not be regarded as 
“reasonable, fair or just” and thus not in conformity with the requirement of Article 
21.There is no doubt that speedy trial or in other words ‘reasonably expeditious trial, 
is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined 
in Article 21.48  It was further emphasized that speedy trial is the essence of criminal 
justice and delay in trial constitutes denial of it. 
Reasons for long pre-trial detentions are the irrational rules of bail, which insist 
on financial security from the accused and sureties. Court made constructive 
suggestions to change the legal provisions relating to bail. The court also laid down 
that if the trial Courts feel satisfied that the accused has his roots in the community 
and he is not likely to abscond, it can safely release him on his personal bond without 
securities. It has also suggested to the government to establish more criminal courts to 
ensure speedy trial.49 
In Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar50 the Supreme Court again reiterated that 
“speedy trial is a fundamental right of an accused implied in Article 21 of the 
Constitution.” A researcher and social scientist had addressed a letter to the Supreme 
Court pointing out that Kadra Pahadia and three other young boys, aged between nine 
and eleven years and belonging to a backward tribe, were put in a Bihar jail about 
eight years back and were still languishing in the jail without trial and kept in leg-
irons and forced to do work outside the jail. Admitting this as a writ petition, the 
Court issued certain directions. The court held that ‘speedy trial is a fundamental right 
implicit in the guarantees to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the 
                                                 
47 Supra  n.155. 
48 Ibid. 
49 L.D.Naikar, The Law relating to Human Rights, (Bangalore: Puliani and Puliani, 2004), pp. 406-7. 
50 Supra n.156. 
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Constitution and any accused who is denied of this right of speedy trial is entitled to 
approach this court for the purpose of enforcing such right and this court in discharge 
of this Constitutional obligation has the power to give necessary directions to the 
State governments and other appropriate authorities for securing this right to the 
accused. 
In Sheela Barase v. Union of India,51 in a writ petition before the Supreme 
Court, the petitioner raised the question of the condition of physically and mentally 
retarded children and also abandoned or destitute children who were lodged in various 
jails in the country for safe custody. There were orders issued by the courts earlier, 
but as they were not affected, this writ petition was filed once again to consider the 
condition and rehabilitation of the children who were housed in the prison. The court 
here held that the children were in jail for a long period without a trial. Right to 
speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. If an 
accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the 
Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental 
right to speedy trial would be violated, unless of course the trial is held up on account 
of some interim order passed by a superior court or the accused is responsible for the 
delay. The Court gave direction for their release and rehabilitation. 
In Madhu Mehta v. Union of India52 a petition was filed by the National 
Convener of ‘Hindustani Andolan’ seeking a writ of habeas corpus or an appropriate 
direction in favour of a person who had been awaiting the decision on his mercy 
petition pending before the President for eight or nine years. The Court held that there 
was inordinate, inexplicable delay of more than eight years in disposal of mercy 
petitions and inordinate delay in execution of death sentence which caused mental 
torture and agony to the convict. It was held that in the absence of sufficient reason 
for the delay and keeping in mind the mental agony suffered by the convict, the nature 
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of crime, the trend against the death sentence and other circumstances, such action 
violated Article 21 which includes right to speedy trial. The death sentence was 
therefore altered to a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus the right to speedy trial 
covers all the stages of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial etc.53 
 Mention may be made here of two more cases where further leaves were added 
to the right of speedy trial. These consist of ordering for release on bail where the trial 
is protracted. The first decision in this regard is, in Supreme Court Legal aid 
Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India54 wherein the court 
was concerned with the detention of large number of persons in jail in connection 
with various offences under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. 
The Court after noting the stringent provisions relating to the bail as incorporated in 
that Act, directed for release of those undertrial prisoners who were in jail for a period 
exceeding half of the punishment provided in the Act. This decision was cited with 
approval in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of  India55 in which harsh 
provisions of TADA were borne in mind and a pragmatic and just approach was 
adopted to release the detenues on bail because of delay in conclusion of trials. 
 Another public interest litigation56 by Mr. R.D.Upadhyay brought to the notice 
of the Court, the plight of a large number of under trial prisoners in Tihar jail 
languishing for long periods, some of them up to 11 years. The Supreme Court here 
recognizing right to speedy trial as part of Article 21, gave directions stipulating the 
time within which the different cases concerning the undertrials were to be disposed 
of. Further directions were given in Common Cause v. Union of India,57 which were 
more general in nature in as much as it dealt with undertrial prisoners lodged in 
                                                 
53 Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India, (1994) 
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56 R.D.Upadhyay  v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) 3 SCC 422. 
57 (1996) 4 SCC 33. 
164 
 
various jails of the country. The court directed for their release on conditions laid 
down in the order. It was stated that directions shall be valid in all States, in Union 
territories and would apply not only to pending cases but also to future cases. 
 This progressive jurisprudence geared to secure speedy justice to undertrials 
suffered a major set back in 2002 where a seven judges’ bench of the Supreme Court 
prospectively over ruled all earlier decisions58 stipulating time limits. This judgement 
was pronounced in the case of P. Ramachandra v. State of Karnataka,59 wherein the 
Court observed as under: 
 “In its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an 
accused, the Court can not devise and almost enact bars on 
limitation beyond which trial shall not proceed and arm of 
law shall lose its hold though the legislature and the statutes 
have not chosen to do so. Bars of limitation, judicially 
engrafted, are, no doubt, meant to provide a solution to the 
aforementioned problems. But a solution of this nature gives 
rise to greater problems like scuttling a trial without 
adjudication, stultifying access to justice and giving easy exit 
from portals of justice. Such general remedial measures 
cannot be said to be apt solutions. For two reasons we hold 
such bars of limitations uncalled for and impermissible: first, 
because it tantamounts to impermissible legislations – an 
activity beyond the power which the Constitution confers on 
judiciary, and secondly, because such bars of limitations fly 
in the face of law laid down by Constitution Bench in A.R. 
Antulay’s case [AIR 1992 SC 1701] and, therefore run 
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counter to the doctrine of precedents and their binding 
efficacy.  
Prescribing periods of limitation at the end of which trial 
court would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and 
necessarily acquit or discharge the accused, and further, 
making such decisions applicable to all cases in the present 
and for the future amounts to legislations, which, in our 
opinion can not be done by judicial directives and within the 
arena of judicial-law making power available to constitutional 
courts, however liberally we may interpret Articles 32, 21, 
141 and 142 of the Constitution.”60 
 
 It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court, on the other hand, in this very 
case reiterated the right to speedy trial in the following terms: 
 “….we should not even for a moment, be considered 
as having made a departure from the law as to speedy trial 
and speedy conclusion of criminal proceedings of whatever 
nature and at whichever stage before any authority or the 
court. It is the constitutional obligation of the State to 
dispense speedy justice, more so in the field of criminal 
law….”61 
 
 It is high time that the union legislature should take the message of this 
judgement and legislate in this area so that the right to speedy trial is entrenched in a 
legislation, either supreme or subordinate, than depend upon the judicial 
interpretation. 
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6.5 Right to Legal Aid 
 Human rights could be meaningless unless a person is provided with legal aid 
to enable him to have access to justice in case of violation of his human rights. In 
India millions of people live below poverty line who are denied human rights either 
because they are ignorant or they cannot afford for the enforcement their rights. In 
order to secure social justice for them and to make their rights meaningful legal aid 
becomes essential. The basic philosophy of legal aid envisages that the machinery of 
administration of justice should be easily accessible and should not be out of the reach 
of those who have to resort to it for the enforcement of their legal rights.  
In fact, legal aid offers a challenging opportunity to a society to redress 
grievances of the poor and thereby lay foundation of “Rule of Law”. The rule of 
equality before the law and equal protection of law under Article 14 of the 
Constitution would only remain constitutional sibboleth if a person can not secure 
legal protection because he is poor.62 The concept of ‘social justice’ promises a fair 
deal to the citizens. In our society if there is a legal battle between haves and have-
nots, the concept of social justice requires that have-nots should be given some 
support in the form of legal aid. Though Preamble does not mention specifically the 
legal aid, it is implicit in its broad phraseology.63 The Preamble resolves to secure to 
all citizens, inter alia justice social, economic and political.  
 The need to provide legal aid was also realized at UN Conference on 
“Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders” at Stockholm in 1965. Here the 
need for legal aid to accused persons and those convicted of crime, who wish to 
appeal were discussed and the Conference expressly recognized the right to legal aid 
in criminal cases. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 also 
incorporates this right under Article 14 para 3 (d). It provides that “everyone shall be 
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entitled to be tried in his person and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case 
where the interest of justice so require and without payment by him in any case if he 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it.64 
 Indian Constitution does not guarantee the right to legal aid or assistance as an 
enumerated fundamental right. However, Article 39-A inserted by Forty-Second 
Amendment to the Constitution provides for equal justice and free legal aid. It reads 
as follows: “The state shall, in particular provide for free legal aid by suitable 
legislation or schemes or any other ways to ensure opportunities for securing justice 
are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.65 
 Article 39-A is the most important and direct Article of the Constitution which 
speaks of the free legal aid. Though this Article finds place in Part IV of the 
Constitution, as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy, and though this Article 
is not enforced by the Courts the principles laid down their in are fundamental in 
governance of the country. Article 37 casts a duty on the State to apply these 
principles in making laws. This Article is the most potent source of providing free 
legal aid.66 The Supreme Court has often relied on this new provision in support of 
right to legal aid and also to support legal aid programs.67  
 In furtherance of the Directive Principle in Article 39-A the Parliament has 
enacted the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, with the object of providing legal 
aid to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that the opportunity of securing 
justice is equally available to all. Because the operation of legal system must 
necessarily promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity for all. Even prior to this 
enactment, the court has pronounced that it is a right emanating from Article 21, as a 
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part of the requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure.68 In India legal aid has 
wider facets and it has been provided in criminal, civil, revenue and administrative 
cases, and also at different stages from obtaining guidance up to the final resolution of 
disputes.  
 Before the passing of the Forty-Second Amendment and the Legal Services 
Authorities Act, there was provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, i.e., 
Section 304 (1) which spoke of legal assistance and was confined to Sessions cases. It 
says “where in a trial before the Court of Sessions, the accused is not represented by a 
pleader and where it appears to the Court that the accused has not sufficient means to 
engage a pleader, the court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the 
State.”69 
 Since late 1970s the Supreme Court has become active in providing access to 
the justice for the poor, as the Court held that providing legal aid to the needy is a 
“State’s duty and not government’s charity”. It held that free legal assistance at the 
state cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve 
jeopardy to his life and personal liberty and this fundamental right is implicit in the 
requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure prescribed by Article 21. The 
exercise of this fundamental right is not conditional upon the accused applying for the 
free legal aid, hence, cannot be denied if the accused failed to apply for it.70 
 For the first time the Supreme Court recognized the right to legal aid and 
brought it within the gambit of Article 21, the right to life in Madhav H. Hoskot v. 
State of Maharashtra.71 Though not a public interest litigation, it is still important for 
the present discussion on the subject as it laid the foundation for the development of 
right to legal aid. In this case the petitioner, who was a Reader, was convicted for 
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offence of counterfeiting university degrees. The lower court sentenced him to simple 
imprisonment till rising of the Court.  On appeal by State, the High Court enhanced 
the sentence to three years in 1973.  
Special leave petition was filed in 1978, that is after the petitioner under went 
imprisonment of full term of punishment. The reason for delay was non-service of 
copy of judgement. The Court held that there are two ingredients of right of appeal : 
(1) service of copy of judgement to the prisoner in time to enable him to file an 
appeal, and (2) provision of free legal service to a prisoner who is indigent or 
otherwise disabled from securing legal assistance. These are State responsibilities 
under Article 21. Krishna Iyer J., declared 
 
 “This is State’s duty and not Government’s charity. If a 
prisoner is unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory 
right of appeal including special leave for appeal for want of 
legal assistance, there is implicit in the court under Article 
142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, the 
power to assign counsel to the prisoner provided he does not 
object to lawyer named by the Court.”  
 
 In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,72 it was held that 
Article 39-A emphasises that free legal service is an inalienable element of 
‘reasonable fair and just’ procedure without which person suffering from economic or 
other disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity for securing justice. The right 
of legal aid is therefore clearly an essential ingredient of “reasonable fair and just 
procedure” for a person accused of an offence and it must be held imperative in the 
guarantee of Article 21.73  In Khatri v. State of Bihar74 the Court cast a duty on the 
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magistrates to inform the accused of his right to have legal aid at state expense. In the 
above case the court directed the State of Bihar that it can not avoid its constitutional 
obligation to provide free legal service to a poor accused by pleading financial or 
administrative inability.75 
 In Sheela Barase, v. State of  Maharashtra,76 the Supreme Court reiterated the 
legal assistance to the poor or indigent accused is constitutional imperative mandated 
not only by article 39-A but also by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Here 
Bhagwati, J., held: 
 “We have already had occasion to point out in several 
decisions given by this court that legal assistance to a poor or 
indigent accused who is arrested and put in jeopardy of his 
life or personal liberty is a constitutional imperative mandated 
not only by Article 39-A but also Articles 14 and 21 of the 
Constitution. It is a necessary sine qua non of justice and 
where it is not provided, injustice is likely to result and 
undeniably every act of injustice corrodes the foundations of 
democracy and rule of law, because nothing rankles more, in 
the human heart than a feeling of injustice and those who 
suffer and cannot get justice because they are priced out of 
the legal system, lose faith in the legal process and a feeling 
begins to overtake them that democracy and rule of law are 
merely slogans or myths intended to perpetuate the 
domination of the rich and powerful and to protect the 
establishment and the vested interests.”77 
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 The Court also gave directions to the effect that whenever a woman is taken to 
police lockup the nearest legal aid committee should be informed and a Sessions 
Judge should make periodic surprise visits to the lockup to meet the prisoners; 
directions were also given for ensuring the provision of free legal aid to the woman in 
custody. The Superintendent of police was directed to send a list of all undertrial 
prisoners to the local legal aid committee and give all facilities to the lawyers 
maintained by the district legal aid committees to deal with their cases. 
 In Sukdas v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh,78 the Court held that the 
right to legal aid can not be denied to an accused on the ground that he has failed to 
apply for it. The magistrate is under an obligation to inform the accused of his right. 
The Court held further that not providing legal aid at the trial is violative of Article 21 
of the Constitution. In case an accused is not told of this right and therefore he 
remains unrepresented by a lawyer his trial is vitiated by constitutional infirmity, any 
conviction as a result of such trial is liable to be set aside. 
 In Centre of Legal Research v. State of Kerala,79 the Supreme Court also 
emphasized the role of people, voluntary organization and social action groups in 
making legal aid meaningful, effective and purpose-oriented. Thus it is evident that 
‘provision relating to getting legal aid is now recognized as a right falling under 
Article 21’80 and many public interest litigations have been maintained to secure this 
right. 
6.6 Right against Torture  
 Though all types and forms of torture are condemned in general by the 
civilized societies, torture by authorities or agents of state are not tolerated, it 
infringes a person’s physical integrity, which is a part of ‘right to life’. A person’s 
                                                 
78 Supra n. 179. 
79 AIR 1986 SC 1322. 
80 P.S.Narayana,  Public Interest Litigation, (Hyderabad: Asia Law House, 1999), p.102. 
172 
 
physical integrity is considered as sacrosanct and inviolable which calls for 
prevention of torture. Hence, it is argued that every person has a right not to be 
tortured or has a right against torture. Conversely states have a duty to protect that 
inviolable right against torture. Most of the International instruments recognize this 
right against torture. 
 Any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within 
the inhibition of Article 21 whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or 
otherwise. If the functionaries of the Government become law-breakers it is bound to 
breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have 
the tendency to anarchy. No civilized nation can permit that to happen.81 
 The Constitution of India did not guarantee to the persons in Police Custody 
the needed effective safeguard to regulate the discretion of the police. The 
Constitution contained no specific right against torture, cruel, inhuman treatment and 
degrading punishment.82 It is well settled that a person whether, undertrial or a 
convict does not loose fundamental rights under the Constitution including the right 
under Article 21. The basic rights cannot be stopped at the prison gates; they can very 
well be enforced within the prison. 
 Torture usually denotes intense suffering, physical, mental and psychological, 
aimed at forcing someone to do or say something, against his or her will. It means 
breaking down under severe physical pain and extreme psychological pressure.83 
 The prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has 
been advocated ever since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948, and the Geneva Convention, 1949, but it was only in 1984 that the UN 
Assembly for the first time adopted the Convention against Torture. The Convention, 
besides the other things carries the definition of torture. It defines torture as follows:  
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 “For the purpose of this Convention the term “torture” 
means any act by which severe pain or suffering whether 
physical or mental is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act, he or a 
third person has committed or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official acting in the official capacity. It does not include pain 
or suffering arising only from inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions”.84 
 
 Even prior to this convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
recognized the right against torture as ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
in human or degrading treatment or punishment’.85  This is reiterated in the Civil and 
Political Covenant. The words ‘No one shall be subjected without his consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation’ being added to the right. The Covenant 
provides: - ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.86 
 The right not to be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment has not been expressly enumerated as a fundamental right 
under the Indian Constitution, in Part III. It has been so recognized by the Supreme 
Court, in different cases. This right encompasses within it certain other related rights, 
like, right against custodial violence, right against handcuffing, right against bar 
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fetters, right against solitary confinement and right against delayed execution. All 
these rights have been separately recognised by the Supreme Court as fundamental 
rights in different cases as coming within the purview of and as part of right to life, 
right to life with human dignity and procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 
21 of the Constitution. They may also be called “Rights of Prisoners to be treated with 
humanity”.87 
 The Supreme Court of India by interpreting Article 21 has developed the 
human rights jurisprudence for the preservation and protection of prisoner’s right to 
human dignity. Emphasising the significance of human dignity the Supreme Court in 
Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,88 observed that the right to 
life is not confined merely to physical existence or the use of any faculty or limb 
through which life is enjoyed, it also includes within its scope and ambit the right to 
live with basic human dignity and the state can not deprive any one of this precious 
and invaluable right without just, fair and reasonable procedure established by law.89 
 In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,90 the court had occasion to discuss in 
depth the prisoners’ rights with the new ferment of thought relating to human rights. 
The court in this case spoke powerfully and profoundly in favour of prisoners’ rights. 
The abuses of the various rights of the prisoners both convicts and under trials and the 
circumstances wherein  the voices of the victims could not be heard outside the 
prisons made it essential for the court to interpret right to life inclusive of rights 
against torture, right against hand cuffing, bar fetting, and solitary confinement etc. 
The court said jurisprudence cannot slumber when the very campuses of punitive 
justice witness torture. The court held that the prisoners are not wholly denuded of 
their fundamental rights. Though a prisoner’s liberty is in the very nature of the thing 
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circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement, his interest in the limited liberty 
left to him is then all the more important. The court further held that “conviction for a 
crime does not reduce the person into a non-person, whose rights are subject to the 
whim of the prison administration, and, therefore the imposition of any major 
punishment within the prison system is conditional upon the observance of procedural 
safeguards”.91 In this case, the Court held that solitary confinement is by itself a 
substantive punishment which can be imposed by a court of law. It can not be left to 
the whim and caprice of prison authorities. Thus the court considered every infliction 
of torture etc as an infraction of liberty or life in its wider sense, and can not be 
sustained unless Article 21 is satisfied. 
 In Article 21, the right to life and liberty deeply concerns with life and limb of 
the person. It becomes dysfunctional unless the agencies of law in police and prison 
have sympathy for human beings. The Supreme Court in Francis Coralie v. The 
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,92 made it clear that “any form of torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is offensive to human dignity and constitutes 
an in road into the right to live and would, therefore, be prohibitive of Article 21. 
 In Sheela Barase v. State of  Maharashtra,93 the Court held torture and ill-
treatment of women suspects in Police lock ups as violative of Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
 In Khatri v. State of Bihar,94 the Supreme Court condemned the blinding of 
undertrials by police by piercing their eyeballs with needless and pouring acid in 
them. This Bhagalpur Blinding case illustrated key aspects of the pattern of torture, 
the sanction of torture by state, and the local judicial authorities, the routine 
concealment of torture, the failure to conduct proper enquiries and the inordinate 
length of judicial proceedings. 
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 Although the prohibition of torture in specific terms lacks constitutional 
authority Indian Courts have held, that Article 21 implies protection against torture 
and that certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Indian Police Act etc. 
specifically forbid torture. Apart from torture, various other physical ill treatments are 
generally taken recourse to in the jails. Some of these are done under the colour of the 
provisions of the jail manuals. The Supreme Court in several cases has made weighty 
pronouncements decrying and condemning the conduct of authorities in torturing, 
hand cuffing the prisoners, undertrials, social workers, advocates and even a chief 
judicial magistrate without any lawful justification. 
 Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a civilized society 
governed by the rule of law. A number of public interest litigations95 brought to the 
notice of Court such incidents of torture resulting in death of persons in custody. In 
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal,96 the Executive Chairman of the Legal Aid 
Services in West Bengal addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of India drawing his 
attention to news items regarding the death of persons in police lock-ups and custody. 
The chairman submitted that it was imperative to examine the issue in depth and 
develop “custody jurisprudence” and formulate modalities for compensation to 
victims and their families for atrocities and deaths by the police. The letter was treated 
as a writ petition by the court. Here, the Court laid down guidelines to be followed by 
the Central and State investigating agencies, in all cases of arrest and detention. With 
regard to custodial deaths the Court held that custodial death is one of the worst 
crimes in a civilized society governed by the rule of law. Any form of torture, or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution 
whether it occurs during interrogation, investigation or otherwise. The right 
guaranteed under Article 21 extends to undertrials, convicts or detenues or prisoners 
in custody. The Court also issued eleven specific requirements to be followed in all 
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cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive 
measures.97 These requirements, flow from Article 21 and 22 (1) of the Constitution 
and need to be strictly followed.98 
6.6.1 Right against Hand Cuffing  
 In Sunil Batra,99 and, Prem Shankar Shukla,100 Court had declared hand 
cuffing of undertrial prisoners violative of the fundamental rights. In Citizens for 
Democracy v. State of Assam,101 allegations of police indulging in hand cuffing of 
undertrial prisoners in violation of the law declared by the Supreme Court, and it was 
also alleged that seven patient prisoners in hospitals were handcuffed and tied with 
ropes. The Court held that handcuffing and tying with ropes of patient prisoners was 
inhuman and is violative of human rights and is not permissible under Articles 14, 19 
and 21, except where permission is obtained from the magistrates in rare cases. 
 In Sunil Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh102 the court condemned the conduct 
of the escort party who arrested, abused, beat up the social workers by handcuffing 
them while taking to the court. The public interest litigation was brought by the social 
workers alleging that they were working against the exploitation of the local farmers 
and tribal people. Cases had been booked against them with charges of obstructing 
public servants in the discharge of their public functions. They were arrested, abused, 
beaten up and taken to the magistrate after handcuffing them. The Court held that it 
was essential for the escort party to take directions from the court before handcuffing 
any prisoner.  As the petitioners were educated persons and agitating for a public 
cause, and they submitted themselves for arrest. They did not even seek bail but chose 
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to continue in prison for a public cause. They had no tendency to escape. There was 
no sufficient cause to handcuff them. They were subjected to humiliation in violation 
of their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The similar conduct of 
handcuffing judicial officer by the police was severely condemned by the Court in 
Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat. 103 
 
6.6.2 Right against Bar-Fetters 
 
 In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration ,104 the court has observed that Article 
21 forbids deprivation of personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure 
established by law and curtailment of personal liberty to such an extent as to be a 
negation of it would constitute deprivation. Bar fetters make a serious in roads on the 
limited personal liberty which a prisoner is left with and therefore, before such 
erosion can be justified it must have the authority of law. 
 Section 56 of the Prisons Act does not permit the use of bar fetters for an 
unusually long period, day and night and that too when the prisoner is confined in 
secure cells, from where escape is somewhat inconceivable. In such situation use of 
bar fetters would amount to violation of the right under Article 21. Krishna Iyer.J., has 
held that bar fetters are a barbarity generally and, like the whipping, must vanish, 
civilized consciousness the walled camps. … The correctional orientation is a 
constitutional implication of social justice whose index-finger points to Article 14 
(anti-arbitrariness), Article 19 (anti-reasonableness) and Article 21 (sensitivised  
processual humanism).105 
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 In Kishore Singh v. State of Rajasthan,106 a telegram was sent to Supreme 
Court by three prisoners lodged in Jaipur Central Jail alleging that a convict had been 
confined in a cell with fetters for more than eight months. Supreme Court held that 
many prison rules have become outdated and unconstitutional. It held bar fetter 
amounted to torture and was illegal. The Court further directed all State governments 
to modify the old rules under the Prisons Act, so that they are in conformity with the 
Constitution, especially Article 21 and with new interpretation put upon it by the 
court. 
 
6.6.3 Right against Delayed Execution 
 
 The rational behind the right against delayed execution is that a prisoner who 
has experienced living death for years is entitled to request the court to consider 
whether after all the agony and torment he is subjected to is just and fair, to allow 
sentence of death to be executed. It is acknowledged that prolonged delay in 
executing a sentence of death can make the punishment inhuman and degrading. 
 The right against delayed execution was recognized in T.V.Vatheeshwaran v. 
State of Tamil Nadu107 and developed through Sher Singh v. State of Punjab108 and 
Triveni ben v. State of Gujarath,109 wherein it was reaffirmed that long delay in 
execution of death sentence will entitle the condemned prisoner to approach the court 
for conversion of death sentence into life imprisonment. Even a person sentenced to 
death is entitled to procedural fairness. Article 21 requires that any procedure which 
takes away the life and liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. Undue delay in 
execution of death sentence due to delay in disposal of mercy petition would result in 
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mental agony to the condemned prisoner which would therefore, be violative of 
Article 21. This enabled public interest litigations to be brought before the court on 
behalf of prisoners sentenced to death awaiting execution, in protection of the rights 
of such persons.  
A public interest litigation was filed in Madhu Mehta v. Union of India,110 by 
Ms. Madhu Mehta, President of the public interest organisation called Hindustan 
Andolan. It was alleged that a person who had been condemned to death in 1981 had 
his mercy petition pending before the President for more than eight years. In the mean 
time, his mental condition had deteriorated to such an extent that it was feared that he 
may commit suicide. The Supreme Court held that undue delay in the execution of 
death sentence would entitle a condemned prisoner to invoke Article 21 of the 
Constitution which guarantees speedy trial. And also, there was not sufficient reason 
to justify the long delay of over eight years in the disposal of the mercy petition of the 
condemned prisoner. The court observed that the time and the manner in which the 
matter of mercy petition pending before the President was dealt with made a sad 
reading and spoke of the deplorable lack of speed and promptitude which should have 
been there in the disposal of the issue. Considering the fact that the convict had 
already suffered much mental agony of living under the shadow of death for long, 
waiting for it, the Court held that he should not suffer any longer. Therefore it 
directed that the death sentence should not be carried out and it was converted into 
life imprisonment.  
6.6.4 Right against Solitary Confinement  
 Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration,111 raised an important question before the 
Supreme Court, as to whether solitary confinement imposed on prisoners sentenced to 
death would violate Article 14,19, 20 and 21. of the Constitution. The Court held a 
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total deprivation of camaraderie amongst co-prisoners, co-mingling and talking and 
being talked to would offend Article 21.112 In this case two convicts who were 
confined in Tihar Central Jail challenged the validity of sections 30 and 56 of the 
Prisons Act. Sunil Batra was sentenced to death by the district and sessions judge and 
the sentence of death was subject to confirmation by the High Court and to a possible 
appeal to the Supreme Court. But he was kept in solitary confinement from the date of 
conviction by the Session Judge. It was contended that Section 30 did not authorize 
prison authorities to impose solitary confinement. Solitary confinement itself is a 
substantive punishment under Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code, which 
can be imposed by a Court of law and not by prison authorities. 
 In this case, the Court held that “prisoner under the sentence of death under 
section 30 (2) of Prisons Act means the prisoner whose sentence of death has become 
final. A sentence is not final until there is a right to appeal against the sentence or to 
an appeal for mercy. Since the convict’s sentence was not confirmed, the Court held 
solitary confinement was violation of Article 21.The liberty to move, mix, mingle, 
talk share company with co-prisoners if substantially curtailed would be violative of 
Article 21 unless curtailment had the backing of law. So while holding solitary 
confinement to be violative of Article 21, the Court held Section 30 of Prisons Act as 
valid for the procedure prescribed for was fair, just and reasonable within the meaning 
of Article 21.  
 Justice Desai observed that solitary confinement has a degrading and 
dehumanising effect on prisoners. Constant and unrelieved isolation of a prisoner is so 
unnatural that it may breed insanity. Special isolation of a prisoner represents the most 
destructual, abnormal environment. Results of long solitary confinement are 
disastrous to the physical and mental health of those subjected to it.113 
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6.7 Right to Compensation 
 
 The emergence of compensatory jurisprudence in the light of human rights 
philosophy is a positive signal indicating that the judiciary has undertaken the task of 
protecting the right to life and personal liberty of all the people irrespective of the 
absence of any express constitutional provision and of judicial precedents.114 
Generally the concept of monetary compensation is to make good the loss, suffered 
through a wrongful act, in the form of money. In cases of irreversible damage it 
remains a sole effective remedy for enforcement of right. On violation of human 
rights through the agency of a State, their redressal through monetary compensation 
has acquired peculiar significance than mere making good the loss, suffered by an 
aggrieved person.115 The ever increasing abuses of power by public authorities and 
arbitrary interference with the life and liberty of the citizens came to be recognized by 
the Court and the Court held such infringements to be wrong in public law and State 
was held liable to compensate the victims.116 In the absence of a comprehensive 
legislation and a statutory scheme for providing compensation to the aggrieved or the 
victim, justice requires him to be fully compensated. The legislative vacuum of a legal 
right to monetary compensation for violation of human rights has been supplemented 
by the higher judiciary by developing a parallel constitutional remedy.117 
 It is an internationally recognized principle that enforceable right to 
compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of guaranteed right. Article 8 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes such a right. It says 
‘everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
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183 
 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution or by law’.118 
Article 9 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
“anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation”.119 This clause in Article 9 suggests that the court 
does not do full justice if it merely frees a person from unlawful arrest or detention. It 
also maintains implicitly that the right to life, liberty and security guaranteed under 
Article 9 (1) of the Covenant requires the court to recognize the person’s right to 
compensation.  
 India adopted the Covenant with a reservation regarding the enforceable right 
to compensation. The Declaration by the Government of India of 10th April 1979 in 
respect of Article 9 (5) is as under: 
 
“Declaration II: With reference to Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Government of the Republic of India takes the position that 
the provisions of the Article shall be so applied as to be in 
consonance with the provisions of Clauses (3) to (7) of the 
Article 22 of the Constitution of India. Further under the 
Indian legal system, there is no enforceable right to 
compensation for persons claiming to be victims of unlawful 
arrest or detention against the State”. 
 
 India’s ratification of Article 9 Para (5) with the above reservation made the 
State unaccountable even in cases of unlawful arrest or detention.120Although the 
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absence of a provision like Article 9 (5) of the Covenant from the Indian Constitution 
cannot be attributed to oversight of Constitution makers, the Indian Supreme Court, 
speaking through Chief Justice Chandrachud, wove into the rich tapestry of the right 
to life and liberty, yet another colourful strand glowing with social relevance; it held 
that when in case of gross violation of the right to personal liberty, if the Court refuses 
to pass an order of Compensation, it would only be paying lip-service to liberty.121 
 The question of compensation for the infractions of the rights implicit in 
Article 21 were brought before the court in Khatri v. State of Bihar;122 Sant Bir v. 
State of Bihar;123 and Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar,124 but were left unanswered. 
However they helped the development that finally enabled the Supreme Court to hold 
that compensation is payable in case of unlawful arrest and detention, as the Court 
viewed it as a gross violation of the right to life. This dynamic move of the Supreme 
Court resulted in the emergence of compensatory jurisprudence for the violation of 
right to personal liberty through Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar.125  
 Rudul Sah depicted a sordid state of affairs of Bihar jail administration. The 
petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Sessions in June 1968, but released from the 
prison after more than 14 years after habeas corpus petition was filed in the Supreme 
Court under Article 32. In this petition he prayed for his release from illegal detention 
as well as for ancillary reliefs such as rehabilitation, reimbursement of expenses 
which he might incur on medical treatment and compensation for his illegal 
incarceration. The Government informed the court that the petitioner had already been 
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released, when the petition was taken up for hearing. Under the general rule the 
petition became infructuous126.  
However the Court issued notice to the Government regarding ancillary reliefs 
including the claim of compensation. The only justification for the unauthorized 
detention offered by the state was unsoundness of mind of the petitioner which the 
Court did not believe. Court felt that illegal detention for such long period constituted 
a flagrant infringement of the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 
21. The Court ordered interim compensation without prejudice to the rights of 
agitating for more compensation under a civil suit. The Court in Rudul Sah by 
ordering payment of compensation ensured an enforceable right to compensation in 
cases of unlawful arrest or detention.127 The Court observed,128 
 
 “Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will 
be denuded of its significance if the power of this court were 
limited to passing orders of release from illegal detention. 
One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right 
can reasonably be prevented and the compliance with the 
mandate of Article 21 secured is to order its violators to pay 
monetary compensation”. 
 
 The scintillating statement of Bhagwati. J., as to why the courts should not be 
prepared to forge new tools and devise new remedies for the purpose of vindicating 
the precious fundamental rights to life and personal liberty129 has inspired the legal 
thought paving way for awarding compensation and it provided compensation for 
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illegal detention.130 The ever increasing abuses of power by the public authorities and 
arbitrary interference with life and liberty of the citizen came to be recognized by the 
Court and held such infringements to be wrong in public law and State was held liable 
to compensate the victims.131 Thus, the Court recognized and declared it a settled law 
that the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to compensation. 
 The case of Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa,132 came before the Supreme 
Court by way of public interest litigation claiming compensation for custodial death 
of Suman Behera, a boy of twenty two years, contravening Article 21 of the 
Constitution. The victim was taken into police custody and he was found dead the 
next day on the railway track without being released from custody and his unnatural 
death was caused by multiple injuries sustained by him.  
The Court inferred that the fatal injuries were inflicted on the deceased in 
police custody resulting in his death for which the State of Orissa was responsible. An 
inquiry by the District Judge also had shown that it was a case of custodial death. On 
the facts of the case the Court directed the State to pay Rs. 1,50,000/ as compensation 
to the mother of the victim. Here the Court observed that, the order for monetary 
relief is to be read into the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the 
High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution.  
Though there is no express constitutional provision for grant of compensation 
when right to life is violated, the Supreme Court has judicially evolved the 
constitutional remedy by way of compulsion of judicial conscience. This is the only 
effective remedy to apply as balm to the wounds and give much solace to the family 
members of the aggrieved or victim. It is the only practical mode of enforcement of 
the fundamental right with a view to preserve and protect the rule of law. This 
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decision has been appreciated as ‘a significant decision’133 and ‘of tremendous 
significance’.134 
 The principle enunciated in Rudul Sah and reiterated in Nilabati Behera has 
been applied in a series of cases; compensation has been awarded to family members 
of the persons who were found dead after being taken for interrogation by army 
police135, or died in police custody due to torture,136 or due to neglect of authority in 
providing medical care in time137 or died in fake encounters.138  Further compensation 
has been awarded to those persons who suffered due to ill-treatment,139 torture,140 
forced labour in detention,141 poisonous gas,142 or suffered bodily harm,143 or to those 
persons who were refused medical treatment at government hospitals.144 
 In D.K .Basu v. State of West Bengal145 the court made the position under 
Indian law clear as against the Article 9 (5) of International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. It observed that ‘the Government of India at the time of its 
                                                 
133 M.S.V. Srinivas, “Compensation under Articles 32 and 226 for Violation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”, AIR 1997 (Jour) p. 167. 
134 G.L.Wazir, “Right to Compensation under Public Law in India: A Basic Human Right and 
International Commitment”, Legal News and Views, July 1997, p.15. 
135 Postsangbam Naingol Thokehom v. General Officer Commanding, (1997) 7 SCC 725; Peoples 
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1203; Punjab and Haryana Bar Association 
v. State of Punjab, (1996) 3 SCJ 87. 
136 Saheli v. Commissiooner of Police, AIR 1990 SC 513; Nilabati Behera  v. State of Orissa, AIR 
1993 SC 1960. 
137 Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v. State of Bihar, (1991) 3 SCC 482: Charanjeet Kaur v. 
Union of India (1994) 2 SCC 1. 
138 Inder Singh v. Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 702; R.S. Sodhi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1994) Supp (1) 
SCC 142. 
139 Arvind Singh  Bagga v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1995 SC 117. 
140 D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610. 
141 Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commissioner, (1989) 4 SCC 730. 
142 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395. 
143 A.S. Mittal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1989) 3 SCC 223. 
144 Paschim Bangal Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal, JT 1996 (2) SC 43. 
145 AIR 1997 SC 610. 
188 
 
ratification (of ICCPR) in 1979 had made a specific reservation to the effect that the 
Indian legal system does not recognise a right to compensation for victims of 
unlawful arrest or detention and thus did not become a party to the Covenant. That 
reservation, however, has now lost its relevance in view of the law laid down by this 
court in a number of cases awarding compensation for the infringement of the 
fundamental right to life of a citizen.146  
 The source of public law proceedings stems from the prerogative writs and the 
order for monetary relief is therefore to be read into powers under Articles 32 and 
226. Thus the court further observed:147  
 “since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public 
power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a 
legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be 
protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in 
proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of 
India for the established violation of fundamental rights 
guaranteed under Article 21 is an exercise of the Court’s 
power under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the 
wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the 
State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect 
the fundamental rights of the citizen”. 
 
 The National Human Rights Commission in exercise of its power under 
Section 18 (3) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, has also advanced the 
cause of compensatory justice to the victims of human rights violations when the 
sanctity and dignity of a person is violated by the agencies of State. 
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 As for granting of compensation for violation of human rights in general - not 
particularly for violation of life and liberty, - The National Human Rights 
Commission also has contributed much since its constitution. The National Human 
Rights Commission has laid down precedents on powerful foundations in awarding 
compensation to the victims of violation of human rights. The Commission has 
always given cogent reasons for awarding the monetary relief which any authority can 
not reject. Whenever the act in question is unauthorized, unlawful, illegal, grossly 
negligent, involves non-implementation of law; dereliction of duty, etc., 
compensation is awarded to the victims of such action.148 
 Award of compensation by the Courts for violation of basic rights is creative 
jurisprudence developed by the Courts. However the criteria adopted by the Courts in 
quantifying the compensation have varied from case to case. Supreme Court in D.K. 
Basu referred to this point   but failed to lay down a definite criterion in determining 
the compensation. The Court went on to say that in the assessment of compensation, 
the emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on punitive element, and the 
quantum of compensation will depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no 
straight-jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. Thus it is submitted that the 
Apex Court should evolve an acceptable scientific criteria to assess the quantum of 
compensation. 
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CHAPTER – 7 
THE HUMAN RIGHT COMMISSIONS 
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Introduction 
The Charter of the United Nations is perhaps the most visionary 
document ever adopted by the nations of the world. In its scope and range, in -its 
prescriptions for peace and progress, it desires to propose a framework for 
collective security and action that is without precedent in political history. 
Central to that concept and to the over-arching determination contained in the 
premise "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" is the 
recognition that the "world should reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights" 
and to promote social progress and better standard of life, and greater freedom, if 
the world is to attain peace. Not surprisingly, the same connection is made in 
Article I of the Charter which asserts, inter alia; that one of the purposes of the 
United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without 
discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion.1 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "the 
United Nations has developed a comprehensive strategy aimed at achieving the 
human rights objective set out in the Charter. The basis of this strategy is the 
body of international rules and standards. which now cover virtually every 
sphere of human activity.2 
Upon the strong legislative foundation has been built an extensive 
network of human rights machinery designed to further develop international 
standards, to monitor their implementation, to promote compliance, and to 
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investigate violations of human rights. The strategy is reinforced by a wide 
variety of public information activities and a technical co-operation programme 
which provides practical help to States in their efforts to promote and protect 
human rights.3 
These structures and activities permit the United Nations to play a pivotal 
standard-setting and leadership role in the struggle for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The task of promoting and protecting human rights, 
however, is not one which could or should be assumed by only one organization. 
United Nations practice in the field of human rights, is based on the fundamental 
premise that universal respect for human rights requires the concerted efforts of 
every government, every individual, every group and every organ in society.4 
However, in the past two decades many countries have become parties to 
the major human rights treaties, thereby incurring a legal obligation to 
implement the human rights standards to which they subscribe at the 
international level. Human rights involve relationships among individuals, and 
between individuals and the State. The practical task of protecting human rights 
is, therefore, primarily a national one, for which each State must be responsible. 
At the national level, rights can be best protected through adequate legislation, 
an independent judiciary, the enactment and enforcement of individual 
safeguards and remedies, and the establishment and strengthening of democratic 
institutions. Activities aimed at the promotion of human rights and the 
development of human rights culture should also be viewed as primarily 
national. Responsibilities. The most effective education and information 
campaigns, for example, are likely to be those which are designed and carried 
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out at the national or local level which takes the local cultural and traditional 
context into account.5 
When States ratify a human rights instrument, they either incorporate its 
provisions directly into their domestic legislation or undertake to comply in other 
ways with the obligations contained in the instrument. Therefore, universal 
human rights standards and norms today find their expression in the domestic 
laws of most countries. Often, however, the fact that a law exists to protect 
certain rights is not enough if that law does not also provide for all the legal 
power and institutions necessary to ensure the effective realization of those 
rights.6 
This problem of effective implementation at the national level has, in 
recent times, generated a great deal of international interest .1nd action. The 
emergence or reemergence of domestic rule in many countries has focused 
attention on the importance of democratic institutions in safeguarding the legal 
and political foundations on which human rights are based.7 
It has, therefore, become increasingly apparent that the effective 
enjoyment of human rights calls for the establishment of national infrastructure 
for their promotion and protection. In recent years, many countries have 
established institutions with the express function of protecting human rights. 
While the specific tasks of such institutions may vary considerably from country 
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to country, they share a common purpose, and for this reason are referred to 
collectively as national human rights institutions.8 
7.1 Establishing standards and goals for Human Rights Institution. 
The question of national human rights institutions was first discussed by 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946, two years before the 
General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as "a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations". At its second 
session, in 1946, ECOSOC invited member States "to consider the desirability of 
establishing information groups or local human rights committees in furthering 
the work of the Commission on Human Rights. Fourteen years later the matter 
was raised again, in a resolution which recognized the important role that 
national institutions could play in the promotion and protection of human rights, 
and which invited governments to encourage the formation and continuation of 
such bodies as well as to communicate all relevant information on the subject to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.9 
As standard-setting in the field of human rights gained momentum during 
the 1960s and 19700s, discussions on national institutions became increasingly 
focused on the ways in which such bodies could assist in the effective 
implementation of these international standards. In 1978, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights decided to organize a seminar in order, inter alia, to draft 
guidelines for the structure and functioning of national institutions. Accordingly, 
the seminar on National and Local Institutions for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights was held in Geneva in September 1978 which approved a set 
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of guidelines. These guidelines suggested that the functions of national 
institutions should be: 
(i) To act as a source of human rights information for the government and 
people of the country; 
(ii) To assist in educating public opinion and promoting awareness of and 
respect for human rights; 
(iii) To consider, deliberate upon, and make recommendations regarding 
any particular state of affairs that may exist nationally and which the government 
may wish to refer to them; 
(iv) To advise on the questions regarding human rights matter referred to 
them by the government; 
(v) To study and keep under review the status of legislation, judicial 
decisions and administrative arrangements for the promotion of human rights, 
and to prepare reports on these matters to the appropriate authorities; 
(vi) To perform any other function which the government may wish them 
to carry out in connection with the duties of the State under those international 
instruments in the field of human rights to which it is a party.10 
As regards the structure of such institutions, the guidelines recommended 
that they should 
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(a) Reflect in their composition wide cross sections of the nation, thereby 
bringing all parts of the population into the decision-making process in regard to 
human rights; 
(b) Function regularly, and that immediate access to them should be 
available to any member of the public or any public authority; 
(e) In appropriate cases, have local or regional advisory organs to assist 
them in discharging their functions. 
The guidelines were subsequently endorsed by the Commission on 
Human Rights and the General Assembly. The Assembly invited the States to 
take appropriate steps for the establishment, where they did not already exist, of 
national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, and 
requested the Secretary-General to submit a detailed report on existing national 
institutions.11 
Throughout the 1980s, the United Nations continued to take an active 
interest in this topic and a series of reports prepared by the Secretary-General 
was presented to the General Assembly. It was during this time that a 
considerable number of national institutions were established-many with the 
support of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights.12 
In 1990s, the Commission on Human Rights called for a workshop to be 
convened with the participation of national and regional institutions involved in 
the promotion and protection of human rights. 
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The workshop was to review patterns of co-operation between national 
institutions and international organizations, such as the United Nations and its 
agencies and to explore ways of increasing the effectiveness of national 
institutions. Accordingly, the first international workshop on national institutions 
for the promotion and protection of human rights was held in Paris from 7th to 
9th October, 1991. Its conclusions were endorsed by the Commission on Human 
Rights in Resolution 1992/54 as principles relating to the status of national 
institutions ("the Paris Principle"), and subsequently by the General Assembly in 
its resolution 48/134 of 20th December, 1993. The principles affirm that national 
institutions are to be vested with competence to promote and protect human 
rights and given as broad mandate as possible, set forth clearly in a constitutional 
or legislative text. 
According to these principles, which represent a refinement and extension 
of the guidelines developed in 1978, a national institution shall have the 
following responsibilities: 
To submit recommendations, proposals and reports on any matter relating 
to human rights including legislative and administrative provisions and any 
situation of violation of human rights to the government, parliament and any 
other competent body;. 
(i),  To promote conformity of national laws and practices with 
international human rights standards; 
(ii) To contribute to the reporting procedure under international 
instruments; 
(iii) To assist in formulating and executing human rights teaching and 
research programmers and to increase public awareness of human rights through 
information and education; 
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(iv) To co-operate with the United Nations, regional institutions, and 
national institutions of other countries. 
The principles also recognized that a number of national institutions have 
been given competence to receive and act on individual complaints of human 
rights violations. They stipulate that the functions of national institutions in this 
respect may be based on the following principles:- 
(a) Seeking an amicable settlement of the matter through conciliation, 
binding decision or other means; 
(b) Informing the complainant of his or her rights and of available means 
of redress, and promoting access to such redressals, hearing complaints or 
referring them to competent authority; 
(c) Making recommendations to the competent authorities, including 
proposals for amendment of laws, regulations or administrative practice which 
obstruct the free exercise of rights.13  
Broadly speaking, on the lines of the aforesaid international guidelines, a 
considerable number of human rights commiss10ns have been set up in different 
parts of the world. "These institutions have a very unique role in translating 
international human rights standards into reality, and giving them a local flavor 
and acceptability without diluting their essential universal characteristics.14 
                                              
13  Ibid. p. 7. 
14  Excerpted from the statement by justice S.S. Kang, Member of the NHRC, at the third International 
Workshop of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights at Manila.  
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In view of such considerations, it would be worthwhile here to 'highlight· 
an overview of the nature, composition and functioning of the existing national 
commissions meant for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
7.2 Human Rights Commission in different countries-an overview 
Human Rights commissions are concerned primarily with the protection 
of individual against discrimination and with the protection of civil and other 
human rights. These commissions and similar public bodies at the national level 
are generally designed to hear and investigate individual charges of human rights 
violations or discriminatory acts committed in violation of existing law.15 The 
precise function and powers of a particular commission is defined by law or 
decrees under which it is established. These laws or decrees also serve to define 
the jurisdiction of the commission by specifying the range of discriminatory or 
violative conduct that it is empowered to investigate. For example, the 
Australian Human Rights Commission is authorized to hear and investigate 
complaints of violation of any rights defined in the Racial Discrimination Act 
and the Human Rights Commission Act. Similarly, the United States Civil 
Rights Commission may hear and investigate complaints alleging discrimination 
on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  
Most human rights Commissions are collegial bodies, comprising of 
members who, in most cases, are selected by the executive.16 In many cases, the 
Commissions enjoy statutory independence and are responsible for reporting to 
the legislative body on a regular basis. Member of Human Rights Commission 
are selected by various departments or ministries of respective countries. For 
example, in Canada and Japan, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for the 
                                              
15  Edward Lawson, Encyclopedia of Human Rights, U.K. Taylor & Francis Ltd., London,1991,p.771.  
16  Ibid. 
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selection whereas in Norway and Denmark, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for the same. 
In keeping with their independent nature, members of the Commission are 
selected from various fields, but preference is generally given to a person having 
prior experience in the field of human rights. For instance, in Denmark, the 
members of the Human rights Commission include representatives from the 
Foreign Ministry, other ministries and various non-governmental organizations. 
In the United States, members of the Civil Rights Commission are selected by 
the President but they must be confirmed by the Senate, with the requirement 
that not more than half of the members belong to the same party. In Japan, the 
Ministry of Justice selects the members from the Civil Liberties Bureau's eight 
offices across the country. The citizens chosen as commissioners include social 
workers, school teachers, attorneys, media personnel and manual workers in 
agriculture and forestry. 
The procedure followed by Human Rights Commission in the 
investigation and resolution of complaints vary from country to country. 
However, it is true that in almost all countries the Human Rights Commissions 
do not have the power to make binding decisions in resolving a complaint. In 
most cases, the Human Rights Commissions attempt to arrive at settlements 
between parties. If the settlement or remedial steps suggested by the 
Commissions are not implemented, they have the authority to apprehend the 
courts or prosecutors office for adjudication or prosecution of the matter. The 
commissions may, as in Australia, submit the matter to the Attorney-General 
with a recommendation as to the appropriate legal action.17 
                                              
17  Ibid. p.8. 
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Cases in which no settlement can be reached, the law often provides the 
procedures to be followed. In Canada, for example, the provincial Minister of 
Justice concerned may, upon the recommendation of the Human Rights 
Commission, set up a Board of inquiry. The Board's membership is entirely 
independent of the Commission. If the Board decides that human rights violation 
has indeed been committed, it may determine the appropriate remedial action to 
be taken including the payment of damages. If the Board's recommendation is 
not implemented, it may be enforced by the courts or in some provinces by the 
Human Rights commission itself. In one Canadian province, in which no Board 
of inquiry exists, the Human Rights Commission may, with the plaintiff's 
consent, seek an injunction from the court, in the event that its recommendation 
has not been implemented. 
In some cases, a Human Rights Commission may hear and investigate 
complaints, but may not be empowered to act upon them. The commission's 
function is, primarily, to review the status of compliance with civil rights law 
and to study the situation concerning respect for human rights. The commission 
is empowered, however, to hear complaints and receive information regarding 
those complaints. In fulfilling its responsibilities, the United Civil Rights 
Commission may issue 'subpoenas', (a writ commanding attendance in court 
under a penalty) and hold formal meetings. 
One of the most important functions of a Human Rights Commission is 
its power to review systematically existing government policy towards human 
rights and suggest improvement.· For instance, in addition to its competence to 
hear, investigate and apply remedies to cases involving human rights violations, 
the National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 
Nicaragua conducts periodic review of the legislative and administrative systems 
and recommends to the government, ways in which these systems might be 
improved. Similarly, the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights for 
Northern Ireland advises parliament on the adequacy and effectiveness of 
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existing laws in preventing discrimination on religious beliefs and public 
opinion. 
Many Human Rights Commissions engage in monitoring State legislative 
compliance with existing human rights law.18 In its review of every newly 
enacted state law, the senate legal committee of Zimbabwe, seeks to ensure that 
all new legislation compliance with the Declaration of Rights embodied in the 
Zimbabwean Constitution. The Committee also advises the government on 
whether any provision in the new legislation; would be in violation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, the Italian Inter-ministerial 
Committee on Human Rights engages in a systematic review of legislative and 
administrative measures in an effort to ensure that Italy meets its obligations 
under international covenants on Human Rights. In New Zealand, the Human 
Rights Commission is also responsible for advising the Prime Minister regarding 
the acceptance and enforcement of international instrument on human rights. 
Most Human Rights Commissions are also actively engaged in 
campaigning among the public their function and purpose as well as about 
various issues in the field of human rights.19 They generally fulfill these 
functions through seminars, counseling services and meetings, as well as through 
the distribution of periodic reports, studies and bulletins prepared by the 
Commissions or other human rights institutions. The Statutes of the Australian 
Human Rights Commission, Japanese Civil Liberties Bureau and Canadian 
Human Rights Commission have included these provisions in order to provide 
educational activities, to encourage community campaigns and non-
governmental activities which promote respect for human rights. Even more 
                                              
18  Ibid.p. 12. 
19  Ibid. p. 14. 
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specifically, the Canadian Human Rights Commission Act provides a broad 
range of activities in this regard. Some of the important provisions are: to 
institute information programmes; to foster public understanding; to carry out 
research programme; to provide assistance and advice directed at ensuring 
compliance with the Act; and to maintain close liaison with bodies or authorities 
in the provinces that are working in the field of human rights. 
In some cases, Commissions are created with the sole purpose of carrying 
out promotional and educational activities concerning human rights. For 
example, the Surinam Human Rights Commission is solely devoted to providing 
promotional services to the community for heightening an awareness of human 
rights issues. 
From the foregoing discussions on the establishment. nature: and 
functioning of Human Rights Commissions in various countries, it can be rightly 
concluded that there has been a growing respect for and observance of human 
rights issues in most parts of the world. Human rights institutions have been 
established with a view to ensuring that laws and regulations concerning the 
protection of human rights are effectively applied, and to educating the public 
about the purpose and operation of such legislations. India being a democratic 
country owes Its obligation to international law and co-operation with other 
nations. It has established an apex body called National Human Rights 
Commission to comply with international standards of human rights and to 
promote and protect human rights as enshrined in its own Constitution. 
7.3 Establishment of the National Human Right Commission 
The present struggle for human rights in India has its antecedents during 
the colonial rule but it became intense and full-fledged in emergency period as 
imposed by Indira Gandhi in between 1975·77. During this phase the 
contemporary moral standards of India's democratic norms stood as particularly 
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amoral due to the increasing weakness in the professional efficiency of. the 3tate 
apparatus, the bureaucracy, political parties, the Judiciary and the media. As a 
result some of the important events such as the demand for restoration of civil 
and democratic rights, the demand for regional autonomy, restructuring of the 
State apparatus and the emergence of various civil and democratic rights 
organizations provided the institutional base of this movement. The 
establishment of the NHRC as governmental machinery is a just supplement of 
it. 
7.4. A.  Brief History of the Commission 
The history of the establishment of a Human Rights Commission in India 
can be traced back to pre-independence era when the national liberation struggle 
was stirring up against British tyranny. Civil Liberties Union, the first human 
rights organization in the country was formed by Jawaharlal nehru and some of 
his colleagues in early 1930s. The main objective of the organization was to 
collect information on violation of human rights and to provide legal aid to 
nationalists who were accused of sedition against the colol1lal authorities. It was 
successful in creating consciousness among masses. The Madras Civil Liberties 
Organization was formed in 1947 which undertook similar activities in Madras. 
Following the ban on Communist Party of India, a nationwide repression took 
place, particularly in Calcutta, which led to the birth of Civil Liberties 
Committee in 1948. The real emergence of human rights organizations took 
place in 1960s when both the privileged social classes and the government 
systematically cracked down on groups fighting for the rights of the traditionally 
oppressed people. In 1972, the Association for Protection of Democratic Rights 
(APDR) was formed in Calcutta and in 1974, the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties 
Committee (APCLC) was formed. Both the organizations were limited by their 
fragmented and sectarian nature, coupled with the indifference of the media and 
public to the plight of marginalized sections of the society. However, their main 
task was to highlight the growing repression and exploitation in the countryside 
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and played a crucial role in confronting and exposing the coercive action of the 
State. 
During the emergency period (1975-77), a major agitation against the 
growing authoritarianism of Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, 
further widened the scope for the establishment of human rights organization in 
the country. With the active initiative of Java Prakash Narayan, the People's 
Union for Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights (PUCLDR) was formed in 
1975. In the subsequent phase, the PUCLDR was split in 1980 into two groups-
PUDR and PUCL. During the post-emergency era, a number of human rights 
organizations such as the Civil Liberties and Human Rights Organizations 
(CLAHRO) in Manipur, Citizens for Democracy (CFD) in Delhi, the Committee 
for the Protection of Democratic Rights (CPDR) in Bombay, the Free Legal Aid 
Committee (FLAC) in Bihar, the J & K Peoples Movement for Human Rights 
and many other have been formed for this cause. Though these organizations 
greatly differ in their structure and modus operandi, their activities are more 01 
less similar with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights. Fact-
finding mission and investigation, public interest litigation, citizen’s awareness 
programme, campaigns, the production of supportive literature for independent 
movements and organizations were some of the important activities of these 
organizations. Their main concern is to create an atmosphere where a 
harmonious state-civil society interaction could be possible. 
The first political initiative to set up a Civil Rights Commission took 
place as early as 1977 in the election manifesto of Janata Party. It was proposed 
to be independent and autonomous, and was to be headed by a person equal to 
the status of a judge of the Supreme Court, who would be competent to ensure 
that minorities, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other backward 
classes did not suffer from discrimination and inequality. The purpose of setting 
up of the Civil Rights Commission had been mooted to fulfill the party's promise 
made in the election. It was also felt that with the setting up of the commission, 
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the key offices of the Commissioners of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and the 
Commissioners of Linguistic Minority would become redundant. Those offices 
would be wound up and their responsibilities entrusted to the proposed 
Commission. The setting up of such a Commission had been thought of mainly 
because of the lack of sufficient powers and inadequate status of the offices of 
the Commissioners of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and the Minorities.  
In early 1983, the Minorities Commission had recommended to set up a 
comprehensive National Integration-cum-Human Rights Commission and urged 
the government to make a constitutional provision for it.20 In 1985, the then 
Chief Justice of India, P.N. Bhagwati, had suggested for a National Human 
Rights Commission.21 In 1986, the Civil Liberties activists in the country 
planned to form a Human Rights Tribunal comprising mainly of former judges 
to investigate violations of human rights.22  The creation of a Human Rights 
Commission in each state and at the national level was suggested by L.M. 
Singvi, an eminent jurist, in March 1988.23 He advocated for the need of a 
constructive, positive and participative mass movement for human rights and 
human obligations. 
 
 
 
                                              
20  “Panel urged on Human Rights Integration”,The Times of India, New Delhi, dated 20th April, 1983. 
21  Manoranjan Mohanty, “The Fight for Rights, Race of Civil Liberties Groups”, The Statesman, New 
Delhi, dated,15th September, 1985.  
22  “Plan to Form Human Rights Tribunal”, The Indian Express, dated,30th June, 1988. 
23  The statesman, dated 20th March, 1988.  
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7.4.B. Activities During 1991-93 
The Congress election manifesto released in 1991 had promised to set up 
a Human Rights Commission to investigate and adjudicate complaints of 
violation of human rights within 365 days' of its assuming power. 
In February 1992, it was proposed that a legislation to help establishing a 
human rights commission was to be formulated after studying the structure of 
similar organization in other countries and also in the backdrop of existing 
countries. 
The Union Horne Minister, S.Y. Chavan, made a remark in the Rajya 
Sabha on March, 1992, that the proposed body would counter the false and 
politically motivated propaganda by foreigner and Indian civil rights agencies 
against the State. In a speech, the Prime Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao, 
remarked that “we must send a clear message that we do not tolerate human 
rights violation". On 24th April, 1992, the Congress Party spokesman, V.N. 
Gadgil, called for a national debate on the role, composition, power and 
jurisdiction of the proposed commission. Gadgil added that the question of 
human rights has now climbed to the top of the international agenda. The best 
way to face the reality is to establish a Human Rights Commission. It can play a 
useful role in furthering human rights standards in the country. Its finding will 
act as correctives to the biased and one-sided report of some of the NGOs. It will 
also be an effective answer to the politically motivated international criticism.24 
In another development, the Chief Ministers' conference was called by the 
Home Minister and attended by a number of central ministers on 14th 
September, 1992; after day-long deliberations the conference adopted a 
                                              
24  Prem singh, “Human Rights Commission: Need for Consensus”, Link, dated 8th November, 1992, pp. 
21-22. 
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resolution endorsing the decision to institute the Commission. In the inaugural 
address the Indian Prime Minister, P.Y. Narasimha Rao, pointed reference to 
"betrayal of custodial trust by the guardians of law and those appointed to protect 
the individual". His urging of the authorities to deal with such lapses with" 
alacrity and in an exemplary manner to ensure that victims got a positive and 
quick redressal", clearly showed that the proposed Commission sought to 
address the very issues which the various reports of the human rights bodies 
have made as the centre-piece of their criticism against the organs of the State. In 
his speech, the Home Minister asserted on the need to enact a central legislation 
as a deterrent to check custodial crimes in the country. The decision to set up a 
committee of five chief ministers with a number of central ministers suggested 
the keenness of the government to have a legislation at the earliest and to get it 
passed at parliament's winter Session.25 
The discussions at the Chief Minister's conference showed a great deal of 
divergent views. Mizoram Chief Minister, Lalthan Wala, opposed the setting up 
of the Commission saying that the Constitution of India guarantees all civil and 
political rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the 
UN. He said that India had a press which was totally free and was most vocal 
and vigilant; hence there was no need to set up such a Commission. Moreover 
the other existll1g Commissions took care of the human rights of the weaker 
section of the society. Orissa Chief Minister, Biju Patnaik, said that there was no 
doubt that the proposed Commission would function as an authority as he 
believed that the State Government would be accountable to it, especially as the 
Commission would be set up by an act of Parliament. On the other hand, Punjab 
Chief Minister, Beant Singh, cautioned against the Commission getting reduced 
                                              
25  Ibid. p. 18. 
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to a forum with only an advisory body.26 Assam Chief Minister, Hiteshwer 
Saikia, lashed out at, some organizations and journalists for blowing custodial 
crimes out of proportion, while keeping silent over rampant violations of basic 
human rights of the citizens. Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Janardhan Reddy, 
warned that the scope of the proposed Commission should not come into conflict 
with the established institution which discharged their functions under various 
statutes. Karnataka Chief Minister, S. Bangarappa, suggested that State-level 
Human rights Commission should be set up and there should be clear 
demarcation of the jurisdiction of these Commissions from that of the National 
Cmmissioll. It was interesting that three Chief Ministers of the BJP-ruled States, 
i.e., Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan favored a single Human 
Rights Commission to coordinate the functions of the existing commissions on 
the Minorities, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Women. 
These are some of the important views of political leaders in connection 
with the scope, structure and status of the proposed Human Rights Commission, 
which provided a feedback to the government, to make up its mind in this 
regard. 
However, it would be apt here to highlight some of the important changes 
in connection with human rights issues which had taken place at international 
level during this phase. International relations are always in a state of flux. 
Important activities during 1991-93, such as the formal end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union, the emergence of trade war between EC, 
USA, Germany and Japan, etc., campaign for democratization of world order 
and, of course, the worldwide violation of human rights led to the resurgence of 
importance of the concept of human rights. The USA has particularly taken 
                                              
26  Ibid. p .22. 
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interest to prevail its ideological hegemony in international sphere in general and 
the Third world countries in particular. Human rights are a sensitive issue for 
many Third World countries facing ethnic upsurge and insurgency. This issue 
has been used as a tool by Western powers led by the US to bring developing 
countries into their lines of thought. Most of the Third World countries are aid-
seekers for their economic development and industrialization. However, these 
countries have been pressurized to show their good human rights record in order 
to receive financial assistance from them. It is in this context that there prevailed 
a linkage between development, democracy and human rights between the 
developed and developing countries. This lends a basis for most of the Third 
World countries in establishing and strengthening national institutions on human 
rights. 
7.5. A.  Need for Setting-up of the NHRC 
The decision by the Government of India to set up a human rights panel 
did not come a day soon. A host of factors led the government to think in terms 
of setting up of a statutory and recommendatory body on human rights. The 
issue had been under active consideration for some time at the appropriate 
official levels. After considered thought government had announced its intention 
to prepare a legislation to serve as a basis for such a Commission. The issue 
assumed urgency in the context of alleged violation of human rights in certain 
States like J & K, Punjab and Assam. However, some of the important factors 
which led to the formation of NHRC are as follows: 
Over the past several years, India has been severely criticized by Amnesty 
International, Asia watch and International Red Cross for alleged violations of 
human rights by the police and security forces in most sensitive areas such as 
Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and Andhra Pradesh. These violations include custodial 
deaths, illegal confinement, police brutalities, rate and other heinous crimes. 
Denial of permission these reputed international bodies to study and assess our 
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human rights record has created suspicion in the minds of such organizations 
about the sincerity of our commitment to uphold human rights. The denial to 
these organizations to visit the sensitive areas was backed by the reasons that it 
might be prejudicial to the security of the State and hamper the work of restoring 
peace and tranquility which has been adversely criticized on account of the 
absence of any plausible reasons. In order to avoid such criticisms/ reports made 
by these organizations, the government decided to set up a native agency to 
examine its own human rights records. 
The charges of violations of human rights in India are being raised 
primarily with the incidents of torture, rape and deaths in police custody, and 
inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners. Apart from this, rampant 
violations of human rights arise out of the poor socio- economic conditions of 
our people, particularly people belonging to the most vulnerable sections 
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, migrant workers and 
landless laborers. Such violations occur due to the country's scarce resources and 
other problems like poverty, malnutrition, mounting unemployment, illiteracy, 
unbearable and. unhygienic conditions in the slums, lack of primary health care 
in the rural areas and a horde of other problems including violence, terrorism and 
outrageous incidents of communal riots.27 Taking all these into account, it seems 
that our commitment to human rights is a mere catchy slogan pronounced at 
public meetings, conferences and seminars. There is, therefore, a need to 
establish a fact-finding body to recommend ways and means to the Government/ 
authority to prevent such violations. 
The growing concern for the promotion and protection of human rights 
issues both at national and international level could be a probable reason for the 
                                              
27  D.S. Aswal, “Human Rights Body: Why”, the Patriot, dated 21st June, 1993. 
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Central Government to think in terms of establishing a human rights commission 
in India. The increasing concern being made about human rights, a real threat 
has been anticipated in the form of link between economic assistance and human 
rights conditionality’s. The USA and UK are not the only Western countries 
which have been expressing their concern over the violations of human rights in 
India, but other donor countries like Sweden, Norway, France and Switzerland 
have also expressed their concern in this regard. They have been influenced by a 
number of international nongovernmental organizations, notably Amnesty 
International and Church bodies. They acknowledge that there have been 
instances of arbitrary killings of civilians by terrorist groups in Kashmir and 
hence stress the point that higher standards are expected from the government 
officials who are entrusted to uphold and protect basic rights of people. 
Another consideration for the introduction of human rights commission 
bill could be analyzed in the light of Kashmir issue. Pakistan has a long-standing 
demand to sponsor resolution recommending the visit of a fact-finding mission 
to J & K to investigate alleged violations’ of human rights by the police and 
other security forces. This issue has been raised at various international 
conferences and has become more intense particularly in the World Conference 
on Human Rights at Geneva on 3rd March, 1993.  
In its proposal for "Co-operation, Agreement on partnership and 
Development with India (1993)", the EC has inserted a clause which states that 
respect for human rights and democratic principles is the. basis for the co-
operation between the contracting parties which constitutes a key element to this 
agreement. Prior to it, the EC had also emphasized on a resolution on Human 
Rights, Democracy and Development in. 1991. In this resolution, the EC had 
made the Insertion of human rights clauses compulsory in the economic and co-
operation agreement between the EC and its member States and developing 
countries. Towards this end, India has recently received an annual aid of about $ 
100 million to $ 150 million for specific projects from the EC. With regard to 
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violations of human rights in India, the European Parliament had also passed a 
resolution on heightened tension in J & K State in 1992 in which it condemned 
all acts of terrorism and repression and abuses of human rights and stressed the 
point that such acts may influence ECs relations with India and Pakistan. As a 
party to the Agreement, India had to perform its obligation to fulfill these 
conditions/clauses imposed by the EC members.  
The various rulings of the Supreme Court, High Courts, the reports of the 
Law Commission, the National Police Commission and the reports of 
independent observers have made clear that the immediate need for amending 
relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code 
are necessary. The amendments suggested that it would shift the liability of 
proof on the police officials in case there is e: iden.ce that injury caused while in 
custody, mandatory Judicial enquiry in case of death or disappearance in 
custody, post-mortem within 24 hours, and medical examination in case of all 
allegation of rape,28 So the proposed Human Rights Commission may be of 
useful instrument in this regard.  
The need for bringing a central legislation providing for mandatory 
financial compensation to the victims of custodial crimes is long overdue. Thus, 
by adopting a three-pronged strategy-first, the establishment of human rights 
commission, second, amendment of the existing administrative law on crime, 
and third, a central Legislation for compensation for the victims of custodial 
crimes-India Can fulfill its international obligations and live up to the 
constitutional mandate.  
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Another point of observation is that the judicial process in India is very 
slow. It often takes years for a case to be decided. The courts are\clogged with 
cases, hence there is a great backlog of pending cases. Besides the technicalities 
of procedure make it a case of 'justice delayed hence justice denied' .So the 
proposed Commission could be another redressal mechanism for the promotion 
and protection of human rights in a more systematic way.  
Despite the criticisms labeled against India by human rights 
organizations, "the world community, by and large, perceives India as a stable 
democracy with an independent judiciary, vibrant legislature and a vigilant 
press. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to uphold India's image at home and 
abroad by establishing an independent and investigatory watchdog body on 
human rights"29 As discussed earlier, many countries like Canada, Australia, 
Mexico, Algeria, Northern Ireland, Japan, Surinam, Nicaragua and The 
Philippines have set up human rights commissions in their respective countries. 
So it is clear from the available indications that our country should have a 
Commission similar to those countries. The Commission so set up can have 
Indian laws and conditions, and can function in coordination with the existing 
Commissions meant for safeguarding the rights of the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, women and the minorities.  
Taking all these points into consideration, the Government of India 
introduced the Human Rights Commission Bill in the Lok Sabha on 14th May, 
1992. The Bill was referred by the Speaker to the Standing Committee of 
Parliament on Home Affairs. In view of the urgency of the matter, the Protection 
of Human Rights Ordinance, 1993 was promulgated by the President on 28th 
September, 1993. After incorporating certain amendments having regard to the 
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discussions in the said Standing Committee and to replace the Ordinance of 1993 
the Protection of Human Rights Bill was passed by both the Houses of 
Parliament and it came on the Statute Book as the Protection of Human Rights 
Act, 1993 (10 of 1994). The Commission was initially constituted on 12th 
October, 1993 under the Protection of Human Rights Ordinance of 28th 
September, 1993.  
7.5.B. Objectives of The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. 
The main objectives of the Act is to provide for the constitution of the 
National and State Human Rights Commissions and Human Rights Courts for 
better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto. Thus, it has a twin objective to fulfill, namely, establishment 
of institutional structure, both at Centre and State levels, and to create 
enforcement machinery in terms of human rights courts for better protection of 
human rights. 
7.6   Structure of the National Human Rights commission.30 
 7.6.1. Constitution of a National Human Rights Commission 
The Central Government shall constitute a body to be known as the 
National Human Rights Commission to exercise the powers conferred upon, and 
to perform the functions assigned to it, under this Act. 
The Commission shall consist of: 
A Chairperson who has been a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; 
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One Member who is or has been, a Judge of the Supreme Court; 
One Member who is, or has been, the Chief Justice of a High Court; 
Two Members to be appointed from amongst persons having knowledge 
of, or practical experience in, matters relating to human rights. 
The Chairperson of the National Commission for Minorities, 1[the 
National Commission for the Scheduled Castes, the National Commission for the 
Scheduled Tribes] and the National Commission for Women shall be deemed to 
be Members of the Commission for the discharge of functions specified in 
clauses (b) to (j) of section 12. 
There shall be a Secretary-General who shall be the Chief Executive 
Officer of the Commission and shall exercise such powers and discharge such 
functions of the Commission2 [except judicial functions and the power to make 
regulations under section 40 B], as may be delegated to him by the Commission 
or the Chairperson as the case may be. 
The headquarters of the Commission shall be at Delhi and the 
Commission may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, 
establish offices at other places in India 
7.6.2 Appointment of Chairperson and other Members 
The Chairperson and [the Members]1shall be appointed by the 
President by warrant under his hand and seal; 
Provided that every appointment under this sub-section shall be made 
after obtaining the recommendations of a Committee consisting of– 
The Prime Minister — Chairperson 
Speaker of the House of the People — Member 
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Minister in-charge of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Government of 
India — Member 
Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People — Member 
Leader of the Opposition in the Council of States — Member 
Deputy Chairman of the Council of States — Member 
Provided further that no sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or sitting 
Chief Justice of a High Court shall be appointed except after consultation with 
the Chief Justice of India. 
(2) No appointment of a Chairperson or a Member shall be invalid 
merely by reason of any vacancy of any member in the Committee referred 
to in the first proviso to sub-section (1). 
7.6.3. Resignation and removal of Chairperson and Members 
The Chairperson or any Member may, by notice in writing under his hand 
addressed to the President of India, resign his office. 
Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Chairperson or any 
Member shall only be removed from his office by order of the President of India 
on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the Supreme Court, on 
reference being made to it by the President, has, on inquiry held in accordance 
with the procedure prescribed in that behalf by the Supreme Court, reported that 
the Chairperson or the Member, as the case may be, ought on any such ground to 
be removed. 
Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (2), the President may, by order, 
remove from office the Chairperson or any Member if the Chairperson or such  
Member, as the case may be– 
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Is adjudged an insolvent; or 
Engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the 
duties of his office; or 
Is unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or 
Is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or 
Is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which in the 
opinion of the President involves moral turpitude. 
7.6.4. Term of office of Chairperson and Members 
A person appointed as Chairperson shall hold office for a term of five 
years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age 
of seventy years, whichever is earlier. 
A person appointed as a Member shall hold office for a term of five years 
from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall be eligible for re-
appointment for another term of five years. 
Provided that no Member shall hold office after he has attained the age of 
seventy years. 
On ceasing to hold office, a Chairperson or a Member shall be 
ineligible for further employment under the Government of India or under 
the Government of any State. 
7.6.5. Member to act as Chairperson or to discharge his functions 
   in certain circumstances 
(1) In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of the 
Chairperson by reason of his death, resignation or otherwise, the President may, 
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by notification, authorise one of the Members to act as the Chairperson until the 
appointment of a new Chairperson to fill such vacancy. 
(2) When the Chairperson is unable to discharge his functions owing to 
absence on leave or otherwise, such one of the Members as the President may, 
by notification, authorise in this behalf, shall discharge the functions of the 
Chairperson until the date on which the Chairperson resumes his duties. 
7.6.6. Terms and conditions of service of Chairperson and 
              Members 
The salaries and allowances payable to, and other terms and conditions of 
service of, the1 [Chairperson and] Members shall be such as may be prescribed. 
Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other terms and 
conditions of service of 2 [the Chairperson or] a Member shall be varied to his 
disadvantage after his appointment. 
7.6.7. Vacancies, etc., not to invalidate the proceedings of the 
            Commission 
No act or proceedings of the Commission shall be questioned or shall be 
invalidated merely on the ground of existence of any vacancy or defect in the 
constitution of the Commission. 
7.6.8. Procedure to be regulated by the Commission 
The Commission shall meet at such time and place as the Chairperson 
may think fit. 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the 
Commission shall have the power to lay down by regulations its own procedure. 
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All orders and decisions of the Commission shall be authenticated by the 
Secretary-General or any other officer of the Commission duly authorised by the 
Chairperson in this behalf. 
7.6.9. Officers and other staff of the Commission 
(1) The Central Government shall make available to the Commission: 
An officer of the rank of the Secretary to the Government of India who 
shall be the Secretary-General of the Commission; and 
Such police and investigative staff under an officer not below the rank of 
a Director General of Police and such other officers and staff as may be 
necessary for the efficient performance of the functions of the Commission. 
Subject to such rules as may be made by the Central Government in this 
behalf, the Commission may appoint such other administrative, technical and 
scientific staff as it may consider necessary. 
The salaries, allowances and conditions of service of the officers and 
other staff appointed under sub-section (2) shall be such as may be prescribed. 
7.6.10. Functions of the Commission 
The Commission shall perform all or any of the following functions, 
namely:- 
(a)  Inquire, suo motu or on a petition presented to it by a victim or any 
person on his behalf [or on a direction or order of any court]1, into complaint of 
(i) Violation of human rights or abetment thereof; or 
(ii) Negligence in the prevention of such violation, by a public servant; 
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(b)  Intervene in any proceeding involving any allegation of violation of 
human rights pending before a court with the approval of such court; 
(c) visit, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time 
being in force, any jail or other institution under the control of the State 
Government, where persons are detained or lodged for purposes of treatment, 
reformation or protection, for the study of the living conditions of the inmates 
thereof and make recommendations thereon to the Government; 
Review the safeguards provided by or under the Constitution or any law 
for the time being in force for the protection of human rights and recommend 
measures for their effective implementation; 
Review the factors, including acts of terrorism that inhibit the enjoyment 
of human rights and recommend appropriate remedial measures; 
Study treaties and other international instruments on human rights and 
make recommendations for their effective implementation; 
Undertake and promote research in the field of human rights; 
Spread human rights literacy among various sections of society and 
promote awareness of the safeguards available for the protection of these rights 
through publications, the media, seminars and other available means; 
Encourage the efforts of non-governmental organisations and institutions 
working in the field of human rights; 
Such other functions as it may consider necessary for the protection of 
human rights. 
 
 
222 
 
7.6.11. Powers relating to inquiries 
(1) The Commission shall, while inquiring into complaints under this 
Act, have all the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of 
Civil Procedure, 1908, and in particular in respect of the following matters, 
namely : 
Summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining 
them on oath; 
Discovery and production of any document; 
Receiving evidence on affidavits; 
Requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; 
Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; 
Any other matter which may be prescribed. 
(2) The Commission shall have power to require any person, subject 
to any privilege which may be claimed by that person under any law for 
the time being in force, to furnish information on such points or matters 
as, in the opinion of the Commission, may be useful for, or relevant to, 
the subject matter of the inquiry and any person so required shall be deemed to 
be legally bound to furnish such information within the meaning of section 176 
and section 177 of the Indian Penal Code. 
The Commission or any other officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted 
Officer, specially authorised in this behalf by the Commission may enter any 
building or place where the Commission has reason to believe that any document 
relating to the subject matter of the inquiry may be found, and may seize any 
such document or take extracts or copies therefrom subject to the provisions of 
223 
 
section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in so far as it may be 
applicable. 
The Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court and when any 
offence as is described in section 175, section 178, section 179, section 180 or 
section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of the 
Commission, the Commission may, after recording the facts constituting the 
offence and the statement of the accused as provided for in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973, forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the 
same and the Magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to 
hear the complaint against the accused as if the case has been forwarded to him 
under section 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
Every proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial 
proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of 
section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, and the Commission shall be deemed to 
be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
(3) Where the Commission considers it necessary or expedient so to do, it 
may, by order, transfer any complaint filed or pending before it to the State 
Commission of the State from which the complaint arises, for disposal in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act; 
Provided that no such complaint shall be transferred unless the same is 
one respecting which the State Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the 
same. 
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7.6.12. Investigation 
(1) The Commission may, for the purpose of conducting any 
investigation pertaining to the inquiry, utilise the services of any officer or 
investigation agency of the Central Government or any State Government 
with the concurrence of the Central Government or the State Government, 
as the case may be. 
(2) For the purpose of investigating into any matter pertaining to the 
inquiry, any officer or agency whose services are utilised under sub section (1) 
may, subject to the direction and control of the Commission:- 
           (a) summon and enforce the attendance of any person and examine him; 
Require the discovery and production of any document; and 
Requisition any public record or copy thereof from any office. 
The provisions of section 15 shall apply in relation to any statement made 
by a person before any officer or agency whose services are utilised under sub-
section (1) as they apply in relation to any statement made by a person in the 
course of giving evidence before the Commission. 
The officer or agency whose services are utilised under subsection (1) 
shall investigate into any matter pertaining to the inquiry and submit a report 
thereon to the Commission within such period as may be specified by the 
Commission in this behalf. 
The Commission shall satisfy itself about the correctness of the facts 
stated and the conclusion, if any, arrived at in the report submitted to it under 
sub-section (4) and for this purpose the Commission may make such inquiry 
(including the examination of the person or persons who conducted or assisted in 
the investigation) as it thinks fit. 
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7.6.13. Statement made by persons to the Commission 
No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before 
the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or 
criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such 
statement: 
Provided that the statement:- 
(a) Is made in reply to the question which he is required by the 
Commission to answer; or 
(b) is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. 
7.6.14. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard 
If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission:- 
(a) Considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or 
(b) is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be 
prejudicially affected by the inquiry;  
it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the 
inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence: 
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a 
witness is being impeached. 
7.6.15. Inquiry into complaints 
The Commission while inquiring into the complaints of violations of 
human rights may– 
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(i) call for information or report from the Central Government or any 
State Government or any other authority or organisation subordinate thereto 
within such time as may be specified by it:-Provided that– 
If the information or report is not received within the time stipulated by 
the Commission, it may proceed to inquire into the complaint on its own; 
if, on receipt of information or report, the Commission is satisfied either 
that no further inquiry is required or that the required action has been initiated or 
taken by the concerned Government or authority, it may not proceed with the 
complaint and inform the complainant accordingly; 
(ii) without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i), if it considers 
necessary, having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate an inquiry. 
7.6.16. Steps during and after inquiry 
The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon the 
completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely:- 
(a) where the inquiry discloses the commission of violation of human 
rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights or abetment 
thereof by a public servant, it may recommend to the concerned Government or 
authority – 
(i) To make payment of compensation or damages to the complainant or 
to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider 
necessary; 
(ii)  To initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action 
as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons; 
(iii)  To take such further action as it may think fit; 
227 
 
Approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such 
directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary; 
Recommend to the concerned Government or authority at any stage of the 
inquiry for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the victim or the 
members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; 
Subject to the provisions of clause (e), provide a copy of the inquiry 
report to the petitioner or his representative; 
the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its 
recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned 
Government or authority shall, within a period of one month, or such further 
time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, 
including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission; 
the Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the 
comments of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the action 
taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority on the 
recommendations of the Commission. 
7.6.17. Procedure with respect to armed forces 
(1)     Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, while dealing with 
complaints of violation of human rights by members of the armed forces, the 
Commission shall adopt the following procedure, namely :- 
(a)     It may, either on its own motion or on receipt of a petition, seek a 
report from the Central Government; after the receipt of the report, it may, either 
not proceed with the complaint or, as the case may be, make its 
recommendations to that Government. 
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The Central Government shall inform the Commission of the action taken 
on the recommendations within three months or such further time as the 
Commission may allow. 
The Commission shall publish its report together with its 
recommendations made to the Central Government and the action taken by that 
Government on such recommendations. 
The Commission shall provide a copy of the report published under sub-
section (3) to the petitioner or his representative. 
7.6.18. Annual and special reports of the Commission 
The Commission shall submit an annual report to the Central Government 
and to the State Government concerned and may at any time submit special 
reports on any matter which, in its opinion, is of such urgency or importance that 
it should not be deferred till submission of the annual report. 
 The Central Government and the State Government, as the case 
may be, shall cause the annual and special reports of the Commission to be laid 
before each House of Parliament or the State Legislature respectively, as the case 
may be, along with a memorandum of action taken or proposed to be taken on 
the recommendations of the Commission and the reasons for non-acceptance of 
the recommendations, if any. 
7.7. A.  State Human Rights Commission. 
Since India is a vast country and it will not be possible for the affected to 
move National Human Rights Commission at Delhi without considerable 
amount of time and money. State Human Rights Commissions are being set up 
all over India to supplement the efforts of National Human Rights Commission. 
The Protection of Human Rights Act,1993 envisages the setting up of the State 
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Human Rights Commissions because, being nearer to the people of the 
respective states, they should be able to provide speedier and less expensive 
redressal of grievances. The national Human Rights Commission, for its part, 
has therefore been urging the early establishment of State Human Rights 
Commissions in all the states. Successive Chairpersons have, accordingly, both 
written to and spoken with the Chief Ministers of states impressing on them the 
need to setup Human Rights Commissions. On 1st  August 2009. The position 
was follows.31 
State Human Rights Commissions had been established in 18(Eighteen) 
states. The National Human Rights Commission meanwhile has continued to 
hold meetings with the chairpersons and members of existing state Human 
Rights Commissions with a view to developing healthy conventions in the 
functioning of various commissions and to ensure that, in their effort to promote 
human rights in the country, they work together smoothly and to the maximum 
benefit of all the people of this country. The National Human Rights 
Commission has observed once again, that it is disappointed with the slow pace 
of state governments acting to constitute State Human Rights Commissions. It 
has also noted that not all the State Human Rights Commissions that have been 
established are being appropriately supported through the provision of adequate 
financial and manpower resources. It strongly recommends, that those state 
governments, which have not yet constituted Human Rights Commission do so 
at the earliest and that, wherever such commissions have been constituted, they 
be provided the backing that is essential to their proper functioning. Thus, the 
momentum is picking up and National Human Rights Commission is lending its 
full support to the process. 
                                              
31  www.nhrc.nic.in 
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7.7. B.  Human Rights Courts 
Human Rights courts are being set up all over India. To associate public 
and Non Governmental Organisations in the process of verifying allegations of 
violations, District Level Enquiry Committee are being set up. National Human 
Rights Commission is the first step to translate Human Rights rhetoric into 
tangible action. India has truly joined the advanced nations in implementing 
human rights in letter and spirit. In a country of continental dimensions with 
great diversity of language, traditions, customs and practices, it will be 
unrealistic to expect overnight change in attitudes congenial to the enjoyment of 
human rights. 
7.8. Structure of State Human Rights Commission32 
7.8.1. Constitution of State Human Rights Commissions 
(1) A State Government may constitute a body to be known as the ………(Name 
of the State) Human Rights Commission to exercise the powers conferred upon, 
and to perform the functions assigned to, a State Commission under this chapter. 
(2) The State Commission shall, with effect from such date as the State 
Government may by notification specify, consist of— 
A Chairperson who has been a Chief Justice of a High Court; 
One Member who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court or District 
Judge in the State with a minimum of seven years experience as District Judge; 
One Member to be appointed from amongst persons having knowledge 
of, or practical experience in, matters relating to human rights. 
                                              
32  The Protection of Human Rights Act. 1993. 
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There shall be a Secretary who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the 
State Commission and shall exercise such powers and discharge such functions 
of the State Commission as it may delegate to him. 
The headquarters of the State Commission shall be at such place as the 
State Government may, by notification, specify. 
A State Commission may inquire into violation of human rights only in 
respect of matters relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List II and List III 
in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution: 
Provided that if any such matter is already being inquired into by the 
Commission or any other Commission duly constituted under any law for the 
time being in force, the State Commission shall not inquire into the said matter: 
Provided further that in relation to the Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights 
Commission, this sub-section shall have effect as if for the words and figures 
“List II and List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution”, the words and 
figures “List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as applicable to the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir and in respect of matters in relation to which the 
Legislature of that State has power to make laws” had been substituted. 
(6) Two or more State Governments may, with the consent of a 
Chairperson or Member of a State Commission, appoint such Chairperson or, as 
the case may be, such Member of another State Commission simultaneously if 
such Chairperson or Member consents to such appointment: 
Provided that every appointment made under this sub-section shall be 
made after obtaining the recommendations of the Committee referred to in sub-
section(1) of section 22 in respect of the State for which a common Chairperson 
or Member, or both, as the case may be, is to be appointed. 
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7.8.2. Appointment of Chairperson and Members of State 
Commission 
(1) The Chairperson and [Members]2 shall be appointed by the Governor 
by warrant under his hand and seal: 
Provided that every appointment under this sub-section shall be made 
after obtaining the recommendation of a Committee consisting of 
the Chief Minister — Chairperson 
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly — Member 
Minister in-charge of the Department of Home, in that State — Member 
Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly — Member 
Provided further that where there is a Legislative Council in a State, the 
Chairman of that Council and the Leader of the Opposition in that Council shall 
also be members of the Committee. 
Provided also that no sitting Judge of a High Court or a sitting District 
Judge shall be appointed except after consultation with the Chief Justice of the 
High Court of the concerned State. 
(2) No appointment of a Chairperson or a Member of the State 
Commission shall be invalid merely by reason of [any vacancy of any Member 
in the Committee referred to in sub-section (1) 
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7.8.3. Resignation and Removal of Chairperson or a Member of the 
State Commission 
(1) The Chairperson or a Member of a State Commission may, by notice 
in writing under his hand addressed to the Governor, resign his office 
(1A) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the Chairperson or any 
Member of the State Commission shall only be removed from his office by order 
of the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the 
Supreme Court, on a reference being made to it by the President, has, on inquiry 
held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that behalf by the Supreme 
Court, reported that the Chairperson or such Member, as the case may be, ought 
on any such ground to be removed. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1A), the President may by 
order remove from office the Chairperson or any [Member]4 if the Chairperson 
or such [Member]5, as the case may be – 
(a)     is adjudged an insolvent; or  
Engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the 
duties of his office; or 
is unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or 
is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or 
is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which in the 
opinion of the President involves moral turpitude. 
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7.8.4. Term of office of Chairperson and Members of the State 
Commission 
A person appointed as Chairperson shall hold office for a term of five 
years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age 
of seventy years, whichever is earlier; 
A person appointed as a Member shall hold office for a term of five years 
from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall be eligible for re-
appointment for another term of five years; 
Provided that no Member shall hold office after he has attained the age of 
seventy years. 
(3) On ceasing to hold office, a Chairperson or a Member shall be 
ineligible for further employment under the Government of a State or under 
the Government of India. 
7.8.5. Member to act as Chairperson or to discharge his functions 
in certain circumstances 
(1) In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of the 
Chairperson by reason of his death, resignation or otherwise, the Governor may, 
by notification, authorise one of the Members to act as the Chairperson until the 
appointment of a new Chairperson to fill such vacancy. 
(2) When the Chairperson is unable to discharge his functions owing to 
absence on leave or otherwise, such one of the Members as the Governor may, 
by notification, authorise in this behalf, shall discharge the functions of the 
Chairperson until the date on which the Chairperson resumes his duties. 
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7.8.6. Terms and conditions of service of Chairperson and 
Members of the State Commissions 
 The salaries and allowances payable to, and other terms and conditions of 
service of, the Chairperson and Members shall be such as may be prescribed by 
the State Government; 
Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other terms and 
conditions of service of the Chairperson or a Member shall be varied to his 
disadvantage after his appointment. 
7.8.7. Officers and other staff of the State Commission 
(1) The State Government shall make available to the Commission 
An officer not below the rank of a Secretary to the State Government who 
shall be the Secretary of the State Commission; and 
Such police and investigative staff under an officer not below the rank of 
an Inspector General of Police and such other officers and staff as may be 
necessary for the efficient performance of the functions of the State 
Commission. 
Subject to such rules as may be made by the State Government in this 
behalf, the State Commission may appoint such other addministrative, technical 
and scientific staff as it may consider necessary. 
The salaries, allowances and conditions of service of the officers and 
other staff appointed under sub-section (2) shall be such as may be prescribed by 
the State Government. 
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7.8.8. Annual and special reports of State Commission 
The State Commission shall submit an annual report to the State 
Government and may at any time submit special reports on any matter which, in 
its opinion, is of such urgency or importance that it should not be deferred till 
submission of the annual report. 
The State Government shall cause the annual and special reports of the 
State Commission to be laid before each House of State Legislature where it 
consists of two Houses, or where such Legislature consists of one House, before 
that House along with a memorandum of action taken or proposed to be taken on 
the recommendations of the State Commission and the reasons for non-
acceptance of the recommendations, if any. 
7.8.9. Application of certain provisions relating to National 
Human Rights Commission to State Commissions 
The provisions of sections 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 shall apply 
to a State Commission and shall have effect, subject to the following 
modifications, namely:- 
(a)     References to “Commission” shall be construed as references to 
“State Commission”; 
in section 10, in  sub-section (3), for the word “Secretary General”, the 
word “Secretary” shall be substituted; 
in section 12, clause (f) shall be omitted; 
in section 17, in clause (i), the words “Central Government or any” shall 
be omitted; 
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7.8.10. Finance, Account and Audit  
For the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences arising out of 
violation of human rights, the State Government may, with the concurrence 
of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification, specify for each 
district a Court of Session to be a Human Rights Court to try the said 
offences. 
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply if 
a Court of Session is already specified as a special court; or 
a special court is already constituted, for such offences under any other 
law for the time being in force. 
7.8.11. Special Public Prosecutor 
For every Human Rights Court, the State Government shall, by 
notification, specify a Public Prosecutor or appoint an advocate who has been in 
practice as an advocate for not less than seven years, as a Special Public 
Prosecutor for the purpose of conducting cases in that Court. 
7.8.12. Grants by the Central Government 
The Central Government shall after due appropriation made by 
Parliament by law in this behalf, pay to the Commission by way of grants such 
sums of money as the Central Government may think fit for being utilised for the 
purposes of this Act. 
The Commission may spend such sums as it thinks fit for performing the 
functions under this Act, and such sums shall be treated as expenditure payable 
out of the grants referred to in sub-section (1). 
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7.8.13. Grants by the State Government 
The State Government shall, after due appropriation made by Legislature 
by law in this behalf, pay to the State Commission by way of grants such sums 
of money as the State Government may think fit for being utilised for the 
purposes of this Act. 
The State Commission may spend such sums as it thinks fit for 
performing the functions under Chapter V, and such sums shall be treated as 
expenditure payable out of the grants referred to in sub-section (1). 
7.8.14. Accounts and Audit 
The Commission shall maintain proper accounts and other relevant 
records and prepare an annual statement of accounts in such form as may be 
prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General of India. 
The Accounts of the Commission shall be audited by the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General at such intervals as may be specified by him and any 
expenditure incurred in connection with such audit shall be payable by the 
Commission to the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
The Comptroller and Auditor-General or any person appointed by him in 
connection with the audit of the accounts of the Commision under this Act shall 
have the same rights and privileges and the authority in connection with such 
audit as the Comptroller and Auditor-General generally has in connection with 
the audit of Government accounts and, in particular, shall have the right to 
demand the production of books, accounts, connected vouchers and other 
documents and papers and to inspect any of the offices of the Commission. 
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The accounts of the Commission as certified by the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General or any other person appointed by him in this behalf, together 
with the audit report thereon shall be forwarded annually to the Central 
Government by the Commission and the Central Government shall cause the 
audit report to be laid as soon as may be after it is received before each House of 
Parliament. 
7.8.15. Accounts and Audit of State Commission 
The State Commission shall maintain proper accounts and other relevant 
records and prepare an annual statement of accounts in such form as may be 
prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General of India. 
The accounts of the State Commission shall be audited by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General at such intervals as may be specified by him 
and any expenditure incurred in connection with such audit shall be payable by 
the State Commission to the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
The Comptroller and Auditor-General or any person appointed by him in 
connection with the audit of the accounts of the State Commission under this Act 
shall have the same rights and privileges and the authority in connection with 
such audit as the Comptroller and Auditor-General generally has in connection 
with the audit of Government accounts and, in particular, shall have the right to 
demand the production of books, accounts, connected vouchers and other 
documents and papers and to inspect any of the offices of the State Commission. 
The accounts of the State Commission, as certified by the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General or any other person appointed by him in this behalf, 
together with the audit report thereon, shall be forwarded annually to the State 
Government by the State Commission and the State Government shall cause the 
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audit report to be laid, as soon as may be after it is received, before the State 
Legislature. 
7.9. Miscellaneous  
The Commission shall not inquire into any matter which is pending 
before a State Commission or any other Commission duly constituted under any 
law for the time being in force. 
The Commission or the State Commission shall not inquire into any 
matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting 
violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed. 
7.9.1. Constitution of special investigation teams 
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in 
force, where the Government considers it necessary so to do, it may constitute 
one or more special investigation teams, consisting of such police officers as it 
thinks necessary for purposes of investigation and prosecution of offences 
arising out of violations of human rights. 
7.9.2. Protection of action taken in good faith 
No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central 
Government, State Government, Commission, the State Commission or any 
Member thereof or any person acting under the direction either of the Central 
Government, State Government, Commission or the State Commission in respect 
of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of 
this Act or of any rules or any order made thereunder or in respect of the 
publication by or under the authority of the Central Government, State 
Government, Commission or the State Commission of any report paper or 
proceedings. 
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7.9.3. Members and officers to be public servants 
Every Member of the Commission, State Commission and every officer 
appointed or authorised by the Commission or the State Commission to exercise 
functions under this Act shall be deemed to be a public servant within the 
meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 
7.9.4. Power of Central Government to make rules 
(1) The Central Government may, by notification, make rules to 
carry out the provisions of this Act. 
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following 
matters namely :- 
 
(a)     the salaries and allowances and other terms and conditions of 
service of the [Chairperson and Members]1 under section 8; 
the conditions subject to which other administrative, technical and 
scientific staff may be appointed by the Commission and the salaries and 
allowances of officers and other staff under subsection (3) of section 11; 
any other power of a civil court required to be prescribed under clause (f) 
of sub-section (1) of section 13; 
the form in which the annual statement of accounts is to be prepared by 
the Commission under sub-section (1 ) of section 34; and 
any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed. 
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(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be 
after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, 
for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session 
or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session 
immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both 
Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree 
that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only 
in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so however, 
that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the 
validity of anything previously done under that rule. 
 
Power to make rules retrospectively — 
The power to make rules under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 40 
shall include the power to make such rules or any of them retrospectively from a 
date not earlier than the date on which this Act received the assent of the 
President, but no such retrospective effect shall be given to any such rule so as to 
prejudicially affect the interests of any person to whom such rule may be 
applicable. 
7.9.5. Power of Commission to make Regulations 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, 
the Commission may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, by 
notification, make regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act. 
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the following 
matters,namely:- 
243 
 
  (a) the procedure to be followed by the Commission under sub- 
section (2) of Section 10; 
the   returns   and   statistics   to   be   furnished   by   the   State 
Commission; 
any other matter which has to be, or may be, specified by regulations. 
(3) Every regulation made by the Commission under this Act shall 
be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, 
while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised 
in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the 
expiry of the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree 
in making any modification in the regulations or both Houses agree that 
the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall thereafter have effect 
only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so 
however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice 
to the validity of anything previously done under that regulation.] 
Inserted by Act 43 of 2006 Inserted by Act 43 of 2006 
7.9.6. Power of State Government to make rules 
The State Government may, by notification, make rules to carry out the 
provisions of this Act. 
In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing 
power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely : 
the salaries and allowances and other terms and conditions of service of 
the Chairperson and   Members under section 26; 
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the conditions subject to which other administrative, technical and 
scientific staff may be appointed by the State Commission and the salaries and 
allowances of officers and other staff under sub-section (3) of section 27; 
the form in which the annual statement of accounts is to be prepared 
under sub-section (1) of section 35. 
(3) Every rule made by the State Government under this section shall 
be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of the State 
Legislature where it consists of two Houses, or where such Legislature 
consists of one House, before that House. 
7.9.7. Power to remove difficulties 
(1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this 
Act, the Central Government, may by order published in the Official 
Gazette, make such provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Act as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty. 
Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of the period of 
two years from the date of commencement of this Act. 
(2) Every order made under this section shall, as soon as may be 
after it is made, be laid before each house of Parliament. 
7.9.8. Repeal and Savings 
The Protection of Human Rights Ordinance, 1993 is hereby repealed. 
Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the 
said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the 
corresponding provisions of this Act. 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
After establishment of the NHRC came into being, it has focused, to a fair extent, 
on violation of human rights by the organs of the Government, the police, the Para-
military forces and the others. It has a more exacting task ahead. That is the task of 
redressing societal wrongs which are more deep-seated. The backward communities, 
together with other deprived sections of the society like women, children and the 
minorities, must be enabled to reap the rewards of independence which was ushered in 
more than five and half decades ago. They must be provided all help in their bid to 
eliminate every type of discrimination. This is possible only in a non-caste, non-
hierarchical society. Basically the weaker section's struggle is a struggle for human 
rights, human dignity. If they succeed in their struggle, as they must, it will prove a 
blessing for entire nation not merely any group or community. The dominating section of 
our people must, therefore, adopt a strong position against caste hierarchy, communalism, 
anti-minorities, gender prejudice which are the major sources of societal human rights 
violations.  
Current researcher has chosen two states to analyze the protection and promotional 
activity of state human right commissions, they are Rajasthan and Gujarat. 
 
8.2 Brief History of State Human Right Commission 
 8.2.A. Rajasthan 
 
 1. The Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission is one of the leading State 
Commissions in the country. In a short span of three years it has achieved many 
milestones in its mission for the protection and promotion of Human Rights. 
2. The State Government of Rajasthan issued a Notification on January 18, 1999 
for the constitution of the State Commission having one full time Chairperson and 4 
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Members in accordance with the provisions of The Protection of Human Rights Act, 
1993. The Commission was fully constituted by appointment of the Chairperson along 
with the Members and became functional from March 2000. 
3. At present the State Commission is fully functional. The particulars of the 
Honorable Chairperson and Honorable Members are as follows: 
Honorable Chairperson, Justice N. K. Jain 
Honorable Member, Justice Jagat Singh 
Honorable Member, Shri D.S.Meena 
Honorable Member, Shri Pukhraj Seervi 
Secretary,   Shri Giri Raj Singh 
Inspector General of Police, Shri Sunil Mehrotra 
 
8.2.B. Gujarat 
 On 16th March, 2002 3 Judges of Gujarat high court were member of 
Human Right committee which was established by Gujarat High court’s legal 
service committee. This committee was working for cases which violate the 
Human rights. On 12th July, 2006 Home ministry of State Government has issued 
a notification to establish State Human right commission at state capital.  
 Under section 22 of Human rights Protection Act 1993, State government 
has appointed official of State Human right commission.  
 Honorable Rt. Chief Justice Shree Dayasharn Shinha was appointed 
Chairperson for State Human right commission. Gujarat State Human Right 
commission is working with following officials. 
Honorable Chairperson Justice Dayasharn Shina 
Secretary, Shri  Dr. R. L. Meena 
Additional D.G.P. Shri Chittrajan Singh 
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8.3 Promotional and Protection activities of RSHRC 
 
 As a leading state commission of India, RSHRC has done remarkable 
activities for protection and promotional for Human rights. During first two year 
they have received 1039 cases in against violation of Human Rights. After 5 years 
of promotional and protection activities they have received 3977 cases for Human 
Rights. RSHRC is on the top of National level score card with total 51 points1,2. 
 The Rajasthan has 32 districts in the states. The District wise lists of 
applications are as below: 
District 2000-02 2007-08 
Ajmer 41 195 
Alwar 34 128 
Bara 16 81 
Baswada 11 40 
Badmer 14 110 
Bharatpur 80 176 
Bhilwada 22 139 
Bikaner 23 92 
Bundi 21 88 
Chitodgarh 33 183 
Churu 14 52 
Dausa 33 112 
Dholpur 30 107 
Dungarpur 5 26 
Hanumangadh 15 76 
                                                            
1 Government of India, compilation of State reports on 20 point program for the year 2007‐08. 
2 The Gujarat State human rights commission Second annual report 2007‐08. 
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Shreeganganagar 41 102 
Jaipur3 173 727 
Jesalmer 4 22 
Jalor 9 62 
Jhalawad 16 159 
JhunZunu 31 86 
Jodhpur 42 115 
Karooli 39 103 
Kota 50 139 
Nagor 34 127 
Pali 47 140 
Rajsamnd 8 53 
Savai madhopur 31 99 
Sikar 33 146 
Sirohi 23 57 
Tonk 33 97 
Udaypur 30 120 
Extra 3 18 
Total 1039 3977 
 Here we can see that in starting period of SHRC the maximum cases were 
listed in Jaipur (173) and minimum cases were listed in Dungarpur (5). During 
2007-08 SHRC has noted more then 3500 cases in against violation of Human 
Rights.  Below Graph 1 shows the progress activity of RSHRC. 
 National Human rights commission has divided subject-wise classification 
of incidence. Rajasthan State Human Rights commission has also worked 
                                                            
3 State capital 
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remarkable of these activities for promotion and protection. Graph 2 shows 
activities of Subject wise activity of RSHRC. 
Subject 2000-2002 2007-08 
Child 25 36 
Health 58 34 
Jail 135 57 
Crime 48 26 
Labour 10 6 
Backward 38 39 
Police 1039 1121 
polution 25 14 
religoin 70 27 
female related 160 191 
Extra 2955 331 
non-acceptable 0 2095 
Total 4563 3977 
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Graph 1. RSHRC activity during 2000-2002 and 2007-2008. 
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Graph 2: Subject wise activity of RSHRC. 
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8.4 Promotional and Protection activities of GSHRC 
 One of the leading state commission of India, GSHRC has done remarkable 
activities for protection and promotional for Human Rights. During first year they have 
received 610 cases in against violation of Human Rights. After year of promotional and 
protection activities they have received 1420 cases for Human Rights.  
 Gujarat has 26 districts is the states. Below is the list of application received at 
GSHRC. 
District 2006-07 2007-08 
Ahmedabad 103 378 
Amreli 26 35 
Anand 25 43 
Banaskatha 26 61 
Bharuch 9 38 
Bhavnagar 22 50 
Dahod 17 29 
Dang 3 3 
Gandhinagar4 24 98 
Jamnagar 28 46 
Junagadh 16 36 
Khchchh-Bhuj 16 27 
Kheda 30 54 
Mehsana 25 41 
Narmada 60 41 
Navsari 3 13 
Panchmahal 11 47 
Patan 23 51 
Porbandar 2 4 
Rajkot 24 57 
Sabarkantha 24 67 
Surat 21 68 
Surendranagar 28 32 
Tapi5 0 2 
Vadodara 23 72 
Valsad 3 9 
Extra 18 18 
Total 610 1420 
                                                            
4 State capital 
5 District formatted from Bharuch during 2007‐2008. 
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Graph 3 GSHRC activity during 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. 
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 Here we can see that in starting period of SHRC the maximum cases were listed in 
Ahmedabad (103) district and minimum cases were listed in porbandar (2) district. 
During 2007-08 SHRC has noted more then 1400 cases in against violation of Human 
Rights.  Above Graph 3 shows the progress activity of GSHRC. 
 National Human rights commission has divided subject-wise classification of 
incidence. Gujarat State Human Rights commission is working on these activities for 
promotion and protection. Graph 4 shows activities of Subject wise activity of GSHRC. 
 
Subject 2006-07 2007-08 
Child 4 8 
Health 5 2 
Jail 10 11 
Crime 25 65 
Labour 10 12 
Sc/st 36 37 
Police 163 394 
Polution 10 16 
Religoin 7 6 
Female related 50 117 
Extra 290 752 
Total 610 1420 
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Graph 4 Subject wise activity of GHRSC. 
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8.5 Percentage wise activity of Rajasthan and Gujarat State human rights 
commission 
 
 During 2007-08 Rajasthan and Gujarat both state has received 3977 and 2030 
respectivly. Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission has solved 3404 while Gujarat 
State Human Rights Commission has solved 1479 cases. Other cases are pending due to 
procedure or any other problem.  
 
 As per National Human Rights commission Rajasthan and Gujarat has nack to 
nack compition for national 20 point compition. Rajasthan is the oldest Human Rights 
Commission and Gujarat Human rights commission was established in 2006 then also 
Gujarat is 3rd6,7 ranked in national 20 point compition.  
 Below chat and Graphs shows the data for percentage wise activity of Both the 
states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Government of India, compilation of State Reports on 20 Points programme for the year 2007‐08. 
7 Gujarat State Human Rights commission second Annual report 2007‐2008 
8 Graph 5 percentage wise activity of Rajasthan State Human Right Commission 
9 Graph 6 percentage wise activity of Gujarat State Human Right Commission 
Rajasthan8 Gujarat9 
Total application 3977 2030 
Total disposal 3404 1479 
Total pending 573 551 
258 
 
 
 
Graph 5 percentage wise activity of Rajasthan State Human Right Commission 
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Graph 6 percentage wise activity of Gujarat State Human Right Commission 
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CONCULSION AND SUGESSTIONS 
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9.1  Conclusion  
The National Human Rights Commission is a premier Authority dedicated towards 
protection of human rights in a country, which has a varied culture, stratified society and 
numerous problems overlooking them. The National Commission has dined note worthy 
service in protecting human rights which lacks human rights culture. The majority of our 
people especially those who are staying in rural areas are still not aware of their rights 
even after independence of more than Sixty-three years. A country which has shown 
great tolerance towards administrative irregularities not knowing whether for their 
inherent nature, high rate of illiteracy, poverty or any other cause or combination of it, 
needs such as an institution as National and State Human Rights Commissions which are 
dedicated completely towards protection of human rights. The independent and 
autonomous nature of the Human Rights Commission is the most important aspect to 
build confidence in the people towards impartial working.  
There was wide spread importance as well as misgivings about the usefulness of 
the National Human Rights Commission established by the Government of India in 1993. 
Several intellectuals, Non Governmental Organisations and the print media and among 
others were sceptical that a Government appointed National Commission would be able 
to uphold human rights in the face of violation of the rights by the state agencies. It was 
thought that human rights and establishment were mutually hostile. At the root of the 
apprehension was the mindset that human rights violations in India were only at the 
hands of the state agencies. In other words the societal dimension was overlooked. In an 
article published in a daily in March 2003, Munthanga incident in Kerala clearly narrates 
societal violation of human rights and the cause of the Dalits especially Adivasis, 
Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe and women which the human right activists believe 
that it should be at the top of agenda of the National Human Rights Commission. 'The 
National Commission seems to have been given a vast area to work with insufficient 
force to do justice to their assigned job. The large number of pending cases before the 
National Human rights Commission is the evidence towards it. The slowly up of the State 
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Human Rights Commissions, Human Rights Cells, Human Rights Courts and district 
level Commissions throughout the country will certainly help the National Human Rights 
Commission. 
The State Human Rights Commission as per the statute does not have direct power 
to award compensation. But this does not render the State Commission look like entire 
like a demon without teeth, due to the compensatory jurisprudence adopted by the 
Commission. The State Human Rights Commission orders for awarding compensation to 
the State Governments, which is to be recovered from the officer or personnel who has 
caused the violation. This Jurisprudence has been applied in many of the custodial death 
cases. The State Human Rights Commission's opposition for laws which largely affect 
the rights of people, has a two faced aspect; the POTA Act, which against terrorism and 
for the security of the nation and the on other hand probability of abusing the discretions 
power granted to administrative organ. Both the Government and the National Human 
Rights Commission seem to in a fix. This is evident from the words of former Chairman 
of the National Human Rights Commission who says ”undoubtedly national security is 
paramount importance, without protection the safety and security of the nation, 
individual rights cannot be protected”. However, the worth of the nation is the worth of 
the individuals constituting it. Art 21 is nonderogable. Both national security and 
individual rights are core values in the Constitution.  
We must recognize that the worst forms of human rights violations and 
infringement of liberties are caused by the inception of Varnavyasta or the caste system 
directly or indirectly, and by communal riots. Present day India wants to rectify these 
grave errors, the National Human Rights Commission calls them ancient wrongs. In this 
condition it is important that men and women of goodwill are brought together to give 
active thought to the errors with a view to rectifying them. 'This coming together 
overcomes sense of isolation and indulgence in speculation on private perceptions it 
generates. Public discussion is the most important method to promote this coming 
together. Moreover it is the task of National and State Human Rights Commission to act 
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in co-operation with enlightened social activists and Non-Governmental Organisations as 
philosopher guide in helping the people to help themselves with a view to creating a new 
man and women and a new society where the values of human rights and freedoms and 
human dignity are respected.  
State and National Human Rights Commission has a special and inescapable 
responsibility to protect those who are the most vulnerable, Dalits and scheduled castes, 
tribes; women and children especially girl child; the disabled; those victimized for 
reasons of religion or language; and those weighed down by economic and social 
tradition or ironically marginalized by growth and change. The State Human Rights 
Commission in its annual report mentions that the scales of justice and equity may be 
evenly balanced for them so that some may cease to be less equal than others. The State 
Commission has made another significant observation with regard to child labour; almost 
the entire child labour force belongs to the marginalized sections like SC/Sts and the 
minority. The State Commission has constantly argued that the most potent way of 
dealing with the question of child labour would be through the provision of free and 
compulsory education as required by Article 45 of the Constitution. The right to 
education if fulfilled would be itself be the strongest weapon in the battle to end child 
labour. The greatest tragedy and the entire mole greater because a wholly avoidable one 
that has befallen on the country is the non-implementation of the programme of universal 
basic education and not putting this social welfare programme first on the list of 
priorities. Moreover when we talk about illiteracy, it is understood that the entire illiterate 
section of our population belongs to SC/STs and Muslims and Women. If we want to 
stand them up the first thing is to give them basic education and it is the fundamental 
duty of the state to provide basic education to all children.  
The condition of girl child, relating to human right violations has been determined 
by our religions and their approach to women in, general. Social injustice in our society is 
a product of the given social structure of our country including the age-old taboos. 
According to religious traditions women are required to find their fulfillment in 
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motherhood and domestically. Their duty is to render their service to the husband, his 
family and to the children. Our intellectuals both ancient and modern have fabricated 
many fables about the exalted position of women in our society portraying them as 
goddesses. The depressing position of the girl child is to be viewed in the light of the 
place a woman occupies in our society. It is hoped that the National Human Rights 
Commission will pursue with greater vigor than hither to the societal aspects of 
protection and promotion of human rights.  
 
9.2  Suggestions for Future of Human Rights 
9.2.1 Global View 
Let us now consider future of human rights and suggestions. To sum up, we have 
argued that concern for human rights in modern times has been a product of a certain 
stage of social, economic and cultural development. Most of the countries do act as yet 
have infrastructure which become the natural carrier of democratization tolerant attitudes  
and civic culture. Moreover, violations and threat to violation of human rights in the 
world emanated from various factors; external military interventions like recently in 
Afghanistan and Iraq; nuclear arms race, and extremely inequitable international 
economic order, denial of the right of the national self determination, endemic and deep 
rooted social ethnic religious discords, rampant poverty, lack of educational facilities to 
millions of young, the protection of civil liberties could become meaningful only when 
the basic necessities for existence are made available to the majority of people.  
The need of the hour is to devise a rational approach to the promotion of human 
rights in the countries of developing economies. International institution and agencies 
concerned, human rights should devote their energy and resources for the creation of 
objective helpful and positive international environment which could accelerate the 
process of development in the developing countries.  
Violation of human rights is a global phenomenon. The difference is only degree. 
Where the people, like India, in majority are illiterate, ignorant, poor and exploited ones, 
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the violation of human rights are bound to be mere but where the people are educated, 
advance they are likely to be less prone to inhuman treatment and exploitations. India 
being a vast country, with greater part of masses being poor, ignorant and illiterate they 
are bound to suffer more atrocities and inhuman treatment at the hands of richer ones or 
the governmental agencies. To make the human rights really meaningful to the society 
and check violation of human rights, the judiciary has made their task easy by evolving 
the concept of social action litigation. The proper implementations of the human rights 
also need the full cooperation of the Government and the Government agencies. The 
government is required to be more responsive to the public opinion regarding inhuman or 
repressive laws in force. Such laws should be repealed of confined to states, which need 
them most.  
It has further to look into the grievances of respectable nations or individuals. It is 
suggested that cases of violation of human rights, if reported, to these authorities, then 
certainly stern action should be taken against the deflators. It is further suggested that 
human right commissions should be established in all countries and independent and 
impartial jurists and personalities should made members of the commission. All 
organizations mainly dealing with human rights should also be considered and their 
opinions should be given complete weight unless there are otherwise reasons for 
disbelieving the same. 
Like-wise national, civil and criminal courts, including the Apex Court of a 
particular nation, International Criminal Court of justice, should be established to try the 
cases of violation international rights at the international level and it should have also an  
authority to punish the defaulter states and defaulter individuals concerned. This court 
must look after their interests not only of the various states or nations but also of various 
groups or individuals or particular community by or group of communities within its 
jurisdiction.  
Terrorism at international level should be sternly dealt with. All terrorists should 
be punished. Terrorism is not only a national or an international problem. All nations 
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have internal problem of terrorism this way or that way and there is an external dispute 
among several nations in present day to day life, causing terrorism to each other. 
Terrorism has not been dealt with and rooted out so far. In the last couple of years 
especially after entering the new millennium it has been seen that it is gaining grounds. It 
has to be rooted out at all levels.  
It is correct to say that there should be equality among all but it is also essential to 
maintain the equality and to abolish discrimination. It is illiterate or religious minorities 
or linguistics, should be protected with special, care for bringing them up to the level of 
society at present. International authorities or various national authorities must keep only 
one thing in mind and that is the protection of human rights and in case of violation, its 
redressal. Various medical authorities, police and military authorities, scientific 
authorities, economic, industrial and social authorities, historical and religious authorities 
shall also be asked to cater their services for the protection of human rights and welfare 
of the individuals or communities. 
 
9.2.2  Indian View 
The position of India is not very much different from the international scenario. 
The violation of human rights in India is also a natural phenomenon as we had faced in 
ancient period; there were ideal conditions for human rights. The violations of human 
rights were never heard of. Gradually, by the passage of time, by various foreign 
invasions, by intermingling societies, by misuse of official positions, by various 
authorities, by plunder of foreign rulers, dictatorial attribute of various kings and rulers 
the earlier good condition of living had changed. Atrocities by the foreign rulers on the 
masses in India, denial of right of self determination, social religious order and 
development denial to industrial growth and development, sticking only to traditions 
without logic, non-adoption of scientific rules and regulations without compulsion, 
rampant poverty, lack of morality and discipline to society and individuals and lastly 
unwillingness of the ruling class or authorities for the enforcement and implementation of 
human rights in India, human rights violation took birth which are still major factors for 
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the violation of human rights. Other intermingling geographical discrepancies, regional 
and seasonal differences throughout in India and complete fusion among Muslims and 
caste conscious Hindus, welfaring Christians, benevolent Jains, Sikhs and Parais, etc, was 
an impossible concept. The factors also caused a fathomless ocean of differences between 
contending communities in India, causing various harms and violations to the field of 
human rights, which is beyond repairs. 
There may be other factors looking into the special circumstances of any particular 
case. Human rights without violation and even no Indian were having the knowledge 
regarding human rights before the commencement of any Constitution and particularly 
before the achievement of the independence. Now our independent Constitution of India 
has guaranteed to all equality, freedom, liberty and fraternity. Now, no governmental 
agency can easily violate the human rights. Although from 1950-90, the awareness and 
implementation of human rights was very slow, Indians were enjoying although full 
fledged freedoms but all those freedoms were not properly protected. Un-codified human 
rights or those rights, which were not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of India or 
any other law particularly for the enforcement of human rights, peoples were deprived of 
relief and human rights enforcement was impossible. After the commencement of the 
Constitution certain laws were enacted. All these laws were enacted mainly for the 
purpose of securing the protection of workers classes, Children Act, Juvenile Justice Act, 
and other laws for the protection of human rights of the ladies were also enacted. 
Government also protected the human rights of the minorities and other weaker sections 
of the society. Proper legislation in this regard has been enacted. A general relief was 
granted to all, by the protection of Human Rights Act. 1993 and by the creation of 
National Human Rights Commission and various other State Human Rights Commissions 
for the purpose of protection of human rights.  
These Commissions have the power to inquire suo-motu or on compliant of human 
rights violation by a public servant. Though the Commission has only recommendatory 
character yet it is a right step in the right direction of proper implementation of human 
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rights. Such Commissions are also required in each unit of administration to monitor the 
human rights violation from close angle. The National Human Rights Commission is 
playing a significant role in creating mass awareness and building mass opinion against 
the human rights violations in India. It has made visits to states and citizens in India and 
reported human rights violations there to the government of that state. It has taken the 
case for modifications to give it human face with the government. The case studies of the 
present study show that Indian Police and other forces have become unruly and turbulent. 
It carries an image of terror and torture. The violence by police seems to be 
institutionalized in the police set up without policing the police, it is impossible to expect 
protection and promotion of human rights. The police training should be re-oriented so as 
to generate the value of ethics and morality. Educated people may be recruited, who may 
not compromise with the primitive technique of torture. Apart from physical fitness, the 
mental health of the police should receive due consideration. Police must be ordered to 
maintain proper records of all persons held in detention, which should be accessible to 
all. No person should be detained without reasons, the place, time of detention, the 
identity of the relevant detaining officials and the law applied, being recorded. Place and 
cause of detention must be communicated to families and the lawyers who must also be 
allowed to access to the detente under the law. Those measures will not only eliminate 
the chances of violations of human rights by the police but also will add to its 
development so that every one should live with dignity and honor in our democratic legal 
system.  
The independent investigations of the National and State Human Rights 
Commission have clearly indicted thousands of police personnel and other para military 
forces. The National and State Human Rights Commission has brought several instances 
of human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Assam and other parts of the 
country. The National and State Human Rights Commission has proved to one of the best 
in the world. The National and State Human Rights Commission has still to play a major 
role in near future for maintaining the human rights field neat and clean. It has still 
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considerable part to play in maintaining peace, security and integrity of the nation. It has 
also ensure the full development of human personality not only by investigating only 
human rights violation but also suggesting that ways for redressal for those violations.  
These days terrorism is a great apprehension for the foundation of human rights in 
India. If terrorism is not checked and it is not rooted out then certainly it shall not root out 
democracy from India. There is a need to create awareness among the masses against the 
ill-effects of this evil of terrorism. The best way to watch out the terrorism is to do it by 
introducing human rights at all educational centers in the basic courses even up o school 
level, meaning thereby all children must be educated with regard to human rights. In this 
way the inculcation in children a sense of respect and regard for the basic rights of others 
and in due course, entire society shall be aware of human rights and shall also is able to 
implement them. It is also felt that the newspapers, televisions and other mass media 
should also educate the masses about the human rights, both human rights may be part 
and parcel of human life in India. All the terrorist affected states should request to their 
State Human Rights Commissions to thrash out the real cause behind the terrorism and 
suitable action should be taken in this regard.  
It is also a fact that at present the findings of the National Human Rights 
Commission and some State Human Rights Commissions are recommendations, which 
do not have any binding force at least the recommendations are at the discretion of the 
government. It may or may not be accepted. This position itself a violation of human 
rights of National Human Rights Commission and various other State Human Rights 
Commissions. Law should be amended to make the recommendations of the Human 
Rights Commission of the National and State Human Rights Commission at least 
obligatory, if not binding. All the States and Union Territories should be directed to 
constitute State Human Rights Commissions. All the State Human Rights Commissions 
should be independent from the control of the State Human Rights Commissions but both 
of them must run simultaneously. These shall, in no way, be rival to each other but the 
function in the State Human Rights Commission should be an additional guarantee other 
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than National Human Rights Commission for the protection of human rights to the 
individuals or growth of individuals or communities. The National and State Human 
Rights Commissions should constitute a body or authority under their on control at 
district level to monitor the human rights violation from a close range. Now, there is need 
to adopt a rational, national and political approach for the protection and promotion of 
human rights in India. All general agencies and non-governmental agencies should fell 
themselves morally and legally bound for the protection of human rights at all levels and 
to initiate actions against the defaulters. In India all the medical authorities, police and 
military authorities, scientific authorities, civil and political authorities, academic and 
industrial authorities, historical and religious authorities should feel themselves bound for 
the enforcement of human rights and redressal in case of violation of these rights. 
Protection of human rights is not the responsibility of an individual. It is the 
responsibility of the society for the protection of individuals. Time has come to rouse 
public opinion on the issue of human rights in order to ensure that concept of human 
rights prevails and the existing constitutional and legal safeguards are sincerely enforced. 
The some of the suggestions for improvement of human rights in India are; 
1. Human rights unions should be strengthened throughout the country. 
2. Advisory committees at the national and state level as well as at local level; be 
constituted to involve more people in the administration. 
3. Through the media of education people particularly illiterate and ignorant masses 
living in extreme rural areas should be made aware of the protection and promotion of 
human rights. 
4. It should be made obligatory on the part of the Member of Legislative Assembly's and 
Member of Parliaments that they must go to their respective constituencies before the 
beginning of the session, so that genuine problems of the people especially economically 
weaker sections of the society may be gathered and presented before Assembly and 
Parliament.  
5. Government must ensure that its law implementing agencies work sincerely. 
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6. Executive magistrates should not be given judicial powers because they act as tools of 
the government and police.  
7. Journalists have to be scrupulously honest and fair and act in a manner that a true 
democracy demands. It is therefore, a fact that Press Council of India should take suitable 
actions including penal actions against the press media whenever there is a gross 
distortion of facts reported against the new papers or magazines in the interest and 
promotion and protection of human rights of nation. 
8. If we wish that the democracy should survive in India and the Constitution of India 
may remain valid in perpetuity, the people of India must remain well informed about the 
administration of the state. Hence, the right to know should be given a statutory 
recognition.  
9. Like Election Commission of India the National and State Human Rights Commission 
should also be strengthened. 
10. To protect human rights, serious efforts be made to end poverty, reduce the existing 
wide gap between the poor and the rich and economic exploitation. 
11. Courts must take special care for human rights. Apex courts should monitor the 
working of subordinate court. Human rights courts must function at district, state and 
national level. Defaulters should be punished rigorously.  
12. Welfare of all individuals and the society should be the main concern. All efforts 
should be made to use all possible medical, police, military, scientific, civil and political, 
economic, industrial, historical and religious views and machinery equipments for the 
protection of human rights and these views and equipments should not be used 
inconsistent with the object of the human rights.  
13. Now we should create a good human rights climate. Human rights enforcement is not 
the responsibility of one individual or governmental agency alone. This is to be carried 
out with the assistance of all members of society and all governmental agencies and 
courts. 
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